United States v. Swearingen , 506 F. App'x 804 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 2, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 12-4125
v. (D.Ct. No. 2:06-CR-00651-DAK-1)
(D. Utah)
KIRK ALAN SWEARINGEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior
Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Kirk Alan Swearingen, a pro se federal prisoner, appeals the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
district court’s order denying his two motions challenging the factual information
in his presentence report pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32 and
36. We deny Mr. Swearingen leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss his
appeal as frivolous. 1
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On February 26, 2007, Mr. Swearingen pled guilty to one count of
possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).
Thereafter, a probation officer prepared a presentence report which, in paragraph
42 of the “Other Criminal Conduct” section, stated, “[a]ccording to a
memorandum and documents dated November 18, 1993, from a homicide
detective at the Aurora Police Department in Aurora, Colorado, [Mr. Swearingen]
was suspected of involvement in homicides and sexual assaults along the
Canadian border.” In addition, paragraph 44, under “Pending Charges,” stated
Mr. Swearingen had been charged with “Rape of a Victim Less Than 10 Years,
First-Degree Felony; Sexual Contact With a Child Under 16 Years, Third-Degree
Felony,” involving a seven-year-old boy.
1
Regarding Mr. Swearingen’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) provides that “notwithstanding any filing fee, or
any portion thereof, that may have been paid,” this court “shall dismiss” a case
any time it determines the “appeal ... is frivolous or malicious ....” The purpose
of § 1915(e) is to “discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private
resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate.”
Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006).
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At sentencing, Mr. Swearingen’s counsel stated that although Mr.
Swearingen “disagree[d] with certain language contained in the presentence
report,” he raised no objection because the disagreements did “not affect his
criminal history or the range that he [was] looking at in the sentence.” On June
25, 2007, the district court sentenced Mr. Swearingen to the minimum statutory
sentence of 120 months in prison and a life term of supervised release. Mr.
Swearingen did not file a direct appeal.
Months later, Mr. Swearingen sought to contest and change information in
his presentence report, and on February 25, 2011, through counsel, he filed a
motion to amend the presentence report pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32, including, but not limited to, changes to paragraphs 42 and 44.
With respect to paragraph 42, his counsel claimed no memorandum or documents
supported the allegations he was suspected of involvement in homicides and
sexual assaults on the Canadian border and that such allegations were “extremely
damaging and prejudicial” and created “difficulty in Mr. Swearingen’s
classification and ability to participate in various [Bureau of Prisons] programs.”
Concerning paragraph 44, Mr. Swearingen’s counsel provided
documentation showing he was not charged with “Rape of a Victim Less than 10
Years,” as indicated in the presentence report, but rather solely charged with
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“Sexual Contact with Child Under Sixteen.” In requesting the charged offense be
changed to the latter, Mr. Swearingen asserted the offense of rape of one less than
ten years old “significantly prejudice[d]” him and subjected him to “ridicule and
harassment while in custody.”
The government filed a response, joined by Mr. Swearingen, in which they
agreed certain corrections should be made to various paragraphs in the
presentence report, including their agreement on stipulated language to amend
paragraph 42 regarding his alleged involvement in homicides and sexual assaults
on the Canadian border. 2 However, the parties did not address Mr. Swearingen’s
objection to paragraph 44 to limit the charge solely to sexual contact with a child
under sixteen. On April 6, 2011, the district court adopted the parties’ stipulated
changes to various provisions of the presentence report, including the stipulated
2
The stipulated language for the proposed amendment read:
A memorandum, written by Detective Brant of the Aurora, Colorado,
Police Department, on November 18, 1993 stated the following:
“I talked with Detective Garbett who told me that
approximately 6 months ago the FBI came in and talked
to him about Kirk. It appears that the FBI in the
Northwest has been working with the [Royal Canadian
Mounted Police] from Canada thinking that [Mr.]
