Pinkey v. Zavislan , 440 F. App'x 610 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                       FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    September 21, 2011
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    CYNTHIA RENEE PINKEY,
    Petitioner - Appellant,
    No. 11-1336
    v.                                           (D.C. No. 1:11-CV-01129-LTB)
    (D. Colo.)
    DONA ZAVISLAN,
    Respondent - Appellee.
    ORDER
    DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
    Before KELLY, HARTZ, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
    Petitioner-Appellant Cynthia Renee Pinkey, a Colorado state inmate
    appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal from the
    district court’s judgment. The district court dismissed Ms. Pinkey’s habeas
    petition as time-barred and found no circumstances warranting equitable tolling.
    
    28 U.S.C. §§ 2241
    , 2244(d)(2); R. 100-08. Ms. Pinkey claims that Colorado’s
    Department of Corrections (“CDOC”) violated her constitutional rights by
    miscalculating her sentence. Aplt. Br. 2. She claims that her state court remedies
    were not exhausted until December 2010. Aplt. Br. 1.
    To obtain a COA, Ms. Pinkey must make “a substantial showing of the
    denial of a constitutional right.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c)(2). Where the district court
    dismisses a petition on procedural grounds, a COA requires the inmate to
    demonstrate that it is reasonably debatable whether (1) the petition states a valid
    claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and (2) the district court’s procedural
    ruling is correct. Slack v. McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 483-84.
    Ms. Pinkey was sentenced in three separate Colorado proceedings between
    March 1, 2004, and September 1, 2005. R. 15, 21, 23. She alleges that the
    CDOC failed to adequately credit presentence confinement. Aplt. Br. 2.
    Specifically, she claims that “403 days” of presentence confinement before her
    first conviction, in Douglas County District Court on March 1, 2004 (02CR63),
    and time served thereafter, should have been applied against her third conviction,
    on September 1, 2005 in Arapahoe County District Court (04CR362), but that this
    period was erroneously “voided.” 
    Id.
     She claims this will eventually result in
    “false imprisonment.” 
    Id.
    Ms. Pinkey previously challenged the terms of her confinement in a federal
    habeas proceeding resulting in a dismissal without prejudice for failure to
    exhaust. See Pinkey v. Ortiz, No. 06-cv-00393-ZLW (D. Colo. May 25, 2006).
    This court denied a COA and dismissed her appeal, reasoning that Ms. Pinkey had
    not exhausted her claims; a state petition for a writ of mandamus did not suffice.
    Pinkey v. Ortiz, 213 F. App’x 678 (10th Cir. 2007). In 2006, Ms. Pinkey also
    filed a habeas corpus petition in the Denver District Court; it was denied on June
    20, 2006, for failure to state a claim that she was entitled to immediate release.
    -2-
    R. 88-89. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals, in accordance with state
    law, referred the matter to the Colorado Supreme Court. R. 90. The Colorado
    Supreme Court affirmed the denial on March 1, 2007. R. 97. Ms. Pinkey filed an
    original petition in that court earlier this year, which was denied on April 8, 2011.
    R. 98. The instant action was filed on April 28, 2011.
    The district court held that Ms. Pinkey’s claim was time-barred under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
    (d), which applies to § 2241 actions challenging the execution of a
    state sentence. See Dulworth v. Evans, 
    442 F.3d 1265
    , 1268 (10th Cir. 2006). It
    determined that the one-year limitation period began to run when the factual
    predicate of Ms. Pinkey’s claim could have been discovered through the exercise
    of due diligence. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
    (d)(1)(D). Even allowing for tolling while the
    Colorado habeas proceedings were pending, § 2244(d)(2), the one-year limitation
    surely was activated by March 1, 2007, when the Colorado Supreme Court
    affirmed the denial of the state habeas petition. The original proceeding that she
    filed in April 2011 in the Colorado Supreme Court did not toll the one-year
    period, since tolling can only occur within the limitation period. Clark v.
    Oklahoma, 
    468 F.3d 711
    , 714 (10th Cir. 2006). The district court’s determination
    on this issue is not reasonably debatable.
    Claims under § 2241 are subject to equitable tolling in extraordinary
    circumstances. Holland v. Florida, 
    130 S.Ct. 2549
    , 2562-63 (2010); Miller v.
    Marr, 
    141 F.3d 976
    , 978 (10th Cir. 1998). The district court’s determination that
    -3-
    no circumstances indicated equitable tolling is not reasonably debatable.
    We DENY a COA, DENY IFP status as moot, and DISMISS the appeal.
    Entered for the Court
    Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
    Circuit Judge
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-1336

Citation Numbers: 440 F. App'x 610

Judges: Kelly, Hartz, Holmes

Filed Date: 9/21/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024