Pama Ventures, LLC v. Wellens , 443 F. App'x 320 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 27, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PAMA VENTURES, LLC, a
Washington limited liability company,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 10-1313
v. (D.C. No. 1:09-CV-01426-REB-CBS)
(D. Colo.)
BRIAN WELLENS,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MATHESON, McKAY and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff PAMA Ventures, LLC (PAMA) brought this action seeking money
damages and a declaratory judgment concerning its rights as obligee under a
promissory note (the Note) executed in its favor by defendant Brian Wellens. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of PAMA on its damage claim
against Wellens and entered judgment on the promissory note, awarding PAMA
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
the Note’s unpaid principal, unpaid interest, attorney’s fees and costs, and
prospective interest. 1 Wellens does not challenge the existence of the Note, its
stated terms, or his failure to repay it as required under its provisions. Rather, he
contends that the Note was satisfied when PAMA’s principals fraudulently and
deceptively hid behind a strawman purchase (the “Cypress Transaction”) to obtain
a complete beneficial ownership interest in Casa Brisas, the Mexican real
property that secured Wellens’s obligations under the Note.
ANALYSIS
The parties are familiar with the facts and we need not recite them in detail
here. Accordingly, we proceed to our analysis of the issues presented.
1. Jurisdictional Issue
At the outset, we must resolve an issue concerning our jurisdiction. After
PAMA sued him on the Note, Wellens filed a third-party complaint in this action,
asserting claims against certain third-party defendants. The third-party claims
were later dismissed without prejudice by stipulation. After Wellens appealed,
we entered an order tolling briefing, noting that “because those [third-party]
claims were dismissed without prejudice, the judgment may not be final for
purposes of appeal.” Order, at 1 (Aug. 31, 2010).
1
The district court concluded that PAMA had abandoned its declaratory
judgment claim, a conclusion that PAMA has not challenged in this appeal.
-2-
On September 3, 2010, the district court entered an order certifying its
summary judgment as a final order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Wellens has
presented the 54(b) certification to this court. Because the district court entered a
Rule 54(b) certification, the judgment appealed from is a final order. See, e.g.,
Ysais v. Richardson, 603 F.3d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir.) (entry of certification under
Rule 54(b) made judgment final and immediately appealable even though claims
remained pending against one defendant), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 163 (2010).
We therefore have jurisdiction to decide this appeal.
2. The District Court’s Reasoning
In granting summary judgment to PAMA, the district court reasoned as
follows. Under Colorado law, PAMA’s claim on the Note was essentially a
breach-of-contract claim. Such a claim required PAMA to prove four elements:
(1) the existence of the contract; (2) performance by the plaintiff; (3) defendant’s
failure to perform; and (4) damages suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the
defendant’s breach. See Western Distributing Co. v. Diodosio, 841 P.2d 1053,
1058 (Colo. 1992). The district court concluded that Wellens only disputed the
fourth element, PAMA’s damages. In this regard it noted that “Wellens claims
that, as a result of the Cypress Transaction, PAMA recovered the bulk of the
amount due under the note” and that “as a result of the Cypress Transaction and
subsequent events, [PAMA’s principals] now have net equity in the property of
about 891,000 dollars.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 600.
-3-
The district court did not accept Wellens’s conclusions concerning PAMA’s
alleged lack of damages, however, because it found that the PAMA principals
who engaged in the Cypress transaction were not equivalent to PAMA itself.
Since the obligation in the Note ran to PAMA and not its principals, the Cypress
Transaction engaged in by PAMA’s principals did not reduce the amount of
damages suffered by PAMA and it did not reduce Wellens’s obligation on the
Note.
3. Standard of Review
Federal-court jurisdiction in this case is founded on diversity of citizenship.
“When exercising diversity jurisdiction, we apply state law with the objective of
obtaining the result that would be reached in state court.” Butt v. Bank of
America, NA, 477 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
“We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard as the district court . . . .” Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1215
(10th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We view the record on
summary judgment in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Gwinn,
354 F.3d at 1215.
-4-
4. Wellens’ Appellate Arguments
Wellens argues the district court’s analysis is unsatisfactory for three
reasons. He charges that the district court (1) abused its discretion by failing to
consider the detailed affirmative defenses he raised in the pretrial order; (2) failed
to view the facts in the light most favorable to him by ignoring the fact that
PAMA only retained the ability to enforce the Note by concealing its principals’
role in the Cypress Transaction; and (3) improperly failed to treat PAMA and its
principals as equivalent, thus permitting the corporate form “to be used to avoid
disclosure, facilitate concealment, and mask an effective double recovery” in a
manner inconsistent with Colorado law and public policy. Aplt. Opening Br. at 3.
Having carefully considered each of these arguments in light of the record,
the briefs, and the applicable law, we conclude that the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment in favor of PAMA on the Note. While the district
court did not specifically discuss each of the defenses Wellens identified in the
pretrial order, it correctly concluded that (1) PAMA had demonstrated its
entitlement to recover on the Note; (2) “no reasonable fact finder could conclude
that Wellens is not liable for the unpaid amounts due under the note”; and
(3) PAMA was entitled to summary judgment. Aplt. App., Vol. II at 601.
Because our de novo review persuades us that the actions of PAMA and its
principals, even if accurately portrayed by Wellens, do not provide a defense to
-5-
his obligation on the Note, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment.
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. PAMA’s motion for
sanctions against Wellens for filing a frivolous appeal is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
-6-