Wright v. Franklin , 438 F. App'x 728 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 27, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
LARRY EUGENE WRIGHT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 11-5086
(D.C. No. 4:08-CV-00028-TCK-FHM)
ERIC FRANKLIN, Warden (N.D. Okla.)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before LUCERO, ANDERSON, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Larry Wright filed a federal petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 seeking
relief from his Oklahoma convictions and sentences for armed robbery and
unlawful possession of a firearm. In response, the district court issued a detailed
opinion explaining its reasons for declining to award relief. Mr. Wright now asks
for a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to allow him to contest the district
court’s decision.
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
We may grant a COA only if Mr. Wright makes a “substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Under this standard,
an applicant must show “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that
matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or
that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation
omitted). Because Mr. Wright proceeds in this court pro se, we review his
pleadings with special solicitude.
Even so, we conclude that we cannot issue a COA. In this court, as in the
district court, Mr. Wright has sought to pursue three claims. None, however,
involves a situation where reasonable jurists could debate the decision to deny
relief.
First, Mr. Wright claims that the prosecutors’ misconduct at his trial denied
him his federal constitutional right to a fair trial. Noting that state courts had
already provided him with some but not all the relief he had requested on this
claim, the district court concluded, after extensive discussion, that the state court
decision not to provide further relief was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable
application of federal law. Mr. Wright’s COA application affords us no basis on
which we might disagree with that considered conclusion. See Wright v.
Franklin, No. 08-CV-028-TCK-FHM, 2011 WL 1990035, at *3–*6 (N.D. Okla.
May 23, 2011).
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Second, Mr. Wright argues that his federal equal protection rights were
offended by the state court’s jury instructions. We agree with the district court,
however, that this claim was not preserved for federal review. To be sure, Mr.
Wright pursued a related claim of error in his direct appeal, taking the question
whether the trial court’s jury instructions comported with state law to the state’s
highest court, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA). See ROA 162
et seq. (raising state law claim on direct appeal); id. at 65 (OCCA ruling). But he
raised his federal equal protection claim involving the jury instructions used at his
trial only for the first time in his state collateral challenge. And he failed to
pursue that collateral challenge on appeal to the OCCA. His failure to do so, to
avail himself of all avenues available to him for relief under state law,
procedurally defaults the claim. See Johnson v. Champion, 288 F.3d 1215,
1226–27 (10th Cir. 2002). Neither has he shown that there was adequate cause
for his delay, or that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” would result from the
default, such that we might potentially excuse his default. Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).
Third, Mr. Wright contends that his trial counsel’s ineffective assistance
violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court found this
claim procedurally defaulted because it was included in his state collateral
challenge, a challenge that he (again) failed to pursue through appeal to the
OCCA. Wright, 2011 WL 1990035, at *7–*8. Mr. Wright, however, also pursued
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his ineffective assistance claim in his direct appeal — and the issue was
entertained and adjudicated by the OCCA. See ROA at 159 et seq. The OCCA
concluded that trial counsel had performed deficiently, but that there was
insufficient proof that counsel’s errors had prejudiced Mr. Wright. See id. at
62–64. On collateral review the state trial court declined to consider Mr.
Wright’s renewed ineffective assistance claim precisely because, in its view, the
claim had already been addressed and resolved on direct appeal. See id. at 73.
But whether or not the claim is procedurally defaulted, there is no way we
might issue a COA. To make out a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
petitioner must show that he was prejudiced by his lawyer’s deficient
performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 694 (1984). What’s more,
because this case arises on collateral review and the OCCA ruled on the merits of
the claim, a federal court may intercede to afford Mr. Wright relief only if the
OCCA’s Strickland analysis — concluding that Mr. Wright suffered no prejudice
from his lawyer’s performance — was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). And it is plain that Mr.
Wright cannot clear this doubly deferential hurdle. As the OCCA noted, the state
presented significant evidence of Mr. Wright’s guilt, and the jury was instructed
in a manner designed to cure any defect arising out of the mistakes made by Mr.
Wright’s defense counsel. See ROA at 61, 64. We see no basis on which a
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reasonable jurist could think the OCCA’s Strickland prejudice assessment was
contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.
The application for a COA is denied and this appeal is dismissed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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