Courtney v. Oklahoma Ex Rel. Department of Public Safety , 722 F.3d 1216 ( 2013 )


Menu:
  •                                                                    FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    July 15, 2013
    PUBLISH             Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    JASON WAYNE COURTNEY,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                                    No. 12-7028
    STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel.,
    DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY;
    JACOB SMITH, Oklahoma Highway
    Patrol Trooper, in his individual capacity,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
    (D.C. NO. 6:11-CV-00280-RAW)
    David R. Keesling (Timothy S. Kittle with him on the briefs), Richardson
    Richardson Boudreaux Keesling, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Devan A. Pederson, Assistant Attorney General (Kevin L. McClure, Assistant
    Attorney General, with him on the brief), Oklahoma Attorney General’s Office,
    Litigation Division, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before KELLY, MURPHY, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
    MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
    I.    Introduction
    Plaintiff Jason Wayne Courtney appeals the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment to Defendants in his action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
    against Trooper Jacob Smith and the State of Oklahoma ex rel the Oklahoma
    Department of Public Safety (the “State”). Courtney’s claims arise from a traffic
    stop on the Muskogee Turnpike during which he was arrested for being a felon in
    possession of a firearm in violation of Oklahoma law. See Okla. Stat. tit. 21
    § 1283(A). Courtney alleges Smith violated his constitutional rights by
    unreasonably extending the scope of the traffic stop and arresting him without
    probable cause. Courtney also asserts state-law causes of action against the State
    for false arrest and imprisonment, assault and battery, and conversion. The
    district court granted the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, concluding
    Smith was entitled to qualified immunity and the State was immune from liability
    under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act. See Okla. Stat. tit. 51
    § 155(4). Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms
    in part and reverses in part.
    II.   Background
    The underlying material facts are undisputed. On October 25, 2010, at
    approximately 1:30 a.m., Smith observed Courtney’s vehicle traveling on the
    Muskogee Turnpike at eighty-two miles per hour. The posted speed limit was
    seventy-five miles per hour. Further, Courtney did not dim his headlights as he
    -2-
    passed Smith’s patrol car. Smith initiated a traffic stop. Courtney did not stop
    immediately, but continued through a traffic light and pulled into an open, well-
    lighted gas station, stopping only after Smith briefly sounded his siren.
    After Courtney came to a complete stop, Smith approached Courtney’s
    vehicle and instructed Courtney to exit and take a seat in the front of the patrol
    car. Smith explained to Courtney he was stopped for speeding and failure to dim
    and that he would be issued a warning. While preparing a written warning, Smith
    asked Courtney questions about his travel plans. Courtney stated he was driving
    from his home in Tennessee to work in Tulsa after spending the weekend with his
    family. He further stated Tulsa was the only place he could find work, and that
    he returned to Tennessee about every three weeks to visit his family. During this
    discussion, Smith observed what he believed to be signs of extreme nervousness,
    including Courtney’s heart beating through his shirt; his carotid artery visibly
    pulsing; heavy breathing; continuous yawning; nervous laughter; and shaky,
    sweaty hands. Smith became suspicious Courtney was engaged in criminal
    activity. He nonetheless returned Courtney’s license and paperwork to him and
    wished him a safe trip.
    As Courtney was returning to his vehicle, Smith asked him if he would be
    willing to answer a few more questions. Courtney declined. Smith then ordered
    Courtney to stop and return to the patrol car. Smith explained to Courtney that he
    was suspicious of criminal activity and asked him if he had any illegal drugs,
    -3-
    large amounts of cash, or firearms in the vehicle. Courtney told Smith he had a
    gun in the trunk. Smith called for another unit and had a police canine sniff
    Courtney’s vehicle for drugs. The dog did not alert.
    While the dog sniff was in progress, Smith requested Courtney’s criminal
    record. A report was sent to Smith’s patrol vehicle via the Interstate
    Identification Index (“Triple I”). The report included an entry indicating
    Courtney had been adjudicated guilty of felony breaking and entering in probate
    court in Alpena County, Michigan on May 5, 1998. Further, the report indicated
    the charge was disposed of through a “juv adjudication.” Smith showed the
    screen to Courtney, but Courtney did not recall any felony conviction and stated
    he did not have a felony on his record. Smith was aware at the time that the
    offense occurred more than twelve years prior and that Courtney would have been
    under eighteen years of age when it occurred. Despite initially expressing
    hesitation to other officers, Smith ultimately arrested Courtney for possession of a
    firearm after former conviction of a felony, in violation of Okla. Stat tit. 21
    § 1283(A).
