United States v. Vazquez-Villa ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
May 19, 2011
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 10-3138
v. (D.C. No. 5:09-CR-40061-SAC-1)
(D. of Kan.)
PASCUAL VAZQUEZ-VILLA,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TYMKOVICH, SEYMOUR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
After a federal jury convicted Pascual Vazquez-Villa of various drug
offenses—including possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of a
mixture containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)—the
district court sentenced him to 25 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Vazquez-
Villa challenges the district court’s evidentiary rulings and sentencing decision.
We conclude the district court did not commit reversible error in admitting
evidence relating to the search of Vazquez-Villa’s vehicle; allowing testimony
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
regarding threats to witnesses; or sentencing Vazquez-Villa to 25 years’
imprisonment.
Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.
I. Background
From 2008 to 2009, the Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI) conducted an
extensive narcotics investigation that eventually led officers to Vazquez-Villa’s
Kansas-based methamphetamine enterprise. Through wire taps and other
surveillance, KBI agents learned Vazquez-Villa was a leader in a conspiracy
spanning multiple states and involving at least seven other conspirators.
The investigation culminated in June 2009, when Kansas police searched
Vazquez-Villa’s residence and trailer and seized more than 500 grams of
methamphetamine, nearly $100,000 in cash, and paraphernalia associated with
narcotics distribution. Vazquez-Villa was arrested and charged with one count of
conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of
methamphetamine mixture; one count of possessing with the intent to distribute
500 grams or more of methamphetamine; and eleven counts of unlawfully using a
communication facility in furtherance of the conspiracy. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846(Count 1), 841(a)(1) (Count 2), and 843(b) (Counts 3–13).
At trial, numerous governmental witnesses testified about KBI’s
investigation—including its search of Vazquez-Villa’s vehicle, residence, and
trailer—and several other witnesses provided details of Vazquez-Villa’s
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methamphetamine trafficking enterprise. For example, Renato Garcia-Medina
described his role in selling methamphetamine for Adam Molina, a significant
methamphetamine distributor and one of Vazquez-Villa’s drug sources; he also
testified about receiving a telephone call from Vazquez-Villa, who told Garcia-
Medina that “he wanted methamphetamine.” R., Vol. IV at 392. Alleged co-
conspirator Jose Aranda-Meza offered similar testimony.
Furthermore, Vazquez-Villa’s brother-in-law testified about an incident
where Molina left him approximately one pound of methamphetamine to give to
Vazquez-Villa, and another where the brother-in-law stored a box of
methamphetamine for Vazquez-Villa. The jury also heard evidence obtained from
wiretap surveillance and police searches.
A federal jury found Vazquez-Villa guilty on all counts. According to the
presentence investigation report (PSR) and the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (USSG), Vazquez-Villa was subject to a base offense level of 38 and a
criminal history category of I. The PSR applied a two-level enhancement because
the offense involved the importation of methamphetamine, USSG
§ 2D1.1(b)(5)(A), and a four-level enhancement because Vazquez-Villa was “an
organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants
or was otherwise extensive,” id. § 3B1.1(a). This yielded a total offense level of
44, but the PSR correctly set Vazquez-Villa’s total offense level as 43, because an
“offense level of more than 43 is to be treated as an offense level of 43.” USSG
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ch. 5, pt. A, cmt. n.2. At this offense level, the USSG recommends a life
sentence.
The district court accepted the PSR’s findings but applied a downward
variance and sentenced Vazquez-Villa to 25 years’ concurrent custody on the first
two counts, and four years’ concurrent custody on the remaining eleven
counts—for a total of 25 years’ imprisonment.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Vazquez-Villa argues the district court (1) erred in admitting
evidence associated with the search of his vehicle; (2) erred in admitting
testimony regarding threats to prosecution witnesses; and (3) issued a
procedurally and substantively unreasonable sentence. After a thorough review of
the record, we conclude all three arguments lack merit.
A. Suppression of Evidence
Vazquez-Villa first contends a search of his vehicle was the result of an
illegal traffic stop. He argues the officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to pull
him over, and the resulting search and evidence gathered from the search should
be suppressed.
In February 2009, after intercepting a phone call involving Vazquez-Villa,
agents determined he was traveling in Kansas with a shipment of
methamphetamine. Upon request from the KBI, local police located and stopped
Vazquez-Villa’s vehicle and deployed a drug dog, which alerted near the front of
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the vehicle. An officer searched the vehicle but found nothing illicit and let
Vazquez-Villa continue his drive. Shortly after the stop, however, KBI agents
intercepted a call in which Vazquez-Villa told Molina, a known drug source, that
the police had stopped him. The jury heard testimony regarding the traffic stop
and Vazquez-Villa’s conversation with Molina. The evidence supported the
government’s contention that Vazquez-Villa was involved in drug distribution.
