Estate of B.I.C. Ex Rel. C.S.C. v. Gillen , 702 F.3d 1182 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 19, 2012
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
THE ESTATE OF B.I.C., a minor
child, deceased; LARRY F.
CROSETTO, individually and as next
friend of C.S.C., a minor child;
MARY LOU CROSETTO,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 11-3219
LINDA GILLEN, individually and as
an agent of the Kansas Social and
Rehabilitation Services,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. No. 6:10-CV-01017-MLB-KGG)
Randall K. Rathbun, (and Molly McMurray of Depew, Gillen, Rathbun &
McInteer, LC, with him on the briefs), Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiffs -
Appellants.
Gerald L. Green, (and Maureen A. Redeker of Gilliland & Hayes, P.A, with him
on the brief), Manhattan, Kansas, for Defendant - Appellee.
Before KELLY, HOLLOWAY, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
This case stems from the death of a minor child, 23-month-old Brooklyn
Coons (“BIC”), on January 20, 2008, at the hands of her father’s girlfriend.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Larry and Mary Crosetto and the Estate of BIC, filed an
action alleging that a social worker, Defendant-Appellee, Linda Gillen, created
the danger that resulted in the death of their granddaughter and denied them their
rights to familial association. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Ms. Gillen, and declined to hear a supplemental state law claim. II Aplt.
App. 356. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that qualified immunity was unwarranted
on their state danger-creation and familial association claims. Our jurisdiction
arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We agree that qualified immunity was not
appropriate on the state danger-creation claim given genuine issues of material
fact. Thus we reverse in part. We affirm summary judgement on the familial
association claims.
Background
In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, we view the facts presented
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Dodds v. Richardson,
614 F.3d 1185, 1191–92 (10th Cir. 2010).
Angela Coons and her children (BIC and “CSC”), lived with her parents,
Mr. and Mrs. Crosetto, after she left her husband, Randy Coons, in August 2006.
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II Aplt. App. 212. In August 2007 Angela died suddenly, and Randy removed
BIC and CSC from the Crosettos’ home. Id. The children often stayed with their
grandparents, however, on weekends. Id. Mr. Coons lived with his girlfriend,
Melissa Wells, who has since been found guilty of BIC’s murder and claims to
have been suffering from a methamphetamine addiction at the time. Id.Appellee, Linda Gillen, has been a social worker with the Kansas
Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services (“SRS”) in Coffeyville, Kansas
for the past several decades. Id. at 290. Mr. and Mrs. Crosetto claim that Ms.
Gillen had intense hatred for their family, stemming from events that occurred
during their adoption of Angela in 1982. Id. at 173–74, 211–12. The Crosettos
also claim that Ms. Gillen knew about Melissa Wells and her background because
she had been in the custody of SRS as a child. Id. at 174–75.
Soon after Randy Coons took back his children, the Crosettos started to
notice bruising on BIC when she would visit. Id. at 332. The babysitter also
noticed that BIC had “a black eye, a busted lip with stitches and random bruising
all over her body.” Id. at 217. She alleges that she called SRS’s child protection
hotline. Id. at 217–18. On September 17, 2007, a school district employee also
reported concerns about BIC and CSC to SRS. Id. at 220–21. A few weeks later,
Mr. Crosetto took BIC to the emergency room, but he admittedly did not contact
SRS at that time because he was attempting to create a conservatorship for BIC
and CSC. Id. at 333. He did call the fire department and ask for an inspection of
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Randy Coons’s home, and though the fire chief examined the exterior, he never
heard back after requesting permission to inspect the inside. Id. at 212.