    Courtney was held for thirty-six hours at the Muskogee County Jail. His
    vehicle and gun were seized pursuant to the arrest. On October 26, 2010,
    Courtney’s attorney contacted the Muskogee County District Attorney’s office
    and informed the district attorney that Courtney did not have a felony conviction
    on his record. The district attorney ordered that Courtney be released; no charges
    -4-
    were filed. Upon his release, Courtney was able to retrieve his vehicle after
    payment of the impound fees. Smith, however, did not turn the gun in to the
    Muskogee County Sheriff’s office until November 9, 2010. On November 12,
    2010, Courtney’s attorney sent the State a notice under the Oklahoma
    Governmental Tort Claims Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 51 § 156, stating, inter alia, that
    the gun had not yet been returned. The gun was not returned to Courtney until
    October 13, 2011, almost one year after it was seized.
    Courtney brought suit against Smith and the State. Courtney asserted
    claims against Smith under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging in two separate counts he
    was subjected to the unconstitutional seizure of his person and property, in
    violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Courtney asserted
    state-law claims against the State for false arrest and imprisonment, assault and
    battery, and conversion. The district court granted summary judgment to the
    Defendants on all of Courtney’s claims. Regarding Courtney’s § 1983 claims, the
    court concluded Smith was entitled to qualified immunity. Further, applying
    Overall v. State ex rel. Department of Public Safety, 
    910 P.2d 1087
    , 1092 (Okla.
    Civ. App. 1995), the court concluded the State was immune from Courtney’s
    state-law claims under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act.
    -5-
    III.   Discussion
    A.    Standard of Review
    This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
    same legal standard as the district court. Becker v. Bateman, 
    709 F.3d 1019
    , 1022
    (10th Cir. 2013). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
    that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
    to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “This court reviews
    summary judgments based on qualified immunity differently than other summary
    judgments. When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment,
    the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a
    constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established.”
    
    Becker, 709 F.3d at 1022
    (quotation omitted). In determining whether a right is
    clearly established, “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry is whether it would be
    clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
    confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 
    533 U.S. 194
    , 202 (2001), overruled on other
    grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 
    555 U.S. 223
    , 236 (2009). “We do not require a
    case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
    constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 
    131 S. Ct. 2074
    ,
    2083 (2011). This court maintains the discretion to decide “which of the two
    prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
    circumstances in the particular case at hand.” 
    Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236
    .
    -6-
    B.     Constitutional Claims
    Courtney’s § 1983 challenge to the seizure of his person has two
    components. First, he alleges Smith lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him
    beyond the time necessary to issue the traffic warning. Second, he alleges Smith
    lacked probable cause to arrest him. As a preliminary matter, however, we first
    address Smith’s argument that because he could have arrested Courtney for
    speeding and failing to dim his headlights, the extended detention and ultimate
    arrest did not violate Courtney’s constitutional rights. Relying primarily on three
    Supreme Court cases, Virginia v. Moore, 
    553 U.S. 164
    (2008), Devenpeck v.
    Alford, 
    543 U.S. 146
    (2004), and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 
    532 U.S. 318
    (2001), Smith argues that when a traffic stop is supported by probable cause that
    a motorist has committed even a minor traffic offense, it is impossible for the
    subsequent stop to be unreasonably extended because the officer could arrest the
    motorist for the traffic offense. At minimum, Smith argues that any violation of
    Courtney’s constitutional rights was not clearly established because Moore,
    Devenpeck, and Atwater inject sufficient uncertainty into the law of traffic stops.
    See Reichle v. Howards, 
    132 S. Ct. 2088
    , 2095–96 (2012) (discussing Supreme
    Court authority which had “injected uncertainty” into clearly established law in
    the qualified immunity context). Smith’s reading of Moore, Devenpeck, and
    Atwater is flawed.