Vazquez-Villa argues the admission of this testimony violated the Fourth
Amendment and affected the trial’s outcome. By not moving to suppress
evidence relating to this traffic stop and vehicle search, however, Vazquez-Villa
waived his right to appeal the district court’s evidentiary decision. Under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(e), a party waives the right to seek suppression of
evidence if he fails to file a pretrial motion to suppress pursuant to Rule
12(b)(3)(C). See United States v. Burke, 633 F.3d 984, 987–88 (10th Cir. 2011).
“Accordingly, . . . Rule 12’s waiver provision, not Rule 52(b)’s plain error
provision, governs motions to suppress evidence, including specific arguments to
suppress evidence, raised for the first time on appeal. Such motions and
arguments are waived absent a showing of good cause for why they were not
raised below.” Id. at 991; see also United States v. Hamilton, 587 F.3d 1199,
1213 (10th Cir. 2009) (“When a motion to suppress evidence is raised for the first
time on appeal, we must decline review.”) (quotation omitted).
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Here, because Vazquez-Villa has not suggested any reason why he failed to
file a pretrial motion to suppress, he has waived the right to contest the district
court’s decision to admit evidence relating to the traffic stop. 1
B. Testimony Regarding Threats to Witnesses
Next, Vazquez-Villa argues the district court abused its discretion in
permitting testimony regarding threats to prosecution witnesses. He asserts this
testimony was more prejudicial than probative and should have been excluded
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). He specifically contends the testimony
was only marginally relevant and was designed to inflame the passion of the jury.
Because Vazquez-Villa advances this argument for the first time on appeal,
we review only for plain error. 2 See F ED . R. C RIM . P. 52(b); United States v. Poe,
556 F.3d 1113, 1128 (10th Cir. 2009). Under plain error review, we may not
reverse unless we find “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial
rights. If all three conditions are met, [we] may then exercise [] discretion to
notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings.” United States v.
Balderama-Iribe, 490 F.3d 1199, 1203–04 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).
1
Even absent waiver, evidence supported the reasonableness of the traffic
stop, and no showing was made that the canine sniff prolonged the stop.
2
Vazquez-Villa appropriately concedes that “no contemporaneous
objection was made to the admission of [threat] evidence and thus it must be
reviewed under the plain error standard.” Aplt. Br. at 20.
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Under the third prong, the error affects substantial rights only if it has affected
the outcome of the district court proceedings. Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418
F.3d 1116, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005). Vazquez-Villa bears the burden of
demonstrating plain error. Id.Given this standard, the district court did not commit reversible error by
admitting testimony regarding alleged threats to witnesses because (1) testimony
regarding threats to Vazquez-Villa’s brother-in-law was admissible under Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b), and (2) the admission of testimony regarding alleged
threats to Jose Aranda-Meza, a governmental witness, was harmless and did not
affect the outcome of the proceedings.
1. Testimony of Vazquez-Villa’s Brother-in-Law
Vazquez-Villa’s brother-in-law, a prosecution witness, testified that his
sister threatened him in an attempt to dissuade him from testifying. According to
the brother-in-law, his wife threatened that if he testified for the prosecution, he
would never see his children again. Another prosecution witness corroborated
this account. Vazquez-Villa purportedly told the witness that if his brother-in-law
testified, “[Vazquez-Villa] would make sure that he lost his wife and his kids.”
R., Vol. V at 618.
The district court did not err in admitting this testimony. Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b) provides that “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
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conformity therewith.” Under this rule, however, “[e]vidence of threats to a
prosecution witness is admissible as showing consciousness of guilt if a direct
connection is established between the defendant and the threat . . . .” United
States v. Smith, 629 F.2d 650, 651 (10th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added); see also F ED . R. E VID . 404(b) (evidence of bad acts is admissible to prove
“motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident”).
Accordingly, we have held that “a defendant’s threat against a potential
witness is generally admissible under Rule 404(b)” because “such threats show
the defendant’s intent to prevent the witness from testifying, and are thus an
implicit acknowledgment of the defendant’s guilt.” United States v. Nichols, 374
F.3d 959, 967 (10th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1113 (2005).
Because Vazquez-Villa is closely related to his sister and her husband, and
because of the corroborating testimony, a “direct connection” existed between the
threats and the defendant, and the content of the threats was evidence of Vazquez-
Villa’s “consciousness of guilt.” See Smith, 629 F.2d at 652. Although the threat
was made by Vazquez-Villa’s sister, the threat was traceable to Vazquez-Villa,
independently corroborated, and probative of Vazquez-Villa’s guilt.
