In Re RBS Securities, Inc. ( 2014 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 4, 2014
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Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
In re: RBS SECURITIES, INC.; RBS No. 14-3151
ACCEPTANCE, INC.; FINANCIAL (D.C. No. 2:11-CV-02340-JWL-JPO)
ASSET SECURITIES CORP.,
Petitioners.
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ORDER
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Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, HOLMES, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
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This matter is before the court following the panel’s determination, sua sponte,
that the order issued originally in this case on August 25, 2014, should be published. As
part of that publication, we note a slight amendment to the second sentence of the last
paragraph on page 4. With that modification, the clerk is directed to reissue the order in
published form. A copy of the published decision is attached to this order.
Entered for the Court
ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS September 4, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
In re:
RBS SECURITIES, INC.;
RBS ACCEPTANCE, INC., No. 14-3151
FINANCIAL ASSET SECURITIES (D.C. No. 2:11-CV-02340-JWL-JPO)
CORP., (D. Kan.)
Petitioners.
ORDER
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, HOLMES and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
RBS Securities, Inc., RBS Acceptance, Inc., and Financial Asset Securities
Corp. (collectively “RBS”) petition “this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the
District Court to strike Section 2 of the Master Discovery Protocol and vacate all
discovery orders entered in this case pursuant to Section 2.” Pet. at 2. For the
reasons explained below, we conclude that RBS has failed to establish its entitlement
to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus.
I. Background
The National Credit Union Administration Board (“NCUA”) has brought a
number of actions against RBS and other defendants in the District of Kansas, the
Central District of California, and the Southern District of New York. RBS and the
other defendants moved pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to centralize the litigation in
the District of Kansas. NCUA opposed the request for consolidation, but agreed that
coordination of its actions would create efficiencies. The Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) denied the consolidation request, noting that the
cases did not share sufficient common questions to warrant consolidation. But the
JPML order indicated that “alternatives to centralization exist, in particular informal
cooperation among the involved attorneys and coordination between the involved
courts, that may minimize whatever possibilities there may be of duplicative
discovery or inconsistent pretrial rulings.” Pet. App., Vol. 4 at 834.
After the JPML issued its order, the defendants, including RBS, submitted a
letter to the three district courts overseeing NCUA’s cases in Kansas, California, and
New York and stated that they would agree to the entry of some form of a master
discovery protocol to apply in all of the related litigation in all three districts. NCUA
then submitted a specific proposal on coordination, suggesting that all three judges
designate a coordination judge and noting that the coordination judge could confer
with the other judges before issuing a ruling.
In early April, there was a joint hearing held to discuss coordinating discovery
in the related litigation in all three districts. Judge Cote from New York reported that
she and the other judges (Judge Lungstrum and Magistrate Judge O’Hara from
Kansas and Judge Wu from California) had been consulting with each other, had
decided that there would be a coordination judge, and that she would serve in that
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role. RBS aired its objections during the hearing, but ultimately, the judges decided
to move forward with the coordination plan. Subsequently, a “Master Discovery
Protocol” (“MDP” or “the Protocol”) was entered in each of the related cases pending
in each of the three districts.
RBS seeks to strike Section 2 of the Protocol through this mandamus petition.
That section is titled “Procedure for Presenting Discovery Dispute” and provides:
To avoid unnecessary conflicts and inconsistencies in the rulings
in the Actions, Judge Cote is designated as the “Coordination Judge” for
all Actions. All discovery applications and disputes shall be brought to
the Coordination Judge in the form of a two-page letter, with copies
simultaneously provided to the other three Judges. Following
consultation with Judges Lungstrum and/or O’Hara, and Judge Wu, the
Coordination Judge will endeavor to respond promptly.
All applications and disputes regarding discovery in any Action
will be filed in the lead case pending in the Southern District of New
York (currently 13 Civ. 6705). If the application or dispute applies to
fewer than all Actions, then the submission should be filed as well in
the Action or Actions to which it applies. The discovery parameters and
limitations set forth in the ruling by the Coordination Judge on the
application or dispute will be given effect in all Actions, unless the
ruling indicates otherwise.