On November 5, 2007, CSC came to school with a 2-inch by 2-inch red
mark on the right side of his face that required ice. Id. at 333. The school
reported the incident to SRS, and Ms. Gillen interviewed Ms. Wells who admitted
to getting upset with the child and slapping him across the face. Id. Ms. Gillen
met with Mr. Coons and Ms. Wells to discuss the incident, but did not report it to
law enforcement. Id. At this time Ms. Wells already had been reported to SRS
on August 27, 2006 for bruises and a head injury on her biological child. Id. at
175. Reports had also been made that the Coons/Wells home was filthy, that
Melissa Wells smoked pot, and that her car smelled like marijuana. Id. On
November 6, 2007—the day after the slapping incident—Mr. Crosetto claims to
have attempted to contact Ms. Gillen. Id. at 213. He allegedly tried again on
November 14, 15, and 16, but could not reach Ms. Gillen until November 20. Id.
At that time, Mr. Crosetto claims that Ms. Gillen said that she had been to the
home to investigate the situation, which the Crosettos dispute. Id. In this same
phone conversation, Mr. Crosetto claims that Ms. Gillen said that allegations of
child abuse were “police matters” and refused to discuss them. Id.
On December 10, 2007, Mr. Crosetto again called Ms. Gillen about the
persistent bruising on BIC, and he claims that she responded that “her job was to
preserve the family unit and not to investigate child abuse.” Id. at 178. On
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December 24, 2007, Mr. Crosetto took BIC to Dr. Chan Han, who sent a letter to
SRS requesting that they investigate. Id. at 229. Ms. Gillen claims that she never
received this letter. I Aplt. App. 45. Around this same time, Coffeyville Police
Department School Resource Officer, Ed Rutherford, observed BIC and left a
message for Ms. Gillen. II Aplt. App. 232. He never received a response. Id.
Officer Rutherford then filed a Child in Need of Care Case Report and sent it to
SRS, the Juvenile County Attorney’s Office and the school’s truancy officer. Id.
On December 28, 2007, the Crosettos met with Ms. Gillen and attempted to
give her a CD of pictures showing BIC’s injuries, but she refused to accept it
saying that it was a police matter. Id. at 214. The Crosettos allege that Ms.
Gillen’s animus towards them was evident at this meeting, and they told her that
if she did nothing one of the children would end up dead. Id.
On January 17, 2008, the Coffeyville police responded to a 911 call,
finding BIC with bruises and head trauma while in Ms. Wells’s care. I Aplt. App.
12. She was hospitalized and transferred to Tulsa, Oklahoma, where doctors
found “a brain bleed from a blow to the head and brain damage resulting from
Shaken Baby Syndrome.” Id. BIC died on January 20, 2008 at the age of twenty-
three months. Id.
After BIC’s death, Camie Russell, Director for the Abuse, Neglect, and
Exploitation Unit of the Kansas Attorney General’s Office reviewed twelve of
Ms. Gillen’s cases, including BIC and CSC’s case. II Aplt. App. 206–09. She
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determined that Ms. Gillen treated BIC and CSC’s case differently than the other
eleven cases assigned to her. Id. at 207. She concluded that Ms. Gillen failed to
fulfill multiple responsibilities to BIC and CSC. Id. at 208. Among these
failures, Ms. Russell noted that Ms. Gillen failed to interview or observe other
children living in the home, failed to report to law enforcement that Ms. Wells
admitted hitting CSC, failed to interview other caretakers, and failed to complete
follow up on reports from law enforcement. Id. Ms. Russell also determined that
Ms. Gillen handled the Coons children differently, taking a more “hands off”
approach than she did in her other cases. Id. at 207.
The Crosettos claim that Ms. Gillen created the danger that resulted in the
death of BIC and denied the Crosettos and CSC their rights to familial
association. Ms. Gillen filed a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity,
but the district court denied this motion and limited discovery to the question of
qualified immunity. Ms. Gillen then filed an amended motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity which the district court granted. The court
held that Ms. Gillen was entitled to qualified immunity because her overall
conduct was not decidedly affirmative and did not shock the conscience. II Aplt.
App. 349. It declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
claim. II Aplt. App. 354.
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Discussion
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment based on
qualified immunity. Christiansen v. City of Tulsa, 332 F.3d 1270, 1278 (10th Cir.
2003). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In applying or reviewing the
application of Rule 56(a), we view all evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1191–92.
A. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity protects government employees from suit, except those
who are “plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Lewis v.
Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff may
only overcome a government official’s immunity by showing “first, that the
official violated the plaintiff’s federal statutory or constitutional rights, and,
second, that the rights in question were clearly established at the time of their
alleged violation.” Id.
1. Violation of a Constitutional Right
The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects an
individual’s life, liberty, and property against government actions. Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). Generally, it does not require the state to
protect life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.
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DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
There are, however, two recognized exceptions to this rule. First, state officials
may be liable for the acts of private parties when the state has assumed a special
relationship with and control over an individual. Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat
Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1126 (10th Cir. 2008). Second, state
officials can be liable for the acts of private parties where those officials created
the very danger that caused the harm. Christiansen, 332 F.3d at 1281 (citation
omitted). The Crosettos argue that the danger-creation exception applies here.
As an initial matter, a showing of affirmative conduct and private violence
are preconditions necessary to invoking the state-created danger theory. Gray v.
Univ. Colo. Hosp. Auth., 672 F.3d 909, 920 n.8 (10th Cir. 2012). Here there is
no question whether BIC’s death was caused by an act of violence by a private
party. There is, however, a question as to whether there is sufficiently
“affirmative conduct on the part of the state in placing the plaintiff in danger.”
Id. at 916 (quotation and emphasis omitted). Our precedents consistently
conclude that mere negligence or inaction is not enough. In particular, a social
worker who fails to act may be negligent but does not forfeit immunity when
there is no affirmative action. See, e.g., Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242,
1251–52 (10th Cir. 2008) (social worker not liable for failure to revoke a
daycare’s license where no there was no affirmative act creating an impression
that the daycare would be safe); Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1183 (10th
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Cir. 2002) (social worker not liable for failing to conduct a background check of a
childcare facility where no alleged affirmative conduct).
The district court held, as a matter of law, that Ms. Gillen’s conduct—while
“hard to explain or justify”—was not actionable because it was not “decidedly
affirmative” conduct. II Aplt. App. 349. Instead, the court concluded, Ms. Gillen
“basically did nothing in the face of evidence that would cause any thinking
person, not merely someone supposedly trained, to recognize that B.I.C. and
C.S.C. were in peril.” Id. We disagree.
There remains an issue here as to whether Ms. Gillen purposefully,
maliciously, and intentionally failed to act—therefore placing BIC and CSC in
harm’s way. This is more than negligence or indifference; the evidence viewed in
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs indicates a deliberate decision to ignore
based on decade-old animosity toward the Crosetto family. We have yet to hold
that such intentional or malicious inaction cannot constitute an act for purposes of
establishing a danger-creation claim. In Currier v. Doran, we concluded that a
state social worker’s alleged failure to investigate allegations that a father abused
his child sufficiently stated a due process claim where the social worker was
aware of the father’s history of financial irresponsibility, the child’s bruises, and
numerous allegations of abuse. 242 F.3d 905, 920 (10th Cir. 2001). Although
here there was no state removal or placement of BIC as occurred in Currier, there
were numerous, specific indications of abuse and a deliberate decision not to
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remove the children or respond in any way to the extensive evidence of abuse. A
rational trier of fact could find that Ms. Gillen’s conduct went well beyond
merely allowing unreasonable risks to persist, but was deliberate, affirmative
conduct in light of her specific knowledge of real danger to BIC.
Even if inaction based on expressed animus would not alone satisfy the
requirement of an affirmative act, the Crosettos suggest several affirmative acts
by Ms. Gillen. They point to at least five specific “acts” that a finder of fact
could determine sufficiently affirmative: (1) Ms. Gillen’s refusal to return police
phone calls; (2) Ms. Gillen’s refusal to accept a CD of photos showing injuries to
the Coons children; (3) Ms. Gillen’s alleged lying about being in the Coons’s
home; (4) Ms. Gillen’s telling the Crosettos the abuse of the Coons children was
not her issue, but one for law enforcement; and (5) Ms. Gillen’s claims that
allegations of abuse by Ms. Wells were unsubstantiated. We need not decide that
all of these acts are affirmative. Rather, we accept the district court’s
characterization, in denying the initial motion to dismiss, that “defendant’s
instruction to call the police and refusal to accept evidence of abuse were
affirmative acts.” I Aplt. App. 24.