Thus, evidence regarding the threat to Vazquez-Villa’s brother-in-law was
admissible under Rule 404(b). Further, even if the district court did err in
admitting the testimony, the error was not plain. Vazquez-Villa points to no
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authority—and indeed, we find none—stating that testimony regarding threats of
the sort made are categorically inadmissible. See United States v. Wardell, 591
F.3d 1279, 1297–98 (10th Cir. 2009) (to constitute plain error, the district court’s
decision must have been contrary to well-settled law of this circuit or the
Supreme Court).
2. Testimony of Jose Aranda-Meza
The jury also heard that Vazquez-Villa indirectly threatened Jose Aranda-
Meza, a governmental witness and one of Vazquez-Villa’s close acquaintances.
Aranda-Meza testified that, while in jail, an unidentified inmate told him
Vazquez-Villa knew Aranda-Meza was “talking.” R., Vol. IV at 460. In
response, Aranda-Meza said he “had not talked yet” and called the inmate’s
suggestion “a lie.” Id. The inmate then remarked, “You know how this is.” Id.Aranda-Meza interpreted this as a threat, even though he did not know the
identity of the person issuing the threat or the threat-maker’s relationship to
Vazquez-Villa. Nothing the inmate said directly connected the threat to Vazquez-
Villa, and further, it is was not clear from Aranda-Meza’s testimony whether the
exchange unequivocally constituted a threat. Aranda-Meza acknowledged on the
stand that the inmate did not threaten violence.
Even if the district court ‘s decision to admit this testimony was erroneous,
the testimony did not affect the outcome of the trial. Under the third prong of the
plain error standard, a defendant must show the error prejudices “substantial
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rights” by affecting the outcome of the district court proceedings. Morales-
Fernandez, 418 F.3d at 1124. The record here demonstrates Aranda-Meza’s
threat-related testimony was, at most, a marginal aspect of the government’s case,
and in any event it did not send a clear message to the jury that Vazquez-Villa
threatened a prosecution witness. It suggested only that Aranda-Meza had some
fear of reprisal for his testimony. Vazquez-Villa himself acknowledges Aranda-
Meza testified in a “convoluted fashion,” and it is plain the jury would have had
to make a significant inferential leap before concluding Vazquez-Villa threatened
Aranda-Meza. See Aplt. Br. at 21.
Most importantly, any improper inference the jury may have drawn from
the testimony was rendered inconsequential by the overwhelming evidence
inculpating Vazquez-Villa—including the detailed testimony of many prosecution
witnesses, recordings of wiretapped conversations, and physical evidence seized
from Vazquez-Villa’s property. As a result, Vazquez-Villa suffered no prejudice
from Aranda-Meza’s testimony.
Finally, it is clear from the record that Aranda-Meza’s testimony did not
prejudice the district court’s sentencing decision. In sentencing Vazquez-Villa,
the district court explicitly disregarded testimony regarding threats to witnesses,
and it applied a significant downward variance. For these reasons, Vazquez-Villa
has not shown the district court committed plain error.
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C. Reasonableness of Vazquez-Villa’s Sentence
Finally, Vazquez-Villa challenges the reasonableness of his 25-year
sentence. He contests the PSR’s factual findings, as adopted by the district court,
and he argues his sentence was too severe, in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors. These arguments are unavailing.
Our review for reasonableness encompasses both a procedural component,
where we assess the district court’s application of the USSG and its calculation of
the sentencing range, as well as a substantive component, where we consider the
length of the sentence imposed. See United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055
(10th Cir. 2006). Procedural errors include “failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to
consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous
facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
1. Procedural Reasonableness
The PSR held Vazquez-Villa accountable for 18.32 kilograms of
methamphetamine, which corresponded to a base offense level of 38. In addition,
the PSR added a two-level enhancement because Vazquez-Villa’s offense
involved the importation of methamphetamine from Mexico, USSG
§ 2D1.1(b)(4)(A), and a four-level enhancement because Vazquez-Villa was an
“organizer or leader” of criminal activity that involved five or more participants,
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id. § 3B1.1(b). The district court adopted the PSR’s factual findings and
recommendations, and it accordingly calculated Vazquez-Villa’s total offense
level as 43, which resulted in an advisory sentence of life imprisonment.
Nevertheless, the district court applied a significant downward variance under
§ 3553(a) and sentenced Vazquez-Villa to 25 years’ imprisonment.
During sentencing, Vazquez-Villa did not object to his sentence or the facts
found in the PSR, but he now claims the district court’s offense-level and
guidelines calculations were factually unsupportable. Specifically, Vazquez-Villa
claims he should have been held liable for at most 9.03 kilograms of
methamphetamine—and perhaps fewer than 5 kilograms—and further that neither
of the enhancements applied by the district court were based in fact.