    -7-
    In Atwater, the Court held an officer may constitutionally arrest an offender
    for minor traffic offenses, such as failure to wear a 
    seatbelt. 532 U.S. at 354
    (“If
    an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a
    very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth
    Amendment, arrest the offender.”). In Moore, the Court clarified that an arrest is
    constitutional even if, under state law, the officer should have issued a summons
    instead of arresting the 
    offender. 553 U.S. at 176
    . (“[W]arrantless arrests for
    crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the
    Constitution, and . . . state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment’s
    protections.”). Finally, in Devenpeck, the Court rejected the argument that an
    officer’s stated reason for arresting an offender must be “closely related” to the
    offense for which there is probable cause to 
    arrest. 543 U.S. at 153
    (“[A]n
    arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant
    to the existence of probable cause. That is to say, his subjective reason for
    making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts
    provide probable cause.” (citations omitted)). Even taken together, these cases do
    not support the conclusion that an officer, after issuing a warning citation for a
    traffic violation, may continue to detain a driver indefinitely and then arrest the
    driver for a different offense without probable cause.
    To the contrary, Smith’s interpretation of Atwater and Devenpeck is
    inconsistent with subsequent Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit authority on the
    -8-
    lawful scope of traffic stops. In Illinois v. Caballes, 
    543 U.S. 405
    , 406 (2005),
    state troopers stopped a defendant traveling along an interstate highway for
    speeding. After first acknowledging the validity of the initial stop, the Court
    proceeded to analyze whether the stop was unreasonably extended:
    Here, the initial seizure of respondent when he was stopped on the
    highway was based on probable cause and was concededly lawful. It
    is nevertheless clear that a seizure that is lawful at its inception can
    violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution
    unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution. A
    seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning
    ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the
    time reasonably required to complete that mission.
    
    Id. at 407 (citation
    omitted) (emphasis added). This court’s cases have followed
    suit, analyzing whether traffic stops which were valid at their inception remain so
    throughout the encounter. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 
    636 F.3d 1281
    , 1290
    (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Villa, 
    589 F.3d 1334
    , 1339 (10th Cir. 2009);
    United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 
    441 F.3d 1252
    , 1258 (10th Cir. 2006). We
    therefore reject Smith’s argument that Courtney’s traffic violations obviated the
    need for additional justification to prolong the stop after the issuance of a
    warning citation or otherwise excuse Smith for arresting Courtney on another
    basis without probable cause.
    1.     Extended Detention
    Courtney argues his detention in Smith’s patrol car following the issuance
    of a warning ticket for the traffic violations constituted an unreasonable seizure in
    -9-
    violation of the Fourth Amendment. “In addition to being justified at its
    inception, a lawful traffic stop must be reasonably related in scope to the
    circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” United States v.
    Lyons, 
    510 F.3d 1225
    , 1236 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted); see also
    
    Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407
    . “Therefore, once an officer returns the driver’s license
    and vehicle registration and issues a warning ticket, he must allow the driver to
    proceed without further detention or questioning unless the officer has an
    objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in
    illegal activity.” 
    Lyons, 510 F.3d at 1237
    . 1
    To determine whether reasonable suspicion exists, “we look to the totality
    of the circumstances to see whether the officer had a particularized and objective
    basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” 
    Id. (quotation omitted). “Reasonable
    suspicion is something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
    hunch, but is considerably less than proof by a preponderance of the evidence or
    proof required for probable cause.” United States v. De La Cruz, 
    703 F.3d 1193
    ,
    1196 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotations and alteration omitted). In the context of
    Courtney’s § 1983 claim and Smith’s defense of qualified immunity, the scope of
    our analysis is limited even further: the issue is not simply whether reasonable
    1
    The traffic stop may also be extended if the driver consents to additional
    questioning. United States v. Lyons, 
    510 F.3d 1225
    , 1237 n.7 (10th Cir. 2007).
    Here, however, Courtney expressly refused such consent. See supra Part II.
    -10-
    suspicion existed, but whether it was clearly established that reasonable suspicion
    did not exist. The inquiry thus focuses on whether it would have been clear to a
    reasonable officer in Smith’s position that he lacked lawful authority to extend
    the stop. 
    Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236
    .
