United States v. Chavez-Cadenas ( 2021 )

Appellate Case: 21-3156 Document: 010110622002 Date Filed: 12/21/2021 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 21, 2021
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 21-3156
(D.C. No. 2:09-CR-20005-DDC-10)
HUGO CHAVEZ-CADENAS, (D. Kan.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before MORITZ, BALDOCK, and EID, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Hugo Chavez-Cadenas, proceeding pro se,1 appeals the district court’s order
denying his request for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as
amended by the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. For the
reasons explained below, we affirm.
*
After examining the brief and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a);
10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
1
We construe Chavez-Cadenas’s pro se brief liberally, but we do not act as his
advocate. Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
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Background
In 2010, Chavez-Cadenas pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of a methamphetamine mixture,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), and 846. Chavez-
Cadenas’s original sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(the Guidelines) was 360 months to life. The district court sentenced him to 360
months in prison, followed by five years of supervised release. The United States
Sentencing Commission later retroactively amended the Guidelines range for
Chavez-Cadenas’s offense, and Chavez-Cadenas sought and obtained a reduced
sentence at the low end of his new Guidelines range, 292 months. See § 3582(c)(2)
(providing that district “court may reduce the term of imprisonment” for “a defendant
who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that
has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission”). “Chavez-Cadenas’s
projected release date is January 23, 2030.” R. vol. 1, 247.
In January 2021, Chavez-Cadenas filed a motion seeking compassionate
release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) based on various medical conditions (including
diabetes, hypertension, and obesity) that he contends place him at greater risk of
complications if he were to contract COVID-19.2 In response, the government
2
This is Chavez-Cadenas’s fourth such motion since the start of the COVID-
19 pandemic. The district court denied Chavez-Cadenas’s first and third motions for
failure to exhaust as required by § 3582(c)(1)(A). It rejected the second (which was
the only motion Chavez-Cadenas filed with the assistance of counsel) after
concluding that Chavez-Cadenas could not show extraordinary and compelling
reasons and that the sentencing factors did not warrant a sentence reduction. Chavez-
2
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conceded that Chavez-Cadenas’s medical conditions established extraordinary and
compelling reasons supporting compassionate release but argued that the sentencing
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed heavily against release and
compelled denial of the motion. The district court agreed. It acknowledged that
Chavez-Cadenas had exhausted his administrative remedies and further assumed that
extraordinary and compelling reasons for a reduction existed, but it denied the
motion based on the § 3553(a) factors.
Chavez-Cadenas appeals. Our review is for abuse of discretion. United States
v. Mannie, 971 F.3d 1145, 1155 (10th Cir. 2020).
Analysis
Chavez-Cadenas argues that the district court erred in denying his
compassionate-release motion. Under the plain language of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), a
district court may grant a motion for a sentence reduction only if three requirements
are met: (1) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction; (2) the
reduction is consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s applicable policy
statements; and (3) consideration of the § 3553(a) factors warrants a reduction. See
United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1042–43 (10th Cir. 2021). As we have
previously explained, the Sentencing Commission’s existing policy statement only
applies to motions filed by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons. Id. at 1050. Thus,
the second requirement is not relevant when, like here, the defendant has moved for
Cadenas did not appeal any of these prior denials, though he did unsuccessfully seek
reconsideration after the district court denied his second motion.
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compassionate release. See id. Moreover, because the district court assumed that
Chavez-Cadenas’s medical conditions, in combination with the COVID-19 pandemic,
constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons, the § 3553(a) factors are the only
relevant consideration on appeal.3
Section 3553(a) directs a sentencing court to consider, among other things,
“the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant,” as well as “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”
§ 3553(a)(1), (6). It further emphasizes “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide
just punishment for the offense”; the sentence should also “afford adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct, . . . protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant[,] and . . . provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.” § 3553(a)(2). “Because the
weighing of the § 3553(a) factors is committed to the discretion of the district court,
we cannot reverse ‘unless we have a definite and firm conviction that the lower court
made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the
circumstances.’” United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 949–50 (10th Cir.) (quoting
3
In light of the district court’s assumption on this point, we reject Chavez-
Cadenas’s argument that the district court abused its discretion in failing to find
extraordinary and compelling reasons. The district court assumed such reasons
existed, so it could not have abused its discretion in failing to find such reasons.
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United States v. Chavez-Meza, 854 F.3d 655, 659 (10th Cir. 2017), aff’d, 138 S. Ct.
1959 (2018)) petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 15, 2021) (No. 21-6594).
