United States v. Ayala , 446 F. App'x 78 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                        FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    September 27, 2011
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    No. 10-5167
    v.                                        (D.C. No. 4:09-CR-00138-CVE-9)
    (N.D. Okla.)
    ERLIN AYALA,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before MURPHY, ANDERSON, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
    Defendant Erlin Ayala appeals his conviction by a jury for possessing with
    intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing
    methamphetamine. He argues that the district court erred in denying his motion
    to suppress and that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.
    Exercising jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we AFFIRM.
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
    collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
    with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    B ACKGROUND
    In October 2009 the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
    learned that Ruben Garcia-Hernandez, a suspected drug trafficker, would be
    participating in a drug transaction. DEA agents and officers from the Tulsa
    Police Department began surveilling him. They saw him enter an apartment in
    Tulsa and exit carrying a paper bag. He then drove to a gas station, where he
    pulled up next to a white Scion bearing Arkansas plates driven by Defendant.
    Tulsa Officer Corbin Collins was watching the gas station. He observed
    Defendant exit the Scion, walk over to the passenger side of Garcia-Hernandez’s
    vehicle, and place something inside while Garcia-Hernandez stood between the
    two vehicles. Collins saw Defendant return to the passenger side of the Scion,
    but he could not see “exactly what he was doing.” R., Vol. 3, Jury Tr. Vol. 1 at
    27. Afterwards, Defendant got in the Scion, picked up a passenger who had
    earlier gone inside the station, and drove north.
    Tulsa Officer Anthony First followed the Scion in the light rain, and
    initiated a traffic stop when he observed the Scion make an unsafe lane change.
    He approached the car on the passenger side, where he noticed that the
    passenger-side window was partially down and that there was “a very strong,
    sweet odor coming from the car.” 
    Id.,
     Vol. 2, Mot. Hr’g at 9. Defendant was
    unable to produce a driver’s license or proof of insurance, and gave different
    versions of who owned the Scion.
    -2-
    Officer First returned to his patrol car, accompanied by Defendant, and
    began a computer-records check. To obtain the Scion’s vehicle identification
    number, First went back to the car, opened the driver’s side door, and examined
    the Nader sticker in the door jamb. While there, he asked the Scion’s passenger
    about the nature of his and Defendant’s visit to Tulsa. The passenger said that
    they were visiting a friend, but he could not remember the friend’s name. Back in
    the patrol car, Defendant told First that he was in Tulsa looking for work as a
    painter. Suspecting criminal activity, First summoned a canine unit for
    assistance.
    A few minutes later, Officer Daryl Johnson arrived with his canine partner,
    Max, and began a “free air search” around the Scion, starting at the front
    passenger-side headlight and moving counterclockwise around the vehicle. 
    Id. at 42
    . When he and Max arrived at the passenger-side door, “Max focused in on the
    lower edge or the lower seam of the door as well as the seat belt which was
    sticking outside of the [Scion].” 
    Id. at 43
    . Max did not alert, however, and they
    resumed circling the Scion. After several more loops around the car, Max “stood
    on his back two legs and stuck his nose up in the [driver’s side] window to the
    window area and looked to be focusing on something,” but then he became
    distracted by the traffic. 
    Id. at 44
    . The window had been fully open, and Max’s
    nose had gone “across the line of the window.” 
    Id. at 45
    . Max then proceeded
    clockwise, stopping 15 or 25 seconds later at the passenger-side door, where he
    -3-
    “focus[ed] on the window and then again on the seat belt” and “alerted to the odor
    of narcotics.” 
    Id. at 46
    .
    A search of the Scion uncovered almost $1,400 in cash, two cell phones (in
    addition to two found on Defendant), two bottles of cologne, and a brown paper
    bag on the floor behind the driver’s seat containing methamphetamine wrapped in
    cellophane. Defendant and his passenger were arrested and ultimately charged
    with possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture or
    substance containing methamphetamine.
    Defendant moved to suppress, alleging that Max “breached the interior of
    the vehicle during the sniff.” 
    Id.,
     Vol. 1 at 36. The district court denied the
    motion. It said that there was no evidence that the officers rolled down a
    window, and even if they did, Max alerted to the passenger-side seat belt, which
    was protruding through the closed door.
    At trial, DEA agents and Tulsa officers testified to their surveillance and
    search. Garcia-Hernandez, who had pleaded guilty, testified that at the gas