    The district court identified three bases for Smith’s suspicion of criminal
    activity: (1) Courtney did not stop immediately after Smith activated his lights,
    but instead proceeded through a traffic light and into a gas station; (2) Smith
    observed signs of extreme nervousness throughout the stop, even after advising
    Courtney he would only be receiving a warning; and (3) Courtney’s stated travel
    plans. Regarding the first of these factors, Courtney argues his decision to
    proceed to a gas station was done for his own safety. While this explanation is
    entirely reasonable, it was also reasonable for Smith to interpret the action as
    potentially indicative of criminal activity. See 
    Lyons, 510 F.3d at 1237
    (“We give
    deference to an officer’s ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious
    actions.” (quotation omitted)). Thus, Courtney’s delay in coming to a stop
    supports the conclusion reasonable suspicion existed to extend the stop.
    As for the second factor, this court has consistently held that ordinary
    nervousness is not entitled to significant weight when determining whether
    reasonable suspicion exists. United States v. Simpson, 
    609 F.3d 1140
    , 1147 (10th
    Cir. 2010). “Extreme and persistent nervousness, however, is entitled to
    somewhat more weight.” 
    Id. at 1148 (quotation
    omitted). Here, Smith articulated
    -11-
    multiple indicia of Courtney’s extreme nervousness during the stop: visible heart
    palpitations; heavy breathing; nervous laughter; repeated yawning; and shaky,
    sweaty hands. See 
    id. (“The court examines
    specific indicia that the defendant’s
    nervousness was extreme, rather than credit an officer’s naked assertion.”).
    Moreover, Smith observed that Courtney’s nervousness did not dissipate after he
    was informed he would only be receiving a warning for the traffic violation. This
    observation is consistent with extreme nervousness. 
    Id. Thus, the second
    factor
    also supports the conclusion reasonable suspicion existed at the time of the stop.
    As for the third factor, this court recently discussed the evaluation of a
    motorist’s stated travel plans in a reasonable suspicion analysis:
    We have credited inconsistent travel plans as a factor contributing to
    reasonable suspicion when there are lies or inconsistencies in the
    detainee’s description of them. For example, a police officer could
    reasonably believe a travel plan was implausible—and the person
    was lying—if that person claimed that he or she had left a certain
    city by car an hour ago if the officer pulled over that person, 200
    miles from the city. To this extent, the factor seems
    noncontroversial: lies, evasions or inconsistencies about any subject
    while being detained may contribute to reasonable suspicion. In
    contrast, this circuit has been reluctant to deem travel plans
    implausible—and hence a factor supporting reasonable
    suspicion—where the plan is simply unusual or strange because it
    indicates a choice that the typical person, or the officer, would not
    make.
    
    Id. at 1148–49. Here,
    Courtney’s assertion that he was traveling from one state to
    another state for work after visiting his family for the weekend was not
    accompanied by any lies, evasions, or inconsistencies. Indeed, his stated plans
    -12-
    were wholly unremarkable. Thus, Courtney’s stated travel plans do not support
    the conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed. 2
    In sum, two of the three factors identified by the district court—Courtney’s
    delay in coming to a stop after Smith activated his lights and the extreme
    nervousness Courtney exhibited throughout the stop—support an inference of
    reasonable suspicion. The third—Courtney’s stated travel plans—does not. The
    factors supporting reasonable suspicion are quite thin. However, it is at least
    debatable whether reasonable suspicion existed. As such, Courtney has not
    shown his extended detention was a violation of clearly established law. 
    al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083
    . 3 The district court therefore did not err in concluding Smith
    2
    While the inquiry into whether reasonable suspicion exists is an objective
    one, 
    Lyons, 510 F.3d at 1236
    , we note that Smith made no mention of suspicious
    travel plans in his probable cause affidavit filed after the arrest. Moreover, at the
    time of the stop Smith indicated to other officers on the scene that he believed
    Courtney was being truthful about his travel plans. Under these circumstances,
    the deference this court normally affords to an officer’s judgments as to whether
    certain activity is innocent or suspicious, 
    id. at 1237, is
    considerably diminished.
    3
    Courtney also argues the district court’s reasonable suspicion analysis
    erroneously relied on factors observed before Smith returned his license and
    registration and attempted, unsuccessfully, to secure his consent. While this court
    has held that, after the return of a driver’s documentation, continued detention of
    a motorist is impermissible absent consent or reasonable suspicion, we have
    expressly rejected the proposition that an officer cannot rely on facts observed
    prior to that point in formulating reasonable suspicion. United States v. Williams,
    
    271 F.3d 1262
    , 1271 (10th Cir. 2001); see also 
    Lyons, 510 F.3d at 1237
    (considering facts observed prior to the return of a motorist’s license and
    registration in analyzing whether reasonable suspicion justified continued
    detention.).
