Moomey v. Sirmons ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
October 30, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
PETE G A RY M O O ME Y ,
Petitioner-A ppellant,
v. No. 05-6299
(D.C. No. 04-CV -880-HE)
M A RTY SIR MO N S, Warden; THE (W .D. Okla.)
A TTO RN EY G EN ER AL O F THE
STA TE OF O K LA H O MA ,
Respondents-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, L UC ER O, and H ARTZ, Circuit Judges.
Pete G ary M oomey, convicted in state court of first-degree murder, appeals
the federal district court’s order denying his petition for habeas relief. 1 W e
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1
W e deny Respondents-Appellees’ motion to dismiss this appeal on the
ground that M oomey failed to lodge specific objections to the federal magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation that habeas relief be denied. W hile
(continued...)
granted a certificate of appealability to determine whether M oomey’s trial counsel
was ineffective for not pursuing certain evidence that another person had
comm itted the crime. W e conclude that (1) counsel acted within the realm of
acceptable trial strategy in deciding what witnesses to call; and (2) that
procedural bar precludes substantive review of counsel’s failure to obtain DNA
evidence. Therefore, we affirm.
B ACKGROUND
M oomey and Bill W alker were friends and business partners. D uring their
relationship, “[t]here had become an imbalance on the order of $160,000.” A plt.
App., Vol. 3, at 985. Specifically, M oomey “had overdrawn [his] share of [the]
net profits.” Id. at 992.
On Thursday, M ay 21, 1998, W alker arrived at the Cove Club, an
Oklahoma City bar, expecting to meet M oomey “with some money.” Id., Vol. 1,
at 250. W hen M oomey arrived, he told W alker that “he had made a deposit at the
bank . . . [and] that it was late in the day and would not show up on the records
until tomorrow.” Id. at 251. The two had a drink, played pool, and then left
separately for the Enzone, another bar.
1
(...continued)
M oomey’s objections w ere limited in specificity, they were specific enough to
focus the district court’s attention on the factual and legal issues in dispute. See
United States v. 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (10th Cir. 1996).
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Before reaching the Enzone, M oomey stopped at his flower shop, where his
friend, Steve Tabor, was waiting. Ordinarily, Tabor would drive M oomey around
town because M oomey had lost his driver’s license. But because M oomey
“need[ed] to take care of some business,” M oomey had Tabor follow him to the
Enzone. Id. at 170-71.
M oomey and Tabor arrived at the Enzone sometime around 5:00 or 7:00
p.m., and began playing pool. W alker was there, along with another of the
group’s friends, Tommy Yost. At 10:00 p.m., M oomey told Tabor to wait at the
Enzone for about an hour, because he might call for a ride. M oomey then left in
W alker’s car.
Around 10:38 p.m., M oomey called Tabor, stating that he w as “at Kerr
Village,” an apartment complex, and needed a ride. Id. at 173. Tabor traveled to
Kerr Village and found M oomey, who was carrying a “shoe box with a cloth” on
it. Id. at 175. According to Tabor, M oomey put the box in the back of Tabor’s
truck, got in, and wiped his hands and forearms with a piece of paper, which he
then threw out the window. M oomey also suggested that Tabor “may need to
vacuum out [the] truck, . . . [as] there may be blood and glass in it.” Id. at 177.
Tabor thought that M oomey appeared “stressed out.” Id. at 176. Tabor drove
M oomey to a parking lot adjacent to M oomey’s home, where M oomey said, “The
less you know , the better off you are. . . . [I’m] not a bad person, it’s just
business, and watch the TV . . . . [I]t has to do with $160,000.” Id. at 177.
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M oomey then exited the truck, retrieved the box and cloth, and walked off tow ard
his home. There, M oomey’s wife, Regina, saw her .38-caliber revolver in the
box.
Around 11:00 or 11:30 p.m., Yost, who was still at the Enzone, received a
telephone call from M oomey, asking if Yost would come to M oomey’s home and
drive Regina to the Enzone so she could retrieve M oomey’s truck. Yost
complied.
Several hours later, M oomey left home in his truck, with the box and some
clothes. M oomey picked-up his girlfriend and left town, intending to order plants
in Kingston, Oklahoma, and then take a trip “somewhere.” Id., Vol. 2, at 403.