A refusal is more than a mere failure to act. As the district court initially
found, “On December 10, 2007, Mr. Crosetto called defendant to report that the
bruises on their grandchildren[] were escalating. Defendant told Mr. Crosetto to
contact the police. Plaintiffs further allege that they provided defendant with a
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CD of photographs of B.I.C.’s injuries and that defendant refused to accept it.”
Id. The way in which Ms. Gillen discouraged the Crosettos and others from
reporting abuse directly to her and her refusal to receive documentation of the
abuse are sufficiently affirmative forms of conduct to proceed with a danger-
creation claim.
Other district courts have come to similar conclusions given a similar
failure to investigate claims of or prevent abuse at the hands of another. See, e.g.,
Kuyper v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Weld Cnty., No. 09-cv-00342-PAB-MEH,
2010 WL 1287534, *8 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2010) (finding social worker’s failure
to inform and misrepresentation to foster parents of a foster child’s history of
sexual misconduct sufficiently affirmative to state a danger-creation claim);
Briggs v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs., 472 F. Supp. 2d 1304,
1314 (W.D. Okla. 2007) (finding case worker’s discouraging reports of abuse
similarly sufficient). In cases such as Gray and DeShaney “[t]he most that
c[ould] be said of the state functionaries . . . is that they stood by and did nothing
when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role for them.” DeShaney,
489 U.S. at 203; see Gray, 672 F.3d at 925 (hospital’s misrepresentation that a
patient would receive 24-hour care was not a sufficiently affirmative act to invoke
the danger-creation doctrine). This is not the most that can be said of Ms. Gillen.
The Crosettos have shown at least two affirmative acts sufficient to proceed with
their danger-creation claims.
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In order to succeed on a danger-creation claim a plaintiff must meet all
elements of a six-part test:
(1) the charged state entity and the charged individual actors created the
danger or increased plaintiff’s vulnerability to the danger in some way;
(2) plaintiff was a member of a limited and specifically definable group;
(3) defendant[’s] conduct put plaintiff at substantial risk of serious,
immediate, and proximate harm; (4) the risk was obvious or known; (5)
defendants acted recklessly in conscious disregard of that risk; and (6)
such conduct, when viewed in total, is conscience shocking.
Christiansen, 332 F.3d at 1281 (quotation omitted). Here, however, the district
court only concluded that the Crosettos failed to prove the sixth element, and held
that Ms. Gillen’s behavior did not shock the conscience without addressing the
other factors. See II Aplt. App. 339–41, 349.
We disagree here as well. The record reveals additional facts that
corroborate the Crosettos’ position that Ms. Gillen’s conduct was outrageous and
conscience-shocking. These facts, taken in the light most favorable to the
Crosettos, could constitute violations of due process rights at trial. In particular,
after BIC’s death, Camie Russell, the director of the state’s Abuse, Neglect and
Exploitation unit in the Attorney General’s office, reviewed several cases handled
by Ms. Gillen. She signed an affidavit stating that Ms. Gillen’s “handling of
abuse cases other than the Coons was very hands on. She undertook actions
without court order based upon suggestions made by the county attorney or the
district judge. As to the Coons children she was very hands off.” Id. at 207.
Furthermore, Ms. Russell stated:
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Based upon my investigation, there were only two explanations for her
different handling of the abuse of the Coons children. One possible
explanation was that her failure to act on the Coons children was a
product of someone blocking her from taking action. The other
explanation was that she had some animus or ill will toward the
Crosettos and elected to do nothing to protect the children. I have
concluded the latter was the case for two reasons: (1) Gillen denied that
anyone had blocked her from taking any action toward the Coon[s]
children and (2) in Gillen’s meeting with law enforcement and the
Crosettos on the day after Brook was taken to the hospital, Gillen’s
animosity toward Larry Crosetto was so obvious that Detective George
indicated that she wishes that she would have recorded the interaction.
