United States v. Franco-Lopez , 687 F.3d 1222 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
July 23, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 11-2123
AGAPITO FRANCO-LOPEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. 2:09-CR-00672-MV-1)
Submitted on the briefs:
Felipe D. J. Millan, Attorney at Law, El Paso, Texas, for Defendant-Appellant.
Kenneth J. Gonzales, United States Attorney, and Laura Fashing, Assistant United
States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, McKAY and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
BRISCOE, Chief Judge.
Defendant Agapito Franco-Lopez appeals his conviction on one count of
transporting an illegal alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). The
statute criminalizes the transportation of an alien who “has come to, entered, or
remains in” the country illegally. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). 1
Franco-Lopez argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for
acquittal because the government did not present evidence that the transported
alien illegally “entered” the United States. In support, Franco-Lopez relies on the
definition of “entry” used in the context of civil immigration law or in illegal
reentry cases charged under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325 and 1326. As to this element of 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), we conclude the government need only prove that the
transported alien was present in the United States in violation of the law.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I
On November 23, 2008, United States Border Patrol agents conducted
routine surveillance from atop a mesa in Sunland Park, New Mexico, near the
Mexican border. Around 9:00 a.m., Agent Marion Anest received a radio alert
that a motion sensor had been triggered in his area. Peering down from the mesa
with binoculars, Anest spotted several individuals running north from the
direction of the border. The agent did not see them enter the United States; he
first noticed them when they were between a quarter-mile and a half-mile north of
the border. Anest notified nearby agents, who moved to intercept.
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is,
therefore, submitted without oral argument.
2
As Anest tracked the fleeing individuals, he saw them jump into a dark-
colored van. Agent Jahshua Binkley, who learned of the group from Anest’s
radio call, located the van and gave chase in his Border Patrol vehicle. The driver
of the van tried to evade Binkley for three or four minutes, but the chase
eventually led to a dead-end street. The occupants bailed out and fled on foot, but
the agents were successful in apprehending everyone. They arrested Franco-
Lopez, who had been a passenger, and Benito Hernandez, Jr., who had been
driving. They also apprehended passengers Felipe Hernandez-Avila and Valente
Mozqueda-Martinez, who were identified as illegal aliens.
A grand jury indicted Franco-Lopez on one count of conspiracy to transport
illegal aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I) (count one), and two
counts of transporting an illegal alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§
1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(1)(B)(i), and (a)(1)(A)(v)(II) (count two as to Hernandez-
Avila and count three as to Mozqueda-Martinez). Aplt. App. at 15-16. After the
trial began but before the government concluded its case-in-chief, the court
granted the government’s unopposed motion to dismiss count two of the
indictment. Id. at 1.
At trial, Hernandez, the driver of the van, testified that Franco-Lopez had
asked him for a ride that day because he was having car trouble. When
Hernandez went to pick him up, Franco-Lopez explained that they needed to make
a stop to pick up a group of people near the border. Hernandez testified that
3
Franco-Lopez was coordinating with someone on the phone as they drove toward
the border. Hernandez believed his passenger was talking to someone in Mexico.
The government also presented testimony from Agent Anest, who testified
that he saw several individuals flee north from the direction of the Mexican
border and get into Hernandez’s van. Agent Binkley testified about the brief
vehicle pursuit and the ensuing foot chase. One of the transported aliens,
Mozqueda-Martinez, testified that he is a Mexican national who attempted to
enter the United States illegally by running across the border and boarding the
van that the agents stopped.
At the close of the government’s case, Franco-Lopez moved for a judgment
of acquittal as to counts one and three. The court denied the motion, and the case
was presented to the jury. The court instructed the jury using instructions that
were agreed upon and submitted by the parties. The jury was instructed that the
offense charged in count three “makes it a crime to illegally transport an alien.”