On Saturday, M ay 23, police found W alker’s car in Kerr Village parked
next to a dumpster. According to residents, it had been parked there since
Thursday night. W alker’s body was found lying in the front seat and there were
two gunshot wounds to his head. The window on the driver’s side door was
shattered. The evidence indicated that W alker had been shot at close range, “six
or so inches away,” id. at 523, with .38-caliber metal-point bullets fired from
either a .38-caliber or a .357-magnum revolver, id. at 558. Among other items
found in the car was a cigarette butt, the DNA profile for which matched neither
M oomey nor W alker.
W hen Tabor learned of Walker’s murder, he contacted police. M oomey
was arrested in Galveston, Texas on Sunday, M ay 24. A search of M oomey’s
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home uncovered a box of .38-caliber ammunition that was consistent with a bullet
removed from W alker’s skull. M oomey was charged with first-degree murder and
robbery with a firearm.
During trial, a dispute arose betw een M oomey and his defense counsel.
M oomey wanted his counsel “to call another witness . . . before I testify, another
person that’s been implicated in this crime.” Id., Vol. 5, at 1660. Defense
counsel explained to the court that there were three designated witnesses in this
area: Tommy M erritt, Patsy Thompson, and Donna Schatz. Thompson and
Schatz purportedly overheard M erritt tell an unidentified party on the telephone
that he (M erritt) had killed W alker. Defense counsel stated that he had
interview ed Thompson and concluded that she would not make “a credible
witness.” Id., Vol. 5, at 1662. He continued: “I have made the decision that
strategically in this trial to not muddy the water and put this on. I feel it will
backfire. And so, I do not intend to call Tommy M erritt, Patsy Thompson or
Donna . . . Schatz.” Id. Defense counsel indicated, however, that he had not
spoken to Schatz. The prosecutor revealed that M erritt was interviewed by police
and denied admitting to W alker’s murder. Thompson was also interviewed, and
she told police “that she was [M oomey’s] first love and that she would do
anything to get [M oomey] out of jail.” Id., Vol. 6, at 1666. Additionally,
Thompson was M oomey’s sister-in-law and M erritt’s ex-girlfriend, had once
smashed M erritt’s windshield, and failed to reveal M erritt’s alleged admission for
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four-and-a-half months. M oomey ultimately decided to follow defense counsel’s
advice and to proceed w ithout calling any of the three witnesses.
M oomey took the stand and testified that around 10:00 p.m., W alker
offered to drive him home from the Enzone. And that while driving him home,
W alker took a diversion to Kerr Village to “pick up” a female prostitute. Id., Vol.
6, at 1742. Because W alker later decided to “hang around [Kerr Village]” and
“party,” M oomey called Tabor for a ride home. Id. at 1747-48. M oomey denied
warning Tabor about blood and glass possibly getting in his truck, denied
mentioning “$160,000,” and claimed that the box he was carrying contained a
bottle of alcohol and that much of his conversation with Tabor concerned Tabor’s
affair with Regina. Id. at 1759. M oomey also testified that he did not kill
W alker, did not owe him $160,000, and that someone must have planted the
amm unition in his home. During closing arguments, M oomey’s counsel
suggested that W alker may have been killed by the prostitute or her pimp, and
that Tabor and Regina implicated M oomey so they could be together.
The jury found M oomey guilty of first-degree murder, but not guilty of
robbery. M oomey appealed to the O klahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA),
arguing, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective for “fail[ing] to
present to the jury that another man had admitted that he had killed W alker.” Id.,
Vol. 7, at 2049. The OCCA affirmed, stating that counsel’s conduct “w as w ithin
the wide range of reasonable professional conduct based on sound trial strategy.”
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Id. at 2224. M oomey then sought state post-conviction relief. He was
unsuccessful initially and on appeal.
In his habeas petition to the federal district court, M oomey argued, among
other things, that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) “fail[ing] to investigate
material exculpatory information from” Schatz and Thompson indicating that
M erritt w as the killer, id. at 2071; and (2) not having the “DNA collected at the
[crime] scene” compared to M erritt’s DNA, id. at 2072. The court denied the
petition and M oomey appealed.