Id. at 207–08. Ms. Russell also listed what Ms. Gillen failed to do in her
handling of the Coons case. Id. at 208.
In the end, there remain fact questions surrounding the Crosettos’
substantive due process claims, including the motivation of Ms. Gillen and
therefore the potential outrageousness of her conduct. In deciding that there
remain material questions of fact, we are mindful of the policy concerns
underlying the requirements for a danger-creation claim including “(1) the general
need for restraint; (2) the concern that § 1983 not replace state tort law; and (3)
the need for deference to local policy decisions impacting public safety.” Currier,
242 F.3d at 920. Yet, in viewing the cumulative impression of Ms. Gillen’s
conduct, see id., we cannot agree with the district court that there was no
conscious-shocking action as a matter of law. No reasoned justifications or
policy considerations support such a conclusion. An intentional or spiteful failure
to act to protect a child in one’s care could be an action sufficient to shock even
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the conscience of a federal judge. See II Aplt. App. 340–41 (“To shock the
conscience of federal judges requires a high level of outrageousness.”).
In reversing the grant of summary judgment on the grounds of qualified
immunity, we recognize that there are five other elements of a danger-creation
claim BIC will have to meet in order to be successful. Because the district court
did not rely on any of these factors in its decision, we leave it to the district court
to analyze them in the first instance upon remand.
2. Clearly Established Law
Ms. Gillen briefly argues that, if the court must reach the second part of the
qualified immunity inquiry—whether the law was clearly established—a
reasonable person in her position would not have been aware that she was subject
to constitutional liability based on court precedent. Aplee. Br. 50–51. She states
that “a refusal to act . . . has never been held as a basis for liability under a
danger creation theory or familial association claim.” Id. at 51.
It seems to us, however, that Ms. Gillen should have known that if she did,
in fact, intentionally fail to act based on animus toward the Crosetto/Coons
family, she could have been liable under a danger-creation theory. This is not a
case where the facts, if true as alleged, would fall within a “hazy border” between
acceptable and illegal behavior. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201
(2004). Even under the theory that intentional, malicious inaction can give rise to
danger-creation liability, a reasonable actor in Ms. Gillen’s position would not
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have believed that she would be entitled to qualified immunity if she deliberately
and maliciously chose not to respond to numerous and specific indications of
child abuse. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740–41 (2002) (“[O]fficials can
still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual
circumstances.”). Spiteful and purposeful inaction when the well-being of a child
is at stake certainly “shocks the conscience” and would put a reasonable person
on notice that they are doing more than merely failing to act because they are
overworked or busy. It was error for the court to grant summary judgment on this
issue, given the evidence including statements and investigation by Ms. Gillen’s
superiors. We therefore reverse the court’s grant of summary judgment on the
issue of qualified immunity.
B. Familial Association
The Crosettos and CSC also claim that their due process rights to familial
association were violated by Ms. Gillen’s actions preceding BIC’s death. They
appeal the district court’s decision dismissing these claims as well.
As an initial matter, claims for loss of familial relationship are not
necessarily limited to those brought by parents or children. See Trujillo v. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs of Santa Fe Cnty., 768 F.2d 1186, 1188–89 (10th Cir. 1985). In
an unpublished opinion, this court has recognized that the right can extend to
grandparents in certain circumstances. Suasnavas v. Stover, No. 05-5171, 196 F.
App’x 647, 657 (10th Cir. Aug. 25, 2006) (citing Trujillo’s recognition of the
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importance of the familial relationship between grandparents and grandchildren).
When extending the right to grandparents, however, courts often consider whether
the grandparents are “custodial figure[s]” or “acting in loco parentis,” and
“whether there is a potential conflict between the rights of the [grandparent] and
the rights or interests of the [child’s] natural parents.” Rees v. Office of Children
& Youth, 744 F. Supp. 2d 434, 450, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2010), aff’d 473 F. App’x 139
(3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2012). We do not need to decide whether such considerations
merit extending the right to the grandparents in this case because the claim fails
even if there is a substantive due process familial interest.