Aplee. Supp. App., Vol. I at 23. “To find the defendant guilty of this crime,” the
jury was told in Instruction 16, “you must be convinced that the government has
proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. The second of the
five elements read: “Valente Mozqueda-Martinez entered or remained in the
United States unlawfully.” Id. In Instruction 17, the jury was advised:
For the purposes of determining whether or not the
government has proved the second element listed in
Instruction 16, “entry” under our immigration laws is
4
defined as:
(1) crossing into the territorial limits of the United
States (i.e. physical presence);
(2) inspection and admission by an immigration
officer; or actual and intentional evasion of
inspection at the nearest inspection point;
and
(3) freedom from restraint.
Even if an alien has crossed the border with the intention
of evading inspection, he has not made an entry into the
United States if, due to being under constant surveillance
by law enforcement from the moment the alien has crossed
into the United States, he lacks the freedom to go at large
and mix with the population.
Id. at 24.
The jury found Franco-Lopez guilty on both counts one and three. In a
renewed motion for judgment of acquittal, Franco-Lopez argued, as regards count
three, that the government failed to present sufficient evidence that Mozqueda-
Martinez entered the United States because he was always under constant
surveillance by Border Patrol agents and therefore not free to mix with the
general population. See id. at 32-34.
In a written order, the district court denied Franco-Lopez’s motion. United
States v. Franco-Lopez, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (D.N.M. 2010). First, the court
recognized that the offense of transporting an illegal alien requires the
government to prove that the alien “has come to, entered, or remained in” the
United States illegally—it “need not have proven all three.” Id. at 1158-59 & n.5.
5
But the jury was instructed on count three that the government must prove
Mozqueda-Martinez “entered or remained in the United States unlawfully,” which
did not account for the charging statute’s third option that he had “come to” the
country illegally. Id. at 1159, 1163.
The district court concluded that the jury instruction, drawn from Tenth
Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 2.03, was an incomplete reading of the
statute. Id. at 1165. But it concluded that “this error was harmless” because,
“[i]f anything, the error created potential prejudice against the government,
because the Court failed to instruct the jury that Mr. Mozqueda-Martinez’s
‘coming to’ the United States would have been sufficient to support a guilty
verdict.” Id. at 1165-66. The court noted that a “sheer lack of evidence [did]
leave a reasonable doubt as to whether the group actually ‘entered’ the United
States such that they were free from official restraint in the form of surveillance.”
Id. at 1165. But “the uncontroverted testimony of the multiple Border Patrol
officers involved in Defendant’s apprehension easily meets the government’s
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Valente Mozqueda-Martinez
crossed the border, and hence ‘came to’ the United States without lawful
authorization.” Id. Further,
the jury’s verdict necessarily rested on a finding that
Valente Mozqueda-Martinez either entered or remained in
the United States. If the jury found that Mr. Mozqueda-
Martinez “entered” the United States—whether a correct
finding or not—it necessarily found that he “came to” the
6
United States. See [United States v. Hernandez-Garcia,
284 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 2002)] (“to come to the
United States is a step subsumed by the court’s definition
of ‘entry’” (emphasis in original)). Nor would it have
been possible for the jury to find that Mr. Mozqueda-
Martinez “remained in” the United States without first
finding that he “came to” the United States. See United
States v. Santana-Castellano, 74 F.3d 593, 597 (5th Cir.
1996) (assuming that one “remains” in the country only
after first having “entered”); United States v. Ortiz-
Villegas, 49 F.3d 1435, 1436 (9th Cir. 1995) (same).
Therefore, the instruction requiring a finding that Mr.
Mozqueda-Martinez “entered or remained in the United
States” was merely superfluous, and caused no prejudice
to Defendant.
Id. at 1166.
On June 7, 2011, the court sentenced Franco-Lopez to two years’ probation
as to each count, to be served concurrently. The court entered judgment on June
14, 2011. Franco-Lopez brought this timely appeal, but only as to the
transportation count (count three).