    -13-
    was entitled to qualified immunity on Courtney’s claim that the traffic stop was
    unreasonably prolonged.
    2.     Warrantless Arrest
    Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, an officer may make a warrantless
    arrest if there is probable cause to believe a criminal offense has been or is being
    committed. 
    Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152
    . “Whether probable cause exists
    depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the
    arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” 
    Id. Further, an officer’s
    subjective
    motivations for making an arrest are irrelevant in a probable cause inquiry. 
    Id. (“[A]n arresting officer’s
    state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is
    irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.”). The district court concluded
    Courtney’s arrest was supported by probable cause that Courtney violated
    Oklahoma’s felon-in-possession statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1283, or, in the
    alternative, Oklahoma’s obstruction of justice statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 540.
    We consider these justifications in turn.
    Oklahoma’s felon-in-possession statute provides, in relevant part:
    A. . . . [I]t shall be unlawful for any person convicted of any felony
    in any court of this state or of another state or of the United States to
    have in his or her possession or under his or her immediate control,
    or in any vehicle which the person is operating, or in which the
    person is riding as a passenger, or at the residence where the
    convicted person resides, any pistol, imitation or homemade pistol,
    altered air or toy pistol, machine gun, sawed-off shotgun or rifle, or
    any other dangerous or deadly firearm.
    -14-
    ....
    D. It shall be unlawful for any person previously adjudicated as a
    delinquent child or a youthful offender for the commission of an
    offense, which would have constituted a felony offense if committed
    by an adult, to have in the possession of the person or under the
    immediate control of the person, or have in any vehicle which he or
    she is driving or in which the person is riding as a passenger, or at
    the residence of the person, any pistol, imitation or homemade pistol,
    altered air or toy pistol, machine gun, sawed-off shotgun or rifle, or
    any other dangerous or deadly firearm within ten (10) years after
    such adjudication . . . .
    Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1283. Thus, while Oklahoma law prohibits the possession of
    firearms by a person previously convicted of a felony, a juvenile adjudication
    over ten years old does not qualify as an underlying felony. At the time Smith
    arrested Courtney, he knew the breaking and entering entry on the Triple I report
    referred to an incident that occurred when Courtney was a minor and that it was
    over ten years old. The Triple I report also indicated the charge was brought by
    petition in probate court and, most importantly, that the charge was disposed of as
    a juvenile adjudication. In concluding Smith had probable cause to arrest
    Courtney, the district court reasoned that “juvenile offenses are generally sealed
    and not listed on a national database. . . . Smith could have reasonably concluded
    that because the felony was listed on the national database, Plaintiff was charged
    as an adult and that the offense, therefore, was not a ‘juvenile offense’ within the
    meaning of the statute.” Order at 11. There is no support in the record for the
    district court’s statement in this regard, nor does Smith point to any such support
    -15-
    on appeal. To the contrary, Department of Justice regulations governing the
    Triple-I system provide that “[c]riminal history record information maintained in
    the [Triple-I] System . . . shall include serious and/or significant adult and
    juvenile offenses.” 28 C.F.R. § 20.32(a) (emphasis added). Further, the district
    court’s analysis ignores the information available to Smith on the Triple-I report,
    which plainly indicates the prior breaking and entering charge was a juvenile
    adjudication. Therefore, given the facts known to him at the time of the arrest,
    Smith lacked probable cause to arrest Courtney for possession of a firearm by a
    convicted felon.
    Alternatively, the district court concluded Smith was entitled to qualified
    immunity on Courtney’s claim of unlawful arrest because he did not violate
    clearly established law. In so doing, the court characterized Smith’s decision to
    arrest Courtney as, at worst, a mistaken legal conclusion regarding the scope of
    the felon-in-possession statute. Because qualified immunity “gives government
    officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open
    legal questions,” 
    al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2085
    , the court concluded any such
    mistake did not vitiate Smith’s claim to qualified immunity. This conclusion, too,
    was error. Oklahoma’s felon-in-possession statute is not ambiguous. Persons
    convicted of a felony as an adult are prohibited from possessing firearms. Okla.