Because Vazquez-Villa did not contest the district court’s factual findings
during sentencing, he has waived his right to appeal this issue. Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32 “requires the defendant to affirmatively point out any fact
in the PSR that he contends is inaccurate. Absent an objection to the PSR, the
district court may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report as a
finding of fact.” United States v. Harris, 447 F.3d 1300, 1306 (10th Cir. 2006)
(quotation omitted). Thus, if a defendant fails to object to the facts stated in the
PSR, we “will deem him to have waived any dispute regarding the facts set forth
in the PSR.” United States v. West, 550 F.3d 952, 957 n.3 (10th Cir. 2008)
(emphasis added), overruled on other grounds as recognized in United States v.
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McConnell, 605 F.3d 822 (10th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Wolfe, 435
F.3d 1289, 1299 (10th Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, it is clear that “factual disputes regarding sentencing not
brought to the attention of the district court do not rise to the level of plain error.”
United States v. Lewis, 594 F.3d 1270, 1288 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 3441 (2010). “While we have reviewed sentencing errors that were not raised
in the district court under a plain error standard, plain error review is not
appropriate when the alleged error involves the resolution of factual disputes.”
United States v. Smith, 531 F.3d 1261, 1270 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).
We have recognized an exception to this rule only “when the appellant can
establish the certainty of a favorable finding on remand.” Lewis, 594 F.3d at
1288.
The present case is paradigmatic of the logic behind this waiver rule. If
Vazquez-Villa had raised his sentencing objections below, the district court could
have heard evidence and made findings regarding the factual questions at issue.
Because he did not object, however, the government did not present evidence and
therefore we are faced with an insufficiently developed record that provides us no
basis to call into question the district court’s approach to sentencing. Further,
Vazquez-Villa has not come close to showing with certainty that he would benefit
from a favorable finding on remand. For these reasons, we find Vazquez-Villa’s
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procedural challenges raise factual questions unsusceptible to appellate review.
Plain error review is inappropriate and Vazquez-Villa’s argument is waived.
Moreover, even if we were not to consider Vazquez-Villa’s arguments
waived, we would still conclude, under plain error analysis, that the district court
did not err in adopting the factual findings of the PSR. As explained, the record
on appeal is sparse and does nothing to call into question the PSR’s detailed
account of the drug quantity attributable to Vazquez-Villa. Likewise, nothing in
the record calls into question the PSR’s findings, which were supported by
intercepted conversations and witness testimony, that Vazquez-Villa was a leader
in a significant drug organization that imported methamphetamine from Mexico. 3
For these reasons, Vazquez-Villa’s sentence is procedurally reasonable.
2. Substantive Reasonableness
Without offering any analysis, Vazquez-Villa contends his 25-year sentence
is substantively unreasonable because it “is more than what should have been
3
Despite conceding that “there may have been more than five participants
involved in [his] criminal activity,” Aplt. Br. at 26, Vazquez-Villa argues that he
should have been classified only as a “manager or supervisor,” which merits a
two-level enhancement under USSG § 3B1.1(c), rather than as an “organizer or
leader,” which merits a four-level enhancement under § 3B1.1(a). This is a
factually dependent claim, and because Vazquez-Villa did not object at
sentencing, the record is insufficiently developed to give us any basis to say that
the district court committed plain error on this point. We also have no reason to
question the district court’s finding that Vazquez-Villa imported
methamphetamine, such that he was subject to a two-level enhancement under
USSG § 2D1.1(b)(4)(A). Indeed, the court heard ample evidence that Vazquez-
Villa obtained methamphetamine from Mexico.
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calculated under the guideline range and is simply unreasonable.” Aplt. Br. at 28.
This contention is belied by the record, which shows Vazquez-Villa received a
sentence tailored to the facts of his crimes, based on a conscientious consideration
of the § 3553(a) factors.
We review the substantive reasonableness of a defendant’s sentence for
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d 1054, 1058
(10th Cir. 2007). Under this deferential standard, we may overturn Vazquez-
Villa’s sentence only if the district court’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d
1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). In this regard, we assess
whether Vazquez-Villa’s sentence is reasonable “given all the circumstances of
the case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. (quotation
omitted).
A sentence within a properly calculated guidelines range is presumed to be
reasonable. United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884, 898 (10th Cir. 2008).
Vazquez-Villa’s sentence was outside the guideline range—but this worked to his
advantage. Indeed, even though the suggested sentence for a level-43 offense is
life imprisonment, the district court applied a significant downward variance and
sentenced Vazquez-Villa to only 25 years’ imprisonment. The court applied this
variance because it concluded the PSR failed to account for the appellant’s “lack
of criminal history, put[] undue weight on the quantity-driven Guideline
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calculations, and overstate[d] the seriousness of the offense due to the nature of
the investigation and due to the attenuated links with an independent drug
distribution operation.” R., Vol. VI at 989. This was not an abuse of discretion.
We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM Vazquez-Villa’s conviction
and sentence.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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