    station Defendant had removed from Garcia-Hernandez’s vehicle a paper bag
    containing methamphetamine and placed it in the Scion. In addition, in regard to
    the methamphetamine seized, DEA agent Michael Rupe testified that its purity
    (99.6%) and weight (446 grams) indicated a “distribution quantity,” rather than a
    “user quantity.” R., Vol. 3, Jury Tr. Vol. 1 at 124. He also testified that the DEA
    had intercepted calls from Defendant’s passenger to Garcia-Hernandez seeking
    -4-
    pure methamphetamine. And Rupe explained that drug traffickers typically use
    multiple cellphones to contact their customers.
    The jury found Defendant guilty, and the district court sentenced him to 60
    months’ imprisonment.
    D ISCUSSION
    M OTION TO S UPPRESS
    Defendant argues that Max’s alert to the methamphetamine was invalid and
    that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. In reviewing a
    district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, “we review legal conclusions
    de novo and findings of fact for clear error.” United States v. Smith, 
    606 F.3d 1270
    , 1275 (10th Cir. 2010). In conducting our review, we view “the evidence in
    the light most favorable to the government.” 
    Id.
    The Fourth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
    Amendment, protects “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.
    amend. IV. But “[a] canine sniff itself does not implicate Fourth Amendment
    rights because of the limited information it provides and its minimal
    intrusiveness.” United States v. Hunnicutt, 
    135 F.3d 1345
    , 1350 (10th Cir. 1998).
    A positive alert by a certified drug dog generally provides probable cause for
    officers to search a vehicle. See United States v. Parada, 
    577 F.3d 1275
    , 1282
    (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 
    130 S. Ct. 3321
     (2010). Officers may not,
    however, rely on a dog’s alert if they open part of the vehicle so the dog can enter
    -5-
    or if they encourage the dog to enter. See United States v. Winningham, 
    140 F.3d 1328
    , 1331 (10th Cir. 1998); cf. United States v. Stone, 
    866 F.2d 359
    , 364 (10th
    Cir. 1989) (reliance on alert was proper when dog’s entry into vehicle was
    instinctive). 1
    Defendant challenges Max’s intrusion with his nose into the Scion through
    the driver’s side window, arguing that the “window was rolled down, and the
    officers provided no explanation for the window being down.” Aplt. Br. at 21.
    He theorizes that he would not have rolled it down because it was raining and
    because Officer First spoke with the occupants from the passenger side. But the
    evidence offered at the suppression hearing suggests that the Scion’s occupants
    likely opened the window. According to Officer First, it was only “kind of rainy”
    or “drizzly.” R., Vol. 2, Mot. Hr’g at 7, 29. Further, when he approached the car
    after pulling it over, the passenger-side window was already partially down. And
    although First opened the driver’s side door to obtain the vehicle identification
    number, the Nader sticker was in the door jamb, so viewing it would not have
    required opening the window. Finally, Officer Johnson, who accompanied Max
    around the Scion, testified in detail about the free-air search but never mentioned
    opening the driver’s side window or doing anything to encourage Max to stick his
    nose through the window.
    1
    Although “[i]n exceptional cases, a dog alert might not give probable cause
    if the particular dog had a poor accuracy record,” Parada, 
    577 F.3d at 1281
    (internal quotation marks omitted), there is no dispute here as to Max’s accuracy.
    -6-
    We conclude that Defendant has not met his “burden of establishing a
    Fourth Amendment violation.” United States v. Chavira, 
    467 F.3d 1286
    , 1290
    (10th Cir. 2006).
    S UFFICIENCY OF THE E VIDENCE
    Defendant argues that the evidence at trial showed only that he possessed
    the methamphetamine found in the Scion, not that he intended to distribute it.
    “We review sufficiency of the evidence challenges de novo, viewing the evidence
    in the light most favorable to the government.” Parada, 
    577 F.3d at 1283
    . “We
    reverse only if no rational jury could have found each element of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id.
    “[W]e have repeatedly stated that possession of a large quantity of
    narcotics is sufficient to establish the element of intent to distribute.” United
    States v. Delreal-Ordones, 
    213 F.3d 1263
    , 1268 n.4 (10th Cir. 2000). And DEA
    Agent Rupe testified that the large amount and high purity of the
    methamphetamine in this case suggest intent to distribute, rather than mere
    possession. He further testified that multiple cellphones, such as the ones
    recovered in the Scion, also indicate drug trafficking.
    We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant on the
    charge of possession with intent to distribute.
    -7-
    C ONCLUSION
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Harris L Hartz
    Circuit Judge
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-5167

Citation Numbers: 446 F. App'x 78

Judges: Murphy, Anderson, Hartz

Filed Date: 9/27/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024