    Stat. tit. 21 § 1283(A). Persons adjudicated delinquent on similar charges as a
    juvenile are only prohibited from possessing firearms for ten years. 
    Id. -16- § 1283(D).
    The information available to Smith at the time of the arrest made
    clear Courtney was in the latter category. It was therefore clearly established that
    Smith lacked probable cause to arrest Courtney for violation of the felon-in-
    possession statute.
    The district court also concluded Smith had probable cause to arrest
    Courtney for obstruction of justice. Okla Stat. tit. 21 § 540 provides: “Every
    person who willfully delays or obstructs any public officer in the discharge or
    attempt to discharge any duty of his office, is guilty of a misdemeanor.” Thus,
    under Oklahoma law, to be guilty of obstruction, a defendant must (1) willfully;
    (2) delay/obstruct; (3) a public officer; (4) known by the defendant to be a public
    officer; (5) in the discharge of any duty of his office. Okla. Uniform Jury
    Instructions, Crim.2d, § 6-48 (2012). A suspect who willfully gives false
    statements to the police which impede an investigation is guilty of obstruction
    under Oklahoma law. Marsh v. State, 
    761 P.2d 915
    , 916–17 (Okla. Crim. App.
    1988). The district court concluded Smith had probable cause to arrest Courtney
    for obstruction because Courtney denied having a felony on his record and stated
    he had never been arrested for breaking and entering. This conclusion is not
    supported by the record. As the video of the traffic stop makes clear, while
    Courtney initially denied having ever been arrested for burglary, as Smith shared
    details from the Triple I report, Courtney clarified he simply did not remember
    any such arrest or conviction. Further, when shown the information on the Triple
    -17-
    I report, Courtney acknowledged it referred to him, and clarified that he simply
    did not remember the event. Thus, there is no evidence Courtney’s statements
    impeded Smith’s investigation or altered its course in any way. Cf. 
    id. at 916 (“In
    his argument on appeal, the appellant admits that the false statement given to the
    police ‘impeded’ the investigation.”). The district court therefore erred in
    concluding probable cause existed to arrest Courtney for obstruction.
    C.     State-Law Claims
    The district court granted summary judgment to the State on Courtney’s
    claims for false arrest and imprisonment, assault and battery, and conversion
    based on the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act., Okla. Stat. tit. 51
    § 155(4) 4, which provides: “The state . . . shall not be liable if a loss or claim
    results from: . . . [a]doption or enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a
    law, whether valid or invalid, including, but not limited to, any statute, charter
    provision, ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation or written policy.” The statute
    immunizes the State for claims of false arrest or imprisonment for arrests made
    with probable cause. Overall v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 
    910 P.2d 1087
    ,
    1092 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995). Having rejected the district court’s conclusion that
    4
    Recently, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held unconstitutional and declared
    void a bill which amended provisions of Okla. Stat. tit. 51 § 155. See Douglas v.
    Cox Ret. Props., 
    2013 WL 2407169
    , at * 3 (Okla. 2013). Okla. Stat. tit. 51
    § 155(4) was unaffected by either the bill or the subsequent decision of the
    Oklahoma Supreme Court. See H.B. 1603, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009).
    -18-
    Smith had probable cause to arrest Courtney, we necessarily reject its corollary
    conclusion that the State is entitled to governmental immunity. As an alternative
    ground for affirmance, 5 the State argues that even if Smith lacked probable cause
    to arrest Courtney, it is still entitled to immunity under § 155(4) because Smith
    was attempting to enforce a law when he made the arrest. This argument lacks
    foundation in Oklahoma law. In Overall, the State argued it was immune from
    liability under § 155(4) for a claim of false arrest because, even if the arresting
    officers lacked probable cause, the arrest was made in good faith. 
    Id. at 1092–93. The
    court rejected this argument:
    We hold the State’s position to be a misinterpretation of the law. . . .
    [T]he troopers were undisputedly acting in good faith when they
    exercised their right to make an arrest. Where the officers ran afoul,
    however, was not in the performance of their duty as arresting
    officers, but in the arrest itself. An arrest made without probable
    cause is a false one, despite the fact it was made by an officer acting
    in good faith in the performance of his duty.