II
The sole issue on appeal is whether the offense of transporting an illegal
alien, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), requires proof that the transported
illegal alien “entered” the United States when the government has established the
alien’s illegal presence in the United States by other means. 2 Franco-Lopez
2
We note that Franco-Lopez does not argue that the district court erred in
instructing the jury as to the elements of this offense. See Aplt. Br. at 1
(statement of the issues); id. at 10 (arguing only that “the evidence at trial
(continued...)
7
contends that he could not have committed that offense because there was no
evidence the transported alien “entered” the United States “in accordance with the
definition of ‘entry’ used in the Immigration & Nationality Act.” Aplt. Br. at 16.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion for
judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. United
States v. Hamilton, 587 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 2009). Reversal is only
appropriate if no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Swanson, 360 F.3d 1155,
1162 (10th Cir. 2004). When conducting this review, we must consider the
evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the government. Id.A
Franco-Lopez was charged with and convicted of violating 8 U.S.C. §
1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), which penalizes
[a]ny person who . . . knowing or in reckless disregard of
the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in
the United States in violation of law, transports, or moves
2
(...continued)
establishes that the alien named in this count never ‘entered’ the United States
and therefore could not have been illegally transported by Appellant”). He does
not challenge the district court’s conclusion that “the instruction requiring a
finding that Mr. Mozqueda-Martinez ‘entered or remained in the United States’
was merely superfluous, and caused no prejudice to Defendant.” Franco-Lopez,
709 F. Supp. 2d at 1166. He also does not challenge the district court’s
conclusion that there was ample evidence that Mozqueda-Martinez “crossed the
border, and hence ‘came to’ the United States without lawful authorization.” Id.
at 1165. Thus, we are left with the single, narrow legal argument framed above.
8
or attempts to transport or move such alien within the
United States by means of transportation or otherwise, in
furtherance of such violation of law[.]
(emphasis added). We have construed this statute to require proof that: (1) the
defendant transported or moved an alien within the United States; (2) the alien
was present in violation of law; (3) the defendant was aware of the alien’s status;
and (4) the defendant acted willfully in furtherance of the alien’s violation of the
law. United States v. Barajas-Chavez, 162 F.3d 1285, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999) (en
banc).
Franco-Lopez focuses our attention on the second element. He asserts that
he “could not have been found guilty of illegal transport of the alien named in
count 3 of the indictment” because there was no evidence that Mozqueda-
Martinez, the alien named in count three, ever “entered” the United States. Aplt.
Br. at 10, 16. At trial, Franco-Lopez’s counsel thoroughly questioned Border
Patrol agents about every phase of their surveillance to show that Mozqueda-
Martinez was not seen crossing the border but was only spotted after he had
crossed. The agents testified Mozqueda-Martinez was then continuously tracked,
and thus was never free from official restraint. See, e.g., Aplee. Supp. App., Vol.
I at 192-98; id. at 220-24. After the close of evidence and the verdict was
received, Franco-Lopez renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal by arguing,
as regards count three, that because Mozqueda-Martinez “was not free to move
about and mix with the general population[,] he was not in the United States per
9
say [sic] and could not be transported in violation of the law.” Id. at 34.
Franco-Lopez has provided no legal authority to support his argument that
if the government has proven that the transported alien either “has come to” or
“remains in” the United States in violation of the law that the government must
also prove that the transported alien “entered” the United States illegally. This is
not surprising because we are aware of none.
The statute requires that the transported alien “has come to, entered, or
remains in” the United States illegally. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). The statute
accounts for a broad range of circumstances that may result in an alien’s illegal
presence in the United States. For example, many aliens who lawfully enter the
United States may eventually find themselves, perhaps because of an intervening
deportation order or loss of parole status, “present” in violation of the law. See,
e.g., United States v. Francisco, 30 F. App’x 48, 49 (4th Cir. 2002) (unpublished)
(holding that § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) applies to transportation of “an alien [who]
enters the United States on a tourist visa and illegally stays after the visa
expired”). The statute accounts for these situations by including aliens who
“remain[] in” the country illegally. Likewise, an alien may unlawfully “come to”
the United States without making entry. See United States v. Hernandez-Garcia,
284 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e believe that ‘come to’ in §
1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) means just what it says, come to the United States, not come
into or enter the United States.”). Thus, if the government has established by
10
other means that the transported alien is present in the United States and that his
presence is illegal, the government need not also prove the transported alien
“entered” the United States illegally.
