United States v. Cobos-Chachas , 445 F. App'x 53 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 3, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 10-1528
(D.C. No. 1:10-CR-00207-REB-1)
NICOLAS COBOS-CHACHAS, (D. Colo.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, Circuit Judge, HOLLOWAY and PORFILIO, Senior Circuit
Judges.
Nicolas Cobos-Chachas, a citizen of Mexico, pleaded guilty to unlawfully
reentering the United States after deportation. At sentencing, the district court
varied downward from the advisory guidelines range and sentenced him to
thirty-eight months’ imprisonment, which was three months below the bottom of
the advisory guideline range. Mr. Cobos-Chachas challenges the length of his
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
sentence as substantively unreasonable in light of the sentencing factors listed in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we affirm.
I.
In 2006, Mr. Cobos-Chachas was apprehended while driving undocumented
co-workers to a job-site. He pleaded guilty to transporting an illegal alien in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), an offense classified as an
aggravated felony, see United States v. Martinez-Candejas, 347 F.3d 853, 857
(10th Cir. 2003). For the offense, he was sentenced to time served and deported
to Mexico.
Mr. Cobos-Chachas returned to this country in September 2007. Upon his
arrest and detention for a traffic offense in March 2010, he admitted to an
immigration agent that he had entered the United States after being deported. He
was charged with unlawfully reentering the United States after deportation for
conviction of an aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2).
He entered a plea of guilty in exchange for the government’s agreement to
recommend a sentence within the advisory guideline range.
A probation officer prepared a presentence report calculating
Mr. Cobos-Chachas’ sentence under the applicable United States Sentencing
Guidelines. His probation officer determined that the base offense level was
eight. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a). Then, he added a sixteen-level enhancement
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because Mr. Cobos-Chachas had previously been deported after conviction of an
alien-smuggling offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). Finally, the probation
officer applied a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. The result was an adjusted offense level of twenty-one. Based
on the offense level and a criminal history category of II, the advisory range was
41 to 51 months’ imprisonment. The probation officer, however, recommended a
variant sentence of 36 months primarily because Mr. Cobos-Chachas’ criminal
history was minimal compared to other defendants charged with similar offenses.
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Cobos-Chachas requested a downward
variant sentence because he had never been incarcerated for a significant length
of time and he had family ties and business opportunities in Mexico. The
prosecution asked for a sentence at the low end of the guideline range, but also
suggested a possible justification for a variant sentence: the harshness of a
sixteen-level enhancement where the prior transporting offense did not involve
bringing illegal aliens across the border.
The district judge imposed a sentence of 38 months, commenting that a
“sentence variance should be granted somewhat anomalously for the reasons
suggested by the [prosecution].” R., Vol. 2 at 50. The sentence was three months
below the low end of the advisory guidelines range and two months above the
probation officer’s recommendation. The district judge stated that he had reached
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his determination after considering all the relevant information in light of the
sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
II.
On appeal, Mr. Cobos-Chachas argues that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable, “prompting a deferential abuse of discretion standard.” United
States v. Reyes-Alfonso, No. 10-2091, 2011 WL 3134683, at *6 (10th Cir.
July 27, 2011). “Substantive reasonableness addresses whether the length of the
sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id., at *7 (alteration and internal
quotation marks omitted). Often “there will be a range of possible outcomes the
facts and law at issue can fairly support; rather than pick and choose among them
ourselves, we will defer to the district court’s judgment so long as it falls within
the realm of these rationally available choices.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In conducting our review, we presume that a below-guideline sentence is
substantively reasonable. United States v. Balbin-Mesa, 643 F.3d 783, 788
(10th Cir. 2011). “The defendant may rebut this presumption by demonstrating
that the sentence is unreasonable” under the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.
Reyes-Alfonso, 2011 WL 3134683, at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Cobos-Chachas argues that a proper consideration of the § 3553(a)
sentencing factors ordains a shorter sentence. In his view, the “minor variance”
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granted by the district judge “was not enough” because it does not acknowledge
that his transporting conduct was relatively trivial in comparison to the more
serious offenses that also trigger a sixteen-level enhancement. Aplt. Br. at 8,
9-12. Further, he states that he does not present a danger to the community and
that a lesser sentence would provide adequate deterrence.
The record indicates, however, that the district judge reached a sentencing
decision after conducting an appropriate evaluation under the dictates of
18 U.S.C. § 3553. The district judge had considered “the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,”
id, § 3553(a)(1) and reached a sentence that he concluded was “sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to comply with” statutory purposes, id., § 3553(a).
We do not “examine the weight a district court assigns to various § 3553(a)
factors, and its ultimate assessment of the balance between them, as a legal
conclusion to be reviewed de novo.” United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 808
(10th Cir. 2008). Rather, we defer “to the district court’s decision that the
§ 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Mr. Cobos-Chachas’ own perception that the
sentencing factors compel a more marked variance does not rebut the
presumption that his below-guideline sentence is substantively reasonable. The
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district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence of thirty-eight
months’ imprisonment.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
William J. Holloway, Jr.
Senior Circuit Judge
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