Swearingen may be involved in some serial murders and
sexual assaults along the Canadian border in the
Northwest.”
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language substituted for paragraph 42, and ordered the presentence report
amended to reflect such changes. Pursuant to the district court’s order, the
probation officer issued a “Second Addendum,” attached to the presentence
report, which reflects the ordered amendment substituting the parties’ stipulated
language for paragraph 42.
Thereafter, Mr. Swearingen filed a pro se motion objecting to the district
court’s order amending the presentence report and stating, “[t]here are currently
items contained in [it] that are false and unverifiable” as well as “items never
corrected.” The district court responded by issuing two orders. The first order
denied Mr. Swearingen’s general objections to the presentence report, stating his
objections were too “general and vague” to provide a basis to question the
accuracy of the parties’ stipulated changes to the report. The other order directed
the probation officer to amend the presentence report by changing paragraph 44,
as requested, to show Mr. Swearingen was charged solely with “Sexual Contact
with Child Under 16.” Accordingly, the probation officer issued a “Third
Addendum” to the presentence report, reflecting the ordered change to paragraph
44.
On May 30, 2012, Mr. Swearingen filed two motions, including a pro se
motion to amend the presentence report challenging the factual accuracy of
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paragraph 42 and a motion for an order to show cause asserting the presentence
report did not contain the correction to paragraph 44 as ordered. On the same
day, the district court denied Mr. Swearingen’s motions. With regard to Mr.
Swearingen’s general objections to the presentence report, the district court
pointed out both his counsel and the government reviewed the presentence report,
evidence in the case, and transcripts of prior proceedings which culminated in his
stipulated changes made to the presentence report and that all appropriate changes
had been made. As to Mr. Swearingen’s allegation the probation officer ignored
its previous order to amend paragraph 44, it explained the ordered change had
been made, as reflected in the third addendum to the presentence report.
II. Discussion
Mr. Swearingen now appeals the district court’s May 30, 2012 order
denying his May 30, 2012 motions concerning alleged factual inaccuracies and
omissions in the presentence report. In apparent reference to paragraph 42, Mr.
Swearingen contends the presentence report contains “innacurate [sic] and false
information” based on hearsay concerning his involvement in murder and sexual
assault, which he states he previously asked the court to correct. Similarly, in an
apparent reference to paragraph 44, Mr. Swearingen reasserts his claim the
probation officer ignored the court’s order to change the presentence report with
regard to the charge against him for sexual contact with a child under sixteen. In
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a few abbreviated sentences, he also generally alleges he has been harmed or
prejudiced by false and/or incorrect information in his presentence report and
requests any unverifiable information be removed but does not identify what facts
are inaccurate nor does he provide legal argument in support thereof.
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, a defendant has an
obligation to allege factual inaccuracies in the presentence report, and the district
court may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report as a finding of
fact. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(f) and (i)(3)(A). Because “accuracy is paramount
in the sentencing process” parties have an obligation to object to the inaccuracies
in the presentence report as part of the “focused, adversarial development of the
factual and legal issues” relevant in determining the appropriate sentence. United
States v. Virgen-Chavarin, 350 F.3d 1122, 1132 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f),
Mr. Swearingen had fourteen days after receiving the presentence report to
challenge any facts contained therein, but he did not object to any facts until
months after issuance of the presentence report and imposition of his sentence.
We have long held “[f]ailure to object to a fact in a presentence report, or failure
to object at the [sentencing] hearing, acts as an admission of fact,” United States
v. Deninno, 29 F.3d 572, 580 (10th Cir. 1994), and waiver of the issue, see United
States v. Kay, 961 F.2d 1505, 1507 (10th Cir. 1992).
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As a result, Mr. Swearingen did not properly preserve for appeal his
general objections to the factual information contained in the presentence report.