In order to show deprivation of the right to familial association, a plaintiff
must show that the state actor intended to deprive him or her of a specially
protected familial relationship. Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1190. In Bryson v. City of
Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1990), we addressed a familial association
claim brought against various government actors when a postal service employee
killed several people inside of a post office. The claims alleged “failures of the
postmaster and the guardsmen to train, supervise, examine or afford medical care
to [the shooter] in deprivation of plaintiffs’ associational right[]” to their
deceased family members. Id. at 1393. We held that the family members failed
to plead any specific intent to interfere with their relationships, and therefore the
claims failed. Id. Furthermore:
To allege that “[b]y [specified] acts and conduct . . . defendant
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intentionally, or with conscious disregard for plaintiff’s rights”
deprived them of associational rights, with the qualification
immediately following that “[s]pecifically, Defendant knew, or should
have known that by the actions set forth above, death was likely to
occur, and the plaintiffs, and those they represent, would be denied the
companionship and association of the decedent,” does not meet the
Trujillo requirement.
Id. at 1393–94 (alterations in original). Therefore, the claim failed because
“[n]owhere in the complaint [was] there an allegation that any claimed acts or
omissions, however intentional, occurred with the specific intent on the part of
the defendants to deprive the plaintiffs of their rights of association with the
victims.” Id. at 1394.
The same is true here. The district court granted summary judgment on this
claim concluding that there was no issue of fact as to whether Ms. Gillen had the
specific intent to cause the death of BIC. See II Aplt. App. 352–53. The
Crosettos even admit that they do not think that Ms. Gillen intended to bring
about the death of BIC. Aplt. Br. 35. Therefore, their familial association claims
fail. See, e.g., Coffey v. United States, Nos. CIV 08–0588 MV/WDS, CIV
09–0028 JB/LFG, 2011 WL 2729068, at *10–*11 (D.N.M. July 7, 2011).
The Crosettos argue that they do not need to show that Ms. Gillen intended
to cause BIC’s death but only need to show an intent to interfere with the
relationship in some way. Yet there similarly is no evidence or reasonable
inference that Ms. Gillen’s conduct was directed at the intimate relationship with
an intent to adversely affect it. See Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1190. Because there is
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no evidence that her actions—even if based on animus—were based on an intent
to interfere with the Crosettos’ or CSC’s relationship with BIC, these claims must
fail and the district court correctly granted summary judgment on them.
C. Two-Year Limitations Period
Finally, Ms. Gillen argues that a two-year limitations period bars BIC’s,
CSC’s, and the Crosettos’ claims. The limitations period for claims arising under
§ 1983 is determined by the law of the state in which the cause of action arose.
See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269, 276 (1985), other parts superseded by
statute. The appropriate limitations period for a survivor’s action is two years.
K AN . S TAT . A NN . § 60-513(a)(4). Though Ms. Gillen agrees, see Aplee. Br. 48,
she argues that the alleged “injury” based on her conduct took place in 2007, and
therefore these claims are time-barred, id. at 49.
This argument is without merit. The injury that took place, and for which
the Crosettos are filing suit, is the death of BIC and the alleged loss of familial
association caused by her death. Aplt. Reply Br. 27. This occurred on January
20, 2008. Therefore, filing on January 19, 2010 was within the two-year
limitations period.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further
proceedings. We DENY Plaintiffs’ amended motion to file a supplemental
appendix as the material was not before the district court. See Fed. R. App. P.
10(a).
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11-3219, The Estate of B.I.C., et al. v. Gillen
MATHESON, J., concurring
I agree we should affirm the district court’s decisions to dismiss the
Plaintiffs’ familial association claim and to deny Defendant Gillen’s statute of
limitations defense. I also agree we should reverse and remand on the danger-
creation claim because Ms. Gillen’s failure to help BIC based on her alleged
longstanding hatred of the Crosettos and in the face of substantial child abuse
evidence could shock the conscience.