D ISCUSSION
We review the denial of federal habeas relief de novo, applying the same
standards used by the district court. Jackson v. Ray, 390 F.3d 1254, 1259
(10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 61 (2005). Under the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a federal court may not grant habeas relief
on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court, unless the state court decision
“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or
“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). M oomey does not
complain that the OCCA unreasonably determined the facts of his ineffective-
assistance claim; thus, our analysis proceeds under § 2254(d)(1).
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The Sixth Amendment’s counsel clause is violated when counsel performs
deficiently and prejudices the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984). “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance
and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment.” Id. at 690. In particular, “strategic choices made after thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation
are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments
support the limitations on investigation.” Id. at 690-91.
I. Witness Testimony
M oomey argues that his counsel’s decision to not call M erritt, Thompson,
and Schatz was deficient because he never interviewed Schatz. M oomey explains
that “Schatz was a potential credible witness [who] would have identified the real
killer and/or who would have been used to impeach M r. M erritt’s testimony or
assertion of the 5th Amendment.” Aplt. Br. at 42. Nevertheless, we cannot say
that the OCCA improperly applied Strickland in deeming counsel’s decision
acceptable trial strategy. M erritt had denied responsibility for the killing and
there was no independent evidence implicating him. Thompson had motive to lie
about M erritt’s involvement and had failed to promptly contact authorities. And
while testimony from Schatz might have drawn the jury’s attention away from
M oomey, it might also have alienated the jury, given the suspect nature of the
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accusation. Further, accusing M erritt would have conflicted, at least partially,
with M oomey’s theory that Walker had been killed by a prostitute or her pimp. 2
Consequently, counsel’s decision to avoid “muddy[ing] the water” by accusing
M erritt of Walker’s murder was strategically sound, notwithstanding the failure to
interview Schatz. Aplt. App., Vol. 5, at 1662.
II. DNA Evidence
M oomey also argues that his counsel was ineffective for not obtaining D N A
from M erritt and comparing it to the DNA on the cigarette butt found in W alker’s
car. This argument was not made to the OCCA on direct appeal. M oomey
apparently advanced this argument during the state post-conviction proceedings,
id., Vol. 7, at 2138, and the OCCA found that it was barred, as it could have been
brought on direct appeal, id. at 2065.
W e do not consider issues on habeas review that have been defaulted in
state court on an independent and adequate state procedural ground, unless the
petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of
justice. Smith v. M ullin, 379 F.3d 919, 926 (10th Cir. 2004). W e have construed
Oklahoma’s procedural bar as effective “to preclude habeas review of ineffective
assistance claims only when ‘trial and appellate counsel differ’ and the ‘claim can
be resolved upon the trial record alone.’” Id. at 927 (quoting English v. Cody,
146 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998)). M oomey had different counsel at trial and
2
Nothing in the record indicates whether M erritt was or was not a pimp.
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on appeal. Further, after the state raised the procedural-bar defense in regard to
the DNA-evidence/ineffective-assistance issue, Aplt. App., Vol. 7, at 2138,
M oomey’s habeas counsel filed a reply completely omitting any mention of the
issue or the state’s defense, id. at 2183-92. See Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206,
1217 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Once the state pleads the affirmative defense of an
independent and adequate state procedural bar, the burden to place that defense in
issue shifts to the petitioner.”). W e conclude that the state sufficiently raised the
procedural-bar defense and that M oomey conceded its applicability before the
federal district court. 3
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
3
In resolving M oomey’s habeas petition, the federal district court found
“analysis of the [habeas] procedural issues more problematic than a review of the
merits of [M oomey’s] ineffective assistance of counsel claims.” Aplt. App., Vol.
7, at 2169. C onsequently, the court did not apply procedural bar or AEDPA-
deference, and instead, reviewed on the merits M oomey’s claim that trial counsel
was ineffective for not obtaining a DNA comparison. W hile we do not share the
district court’s view that the record is so vague as to warrant a merits review, w e
would agree with the district court that, on the merits, M oomey’s trial counsel
was not deficient for failing to obtain a DNA comparison.
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