Here, the district court held that the § 3553(a) factors did not warrant granting
compassionate release. In reaching this conclusion, the district court found that
because Chavez-Cadenas had 101 months until his release date, which represents
about 34% of his modified 292-month sentence, granting his requested relief would
significantly reduce the severity of his sentence. The district court further noted the
seriousness of Chavez-Cadenas’s underlying crime, citing both the large quantity of
methamphetamine—in excess of 1.5 kilograms—attributable to Chavez-Cadenas and
his managerial role in the conspiracy. Overall, the district court concluded that
neither reducing Chavez-Cadenas’s sentence to time served nor replacing his
remaining 101-month sentence with home confinement would comport with the
nature and circumstances of the offense, promote respect for the law, or provide just
punishment for the offense.
On appeal, Chavez-Cadenas argues that the district court abused its discretion
in balancing the § 3553(a) factors. But his arguments fail to establish “that the lower
court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in
the circumstances.” Hald, 8 F.4th at 949–50 (quoting Chavez-Meza, 854 F.3d at 659).
First, contrary to what Chavez-Cadenas asserts, the district court did expressly
consider Chavez-Cadenas’s rehabilitation efforts and family circumstances in its
analysis of the § 3553(a) factors, including his educational achievements, his good
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behavior in prison, and his mother’s deteriorating health; it simply found these
factors outweighed by other considerations.
Next, Chavez-Cadenas contends that the district court erred in failing to
consider that he is subject to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
detainer. District courts considering compassionate release have taken varying
approaches when a defendant is subject to an ICE detainer. See United States v.
Hamidu, No. 18-cr-00058-6, 2021 WL 2808721, at *4–5 (S.D. Ohio July 6, 2021)
(collecting district-court cases and observing that some courts have found detainer to
be insufficient reason to deny compassionate release and others have weighed
detainer against release). We need not decide here which approach is most
appropriate because, as he did below, Chavez-Cadenas fails to explain why his
pending deportation supports compassionate release. Moreover, a district court need
not expressly discuss every § 3553(a) factor or every fact a defendant marshals in
support of a compassionate-release motion. See Hald, 8 F.4th at 948 (rejecting
position “that the district court erred by failing to mention some of [defendant’s]
mitigation arguments” because district court’s § 3582(c) decision need not be
extremely detailed); United States v. Piper, 839 F.3d 1261, 1267 (10th Cir. 2016)
(district court need not address “‘every nonfrivolous, material argument raised by the
defendant’ in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding” (quoting United States v. Verdin-Garcia,
824 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir. 2016))). We therefore see no abuse of discretion in
the district court’s failure to expressly address Chavez-Cadenas’s ICE detainer.
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Chavez-Cadenas also asserts that he played a minor role in the conspiracy
compared to his codefendants, his crime was nonviolent, and he is serving a
comparatively long sentence. But his minor-role assertion does not align with his
sentencing enhancement for playing a managerial role in the conspiracy. Moreover,
Chavez-Cadenas does not demonstrate that his sentence was incongruent with others
who possessed similar records and were found guilty of similar conduct. See
§ 3553(a)(6). At best, he points to a district-court case where the defendant, who was
charged with possession and intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine, was
sentenced to 188 months and was granted compassionate release after serving 85
months. See United States v. Rountree, 460 F. Supp. 3d 224, 227–28 (N.D.N.Y.
2020). But as to the initial sentence, Chavez-Cadenas ignores the fact that the
defendant received a downward departure based on substantial assistance to the
government. See id. at 228. And as to compassionate release, that the district court in
Rountree—and in other district court cases that Chavez-Cadenas cites—found the
§ 3553(a) factors warranted compassionate release does not establish that the district
court here abused its discretion in reaching the opposite conclusion. See Hald, 8 F.4th
at 949 (“[T]he weighing of the § 3553(a) factors is committed to the discretion of the
district court . . . .”). Finally, while it may be true that Chavez-Cadenas did not
engage in violence in connection with the drug conspiracy and there is no identifiable
victim, these facts standing alone do not alter the balance of the § 3553(a) analysis or
cause us to question how the district court chose to weigh the severity of Chavez-
Cadenas’s crime in the § 3553(a) analysis.
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In sum, having carefully considered Chavez-Cadenas’s motion and the relevant
portions of the record, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the
district court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible
choice in the circumstances. Hald, 8 F.4th at 949.
Conclusion
Finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s careful § 3553(a) analysis,
we affirm.
Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz
Circuit Judge
8