Add. to Pet. at 4.
At the end of April, RBS and Nomura, one of the other defendants, filed a
motion in the District of Kansas to modify the MDP requesting that the district court
strike Section 2. The district court denied the motion to modify.
Subsequently, RBS filed the instant mandamus petition. Nomura did not join
in the mandamus petition and neither have the other seven defendants in these
actions. RBS has also filed mandamus petitions in the Second and Ninth Circuits
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seeking orders directing the district courts in those circuits to strike Section 2 of the
MDP.
II. Discussion
“[A] writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy, and is to be invoked only in
extraordinary circumstances.” In re Cooper & Tire Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1186
(10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is “used only to confine an
inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to
exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus, three conditions must be
met:
First, because a writ is not a substitute for an appeal, the party seeking
issuance of the writ must have no other adequate means to attain the
relief he desires. Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that his right
to the writ is clear and indisputable. Finally, the issuing court, in the
exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate
under the circumstances.
Id. at 1187 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Discovery orders, like the one at issue in this case, are interlocutory and not
subject to appeal until final judgment. On occasion, we have permitted review of
discovery orders in the mandamus context. See, e.g., id. at 1183 (reviewing
mandamus petition involving claim that district court disregarded the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in ordering discovery); Barclaysamerican Corp. v. Kane, 746 F.2d
653, 654 (10th Cir. 1984) (reviewing mandamus petition involving claim that district
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court’s order required disclosure of privileged information). RBS’s challenge to the
Protocol is appropriate for mandamus review.
RBS, however, has failed to demonstrate that its right to the writ is clear and
indisputable. RBS’s primary argument is that Section 2 of the MDP improperly gives
Judge Cote authority to decide issues in the Kansas cases without complying with the
local rules and statutory provisions for transferring cases or the process for
designating a judge for service in another circuit. In a related argument, RBS also
contends that Section 2 permits the district court in Kansas to abstain from deciding
disputes in the cases before it and cede its authority to a court outside of this circuit.
We appreciate the concerns RBS raises in its petition as the procedure adopted
by the Protocol in Section 2 is broadly stated. We also note that Judge Cote initially
issued some rulings in Kansas cases that did not contain a signature of a Kansas
judge. In Judge Lungstrum’s order denying the motion to modify the Protocol,
however, he explained that:
[T]his Court does not understand or intend the MDP to provide for
rulings by Judge Cote that are binding in the Kansas cases. The MDP
expressly requires Judge Cote to consult with a judge from this district
on any discovery dispute. To the extent that an issue affects or applies
to a Kansas case, it will be decided by a Kansas judge (after
consultation in accordance with the MDP’s procedure), and no order
will be effective in the Kansas cases unless it is signed by a Kansas
judge and filed in this Court.
Add. to Pet. at 13-14. He further explained that:
Although the judges of this Court did consult and decide how the
issues would be resolved for purposes of the Kansas cases, did authorize
Orders to be issued bearing this Court’s caption and listing the names of
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the judges of this Court, and did cause the resulting orders to be filed in
this Court, in a few recent instances the signature of a Kansas judge was
inadvertently omitted from the orders. The Court will issue orders
nunc pro tunc to give those unsigned orders effect in the Kansas cases.
Id. at 14 n.1. Judge Lungstrum then entered the nunc pro tunc orders that same day.
See, e.g., Pet. App., Vol. 2 at 538-43. Since that time, there have been no orders
issued in a Kansas case that have not been signed by a Kansas judge.
Under these circumstances, RBS has not demonstrated that its right to
mandamus relief is clear and indisputable. Judge Lungstrum unambiguously stated
that he or Judge O’Hara would be deciding any issues that affect or apply to the
Kansas cases, and that no order would be effective in a Kansas case unless it is
signed by a Kansas judge and filed in that court.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.
Entered for the Court
ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk
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