We need not address whether Ms. Gillen’s intentional inaction constitutes
“affirmative conduct” as that term is used in danger-creation jurisprudence. I
further do not think existing law clearly establishes that such intentional inaction
constitutes “affirmative conduct.”
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S.
189 (1989), the Supreme Court held that state actors who “played no part in the[]
creation” of danger to a plaintiff, and who did nothing to “render him any more
vulnerable” to danger, were not liable under the Due Process Clause for acts of
private violence. Id. at 201. Given this limitation, a plaintiff may establish a
substantive due process claim under a danger-creation theory by proving the
following elements:
(1) the charged state entity and the charged individual actors created
the danger or increased plaintiff’s vulnerability to the danger in some
way; (2) plaintiff was a member of a limited and specifically
definable group; (3) defendant[’s] conduct put plaintiff at substantial
risk of serious, immediate, and proximate harm; (4) the risk was
obvious or known; (5) defendants acted recklessly in conscious
disregard of that risk; and (6) such conduct, when viewed in total, is
conscience shocking.
Christiansen v. City of Tulsa, 332 F.3d 1270, 1281 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotations
omitted).
The parties vigorously contest the first element, but the district court chose
to skip elements one through five and rest its summary judgment ruling on
element six—whether Ms. Gillen’s conduct shocks the conscience.
It is not clear whether the district court assumed, without deciding, that
elements one through five could be proved, or thought it could simply bypass
those elements as long as addressing element six would resolve the summary
judgment motion. The court recognized that the Plaintiffs must show that
“affirmative acts created or increased the danger to BIC,” Dist. Ct. Op at 10; that
“defendant’s overall conduct must be decidedly affirmative,” id. at 20; and that
“little affirmative conduct appears,” id. But it nonetheless explicitly relied on
element six—failure to show that the defendant’s conduct shocks the
conscience—to grant summary judgment to Ms. Gillen.
Although affirmative conduct is “a necessary precondition” of a danger-
creation claim, Gray v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 672 F.3d 909, 925 (10th Cir.
2012), the shocks-the-conscience part of such a claim concerns the defendant’s
“conduct as a whole,” Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 574 (10th Cir. 1995). This
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includes both action and inaction. See Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 920 (10th
Cir. 2001) (stating that a social worker’s failure to act could be conscience-
shocking under a danger-creation theory). Viewed in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiffs, Ms. Gillen’s refusal to accept evidence from the Crosettos that BIC
was being abused and her refusal to help BIC based on her alleged longstanding
hatred of the Crosettos is sufficient for Plaintiffs to withstand summary judgment
on the shocks-the-conscience element.
I agree with the majority that remanding this case will allow the parties and
the district court to address whether summary judgment should be granted based
on the other five elements of the danger-creation claim.
The majority addresses “whether Ms. Gillen purposefully, maliciously, and
intentionally failed to act—therefore placing BIC and CSC in harm’s way.” Maj.
Op. at 9. It concludes that our precedent clearly establishes that such inaction
constitutes affirmative conduct that exposed Ms. Gillen to danger-creation
liability. See id. at 14. Because this question goes to element one of the
Plaintiffs’ danger-creation claim, and because the district court based its ruling
only on element six, I would not address this issue.
In addition, I am not convinced that clearly established law holds that such
intentional inaction constitutes affirmative conduct that would defeat a qualified
immunity defense. We have said that “[i]naction by the state in the face of a
known danger is not enough to trigger the obligation” to protect a plaintiff under
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a danger-creation theory, Graham v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-89, 22 F.3d 991, 995
(10th Cir. 1994), because inaction does not change the “status quo” and expose
the plaintiff to acts of private violence, see Currier, 242 F.3d at 924. It is thus
not clearly established that inaction, even if intentional and malicious, constitutes
“affirmative conduct” as that term is used in our danger-creation jurisprudence.
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