    
    Id. at 1093 (emphasis
    added). The State’s argument before this court is nearly
    identical to that rejected in Overall. We therefore conclude the State is not
    entitled to governmental immunity from Courtney’s claim of false arrest and
    imprisonment. 6
    5
    It is well established that this court “may affirm for any reason supported
    by the record, but not relied on by the district court.” Brady v. UBS Fin. Servs.,
    Inc., 
    538 F.3d 1319
    , 1327 (10th Cir. 2008).
    6
    In support of its assertion that § 155(4) immunizes it from liability
    regardless of whether Smith had probable cause to make the arrest, the State
    (continued...)
    -19-
    Regarding Courtney’s claim for conversion, even if the district court was
    correct in concluding Smith had probable cause to make the arrest, § 155(4)
    would not necessarily bar Courtney’s claim for conversion. Under Oklahoma law,
    “[c]onversion is any act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another’s personal
    property in denial of or inconsistent with his rights therein.” Welty v. Martinaire
    of Okla., Inc., 
    867 P.2d 1273
    , 1275 (Okla. 1994). The undisputed material facts
    in the present case indicate that, even after Courtney had been released from jail
    and it had been determined it was not illegal for him to possess a firearm, the
    State retained possession of his pistol for almost one year. The district court
    therefore erred in granting summary judgment on Courtney’s conversion claim.
    Finally, as to Courtney’s assault and battery claim, Courtney alleges he was
    subjected to offensive physical contact without his consent in the course of his
    arrest and confinement. Under Oklahoma law, a battery occurs when the
    defendant acts with the intent of making a harmful or offensive contact with the
    person of the plaintiff and the act results in a harmful or offensive contact. See
    6
    (...continued)
    relies on Turner v. Klika, No. 07-CV-268, 
    2011 WL 4538423
    (W.D. Okla. Sept.
    29, 2011) (unpublished), Morales v. City of Oklahoma City ex rel. Oklahoma City
    Police Department, 
    230 P.3d 869
    (Okla. 2010), and Williams v. City of Warr
    Acres, 
    695 P.2d 519
    (Okla. 1985). None of these authorities, however, involved
    an allegation of arrest made without probable cause. See Turner, 
    2011 WL 4538423
    , at *1; 
    Morales, 230 P.3d at 873
    , 876; 
    Williams, 695 P.2d at 520–21
    .
    -20-
    Okla. Uniform Jury Instruction, Civ.2d, § 19.6 (2012). 7 In response, the State
    relies on Okla. Stat. tit. 51 § 155(16) and Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 643(1). Okla. Stat.
    tit. 51 § 155(16) provides: “The state . . . shall not be liable if a loss or claim
    results from . . . [a]ny claim which is limited or barred by any other law.” Okla.
    Stat. tit. 21 § 643(1) provides: “To use or to attempt to offer to use force or
    violence upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful . . . [w]hen
    necessarily committed by a public officer in the performance of any legal duty.”
    The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, has held that § 643 cannot be used in
    conjunction with § 155(16) to immunize a government agency from suit based on
    the conduct of its employees. Morales v. City of Okla. City ex rel. Okla. City
    Police Dep’t, 
    230 P.3d 869
    , 877 (Okla. 2010) (“We reject City’s argument that
    § 643, in conjunction with § 155(16), renders City immune from suit. . . . Instead,
    we interpret § 155(16) to bar suit against a governmental employer only if, and to
    the extent that, a law outside the [Act] would prevent a suit from being brought
    against the employee-tortfeasor.” (emphasis added)). We therefore decline to
    affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Courtney’s assault and
    battery claim on the alternate grounds proposed by the State.
    7
    Every battery necessarily includes an assault. Hall v. State, 
    309 P.2d 1096
    , 1100 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957).
    -21-
    IV.   Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s order granting summary
    judgment to Smith and the State is affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The
    district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Smith as to Courtney’s claims
    related to the extension of the traffic stop is affirmed. The district court’s grant
    of qualified immunity to Smith as to Courtney’s claims of unlawful arrest without
    probable cause is reversed. The district court’s grant of summary judgment to
    the State on Courtney’s claims for false arrest, conversion, and assault and battery
    is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings
    not inconsistent with this opinion.
    -22-