See Deninno, 29 F.3d at 580. Moreover, even if we were to consider his cursory
argument his presentence report contains unverifiable facts or information, such a
perfunctory argument, unaccompanied by identification of the contested facts and
some effort at developed argument, is inadequate to warrant our consideration,
see United States v. Almaraz, 306 F.3d 1031, 1041 (10th Cir. 2002), even though
we construe Mr. Swearingen’s pro se pleadings liberally, see Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
While Mr. Swearingen waived his right to object to the facts contained in
the presentence report, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 enables a court to
“at any time correct a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the
record, or correct an error in the record arising from oversight or omission.” Fed.
R. Crim. P. 36. However, this provision allows correction of only non-
substantive errors and does not empower a court to substantively modify a
sentence. See United States v. Lonjose, 663 F.3d 1292, 1299 n.7 (10th Cir. 2011)
(relying on United States v. Blackwell, 81 F.3d 945, 949 (10th Cir. 1996)).
Accordingly, the district court in this case was empowered to make non-
substantive corrections, which it did by ordering the agreed-to corrections to the
presentence report, including inclusion of the parties’ stipulated language for
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paragraph 42 and the requested correction to the offense charged in paragraph 44.
Despite these corrections, Mr. Swearingen on appeal continues to challenge
the previously-stipulated language used to correct and amend paragraph 42.
Under the circumstances presented, we decline to relieve him from his stipulation,
see Stafford v. Crane, 382 F.3d 1175, 1180 (10th Cir. 2004), and also note his
challenge to the stipulated language in paragraph 42 is akin to the “invited error
doctrine,” which precludes one from arguing the district court erred in adopting a
proposition he previously urged it to adopt. See United States v. Quaintance, 608
F.3d 717, 721 n.2 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Deberry, 430 F.3d 1294,
1302 (10th Cir. 2005). Because he is challenging the very language to which he
agreed, Mr. Swearingen’s appeal of the corrected language in paragraph 44 is
soundly frivolous. See Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1510 (10th Cir. 1987)
(holding an appeal is frivolous if the result is obvious or the arguments of error
are wholly without merit).
Similarly, Mr. Swearingen’s assertion the probation officer ignored the
district court’s order to omit the sexual contact charge in paragraph 44 is woefully
frivolous given the requested change was made, as clearly explained by the
district court and evidenced in the third addendum to the presentence report. To
the extent Mr. Swearingen is somehow arguing he continues to experience
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prejudice because the requested corrections are recorded in the two addenda,
rather than in the presentence report itself, we note each addendum is
incorporated into and made a part of the presentence report for review by those
with access to his sealed records.
We advise Mr. Swearingen, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 38, that this court may “award just damages, including attorney’s fees,”
when we determine an appeal is frivolous, Braley, 832 F.2d at 1510, and such
sanctions may be imposed against a pro se litigant, see Haworth v. Royal, 347
F.3d 1189, 1192 (10th Cir. 2003). We caution him any future frivolous appeals
may result in summary disposition without discussion and/or an order requiring
him to show cause why this court should not impose both appellate filing
restrictions and sanctions. 3
3
“The right of access to the court is neither absolute nor unconditional,
and there is no constitutional right of access to the courts to prosecute an action
that is frivolous or malicious.” Winslow v. Hunter (In re Winslow), 17 F.3d 314,
315 (10th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). We possess inherent
authority “to regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully
tailored restrictions under the appropriate circumstances.” Tripati v. Beaman, 878
F.2d 351, 352 (10th Cir. 1989). We have long held that where a party has
engaged in a pattern of litigation activity which is manifestly abusive, restrictions
are appropriate, but only after notice and an opportunity to respond are given.
See Werner v. Utah, 32 F.3d 1446, 1447-48 (10th Cir. 1994); In re Winslow, 17
F.3d at 315. We may impose filing restrictions based on our inherent power to
regulate federal dockets, promote judicial efficiency, and deter frivolous filings.
See Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1437 (10th Cir. 1986).
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III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we DENY Mr. Swearingen leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and DISMISS his appeal as frivolous.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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