Our precedent construes this element to require proof that the alien “was
present in violation of law.” Barajas-Chavez, 162 F.3d at 1287. Our generalized
inquiry into the transported alien’s unlawful presence in the United States finds
support in the caselaw of our sister circuits. See United States v. Lopez-Moreno,
420 F.3d 420, 438 (5th Cir. 2005) (requiring proof that passengers in the
defendant’s car “were in the United States illegally”); Hernandez-Garcia, 284
F.3d at 1139 (holding that, for purposes of proving transported alien’s status, “it
suffices for the government to show that the transporter drove an alien within this
country who had come to the United States unlawfully”); United States v.
Hernandez, 913 F.2d 568, 569-70 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that there was
sufficient evidence that transported aliens were “in the United States in violation
of the law” when aliens testified that they did not have “papers” authorizing them
to be in the country and that they were threatened with being sent back to
Guatemala if discovered); United States v. Alvarado-Machado, 867 F.2d 209, 213
(5th Cir. 1989) (“In order to be convicted of transporting illegal aliens . . . , the
alienage of those transported must be proved.”). As the Ninth Circuit explained
in Hernandez-Garcia:
On its face the statute prohibits transportation within the
11
United States of an alien who has “come to, entered, or
remains in the United States.” These are disjunctive
concepts. The crime is the transportation of an illegal
alien within this country, not the alien’s reentry. So long
as an alien has come to the United States unlawfully and
the transporter knows this (or recklessly disregards this
fact), and the alien is transported within the United States,
it is immaterial whether the alien has technically “entered”
the country or not.
284 F.3d at 1138; see also United States v. Esparza, 882 F.2d 143, 145 (5th Cir.
1989) (“The statute sets forth, in disjunctive form, the violations. The
prosecution must prove that the alien . . . ‘has come to, entered, or remains in the
United States in violation of the law.’ The government is not required to prove
all three conditions.”).
We therefore conclude that proof of the transported alien’s unlawful entry
into the United States is one, but not the only, method to prove that “the alien was
present in violation of law.” Barajas-Chavez, 162 F.3d at 1287. Given the
government’s proof that the transported alien was present in the United States
illegally, the district court did not err in holding that the government was not
additionally required to prove the transported alien’s entry was illegal. 3
3
While the motion for judgment of acquittal filed in the district court
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, Franco-Lopez did not raise this
argument on appeal. We read his appellate brief as only challenging the district
court’s legal conclusion that proof of the transported alien’s entry is not required
to sustain a conviction under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). Therefore, we will not review
the district court’s conclusion that “the uncontroverted testimony of the multiple
Border Patrol officers involved in Defendant’s apprehension easily meets the
(continued...)
12
B
The district court noted, in passing, that “the Tenth Circuit’s pattern jury
instruction on transportation offenses under § 1324 is in tension with established
law in all but three other federal circuits.” Franco-Lopez, 709 F. Supp. 2d at
1165. As discussed, it is clear from our precedent that the government must
prove the transported alien was present in the United States in violation of law.
That language is undoubtedly broader than the pattern instruction’s requirement
that the jury find that the alien entered or remained in the country unlawfully.
We again note, however, that Franco-Lopez has not raised as an issue on appeal
whether the district court erred in instructing the jury. But future juries should be
instructed using the broader language, which is more consistent with the statutory
offense and also easier for a jury to understand and apply.
III
We AFFIRM Franco-Lopez’s conviction for violation of 8 U.S.C. §
1324(a)(1)(A)(ii).
3
(...continued)
government’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Valente Mozqueda-
Martinez crossed the border, and hence ‘came to’ the United States without lawful
authorization.” Franco-Lopez, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 1165.
13