United States v. Vasquez ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 25, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 10-8051
v. (D.C. No. 1:09-CR-00359-WFD-2)
(D. Wyo.)
RICHARD VASQUEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, TACHA, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Richard Vasquez appeals from his conviction and sentence upon a jury
verdict of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute
methamphetamine. 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A); Aplt. App. at 11.
He was sentenced to 156 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised
release. Aplt. App. at 605. On appeal, Mr. Vasquez challenges the admission of
his own statements and those of other claimed conspirators. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Background
In September 2009, a confidential informant identified Scott Hoffman as a
source of methamphetamine. Further investigation led the Wyoming Division of
Criminal Investigation (“DCI”) to believe that Mr. Vasquez was Mr. Hoffman’s
source. A search warrant was prepared and authorized. Mr. Vasquez’s statements
were made on October 17, 2009, when, following the search of Mr. Vasquez’s
home and his arrest, DCI Special Agent Scott Weischedel interviewed Mr.
Vasquez. Id. at 235. The search revealed small quantities of marijuana and
cocaine and a plastic spoon that tested positive for cocaine and methamphetamine,
along with a scale, plastic bags, six pistols and a rifle, and business cards
imprinted with the name “Richard Vasquez Drilling, Inc.”–all of which were
seized by authorities. Id. at 311-20, 323-24, 335. During his interview with the
DCI agent, Mr. Vasquez said he had cocaine in the house but no marijuana or
methamphetamine. Id. at 238. He did, however, admit to selling
methamphetamine “a long time ago” and that “he had used cocaine and
methamphetamine and that he shared it with people but that didn’t mean he sold
it.” Id. at 238-39.
The deadline to file pretrial motions was January 4, 2010. Fed. R. Crim. P.
12(b)(3). Mr. Vasquez moved to exclude the seized cocaine and marijuana as
well as any lab reports and testimony referencing them on Fed. R. Evid. 403 and
404(b) grounds. Doc. 62. At the hearing on the motion the district court
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informed counsel it would await the foundation offered by the government before
ruling. Aplt. App. at 26. The parties proceeded to trial.
Following admission and discussion of Mr. Vasquez’s statement to the DCI
Agent, the district court expressed some concern in chambers about the
voluntariness of the statement, id. at 259, 264, 277, which counsel for the parties
discussed at length, id. at 259-75. When the jury reconvened defense counsel
made an oral motion to suppress the statement in question. Id. at 278-80.
However, ruling on the motion, the district court determined that it was untimely
and that Mr. Vasquez failed to establish good cause for failing to file a motion
before trial or raise an issue regarding the statement’s voluntariness prior to its
introduction. Id. at 442-43. The court did issue a limiting instruction to the jury
advising them to disregard Mr. Vasquez’s statement unless they determined that it
was voluntary and giving them several factors to consider in assessing
voluntariness. Aplee. App. 31.
Also at trial, co-defendant Scott Hoffman testified that he purchased
methamphetamine and marijuana from Shannon Blake, who was not indicted in
the case, and that Mr. Blake introduced Mr. Vasquez to Mr. Hoffman as his
source. Aplt. App. at 131, 134. Defendant’s counsel objected. Id. at 135-40.
The district court responded:
“The Court will allow the testimony of this witness under
801(d)(2)(E) and will make the appropriate findings, as I must, at the
conclusion of the evidence in this case. The court is satisfied the
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government has laid a satisfactory foundation.
I’d also note that I’ve not been asked to do a James hearing in
this matter, either orally or in writing; but, nevertheless, I’ll make
the requisite findings and tie it all up at the end.”
Id. at 143.
Mr. Hoffman testified that he purchased methamphetamine directly from
Mr. Vasquez after Mr. Blake’s arrest and that the two were in frequent phone
contact between 2006 and 2009. Id. at 148-50, 152-54, 164-66, 174, 180. He
also testified that he purchased marijuana from Mr. Vasquez on one occasion and
that Mr. Vasquez had also offered to procure cocaine. Id. at 156. Donna Cate,
Mr. Hoffman’s girlfriend, testified that she and Mr. Hoffman met Mr. Vasquez
through Mr. Blake, that she accompanied Mr. Hoffman to buy methamphetamine
from Mr. Vasquez nearly weekly, and that the men used the term “drill bits,”
which Mr. Hoffman told her was code for methamphetamine. Id. at 352-54, 356.
Mr. Vasquez made no objection to this statement.
The court made its Rule 801(d)(2)(E) findings later, during the jury
instructions conference, concluding a preponderance of the evidence showed that
a conspiracy to sell methamphetamine existed; Mr. Vasquez, Mr. Blake, and Mr.
Hoffman were all members of that conspiracy; and the out-of-court statements
were made in furtherance of and during the course of that conspiracy. Id. at 475-
76, 478-79. With respect to Rule 404(b), the court considered testimony
demonstrating that Mr. Vasquez was a source of marijuana, that Mr. Hoffman
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purchased marijuana from Mr. Vasquez, and that Mr. Vasquez offered to sell him
cocaine. It concluded that these statements were inextricably intertwined with the
charged conspiracy and, therefore, outside the ambit of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Id.
at 482, 521-22. Moreover, the court concluded, Mr. Vasquez opened the door to
the introduction of evidence of cocaine and marijuana by putting forth Exhibit X,
which listed suspected marijuana and cocaine as among the items seized in Mr.
Vasquez’s home. Id. at 293-94, 318-20.
Discussion
On appeal, Mr. Vasquez argues that the district court erred in (1) denying
his untimely motion to suppress his own statement, (2) denying his motion to
suppress evidence of possession of cocaine and marijuana, and in (3) admitting
the statements of his alleged co-conspirators.
A. Mr. Vasquez’s Statement.
Mr. Vasquez argues that the statement made by him was involuntary and,
therefore, its admission violated the Fifth Amendment. Aplt. Br. 11. We review
the district court’s determination that a defendant has waived his right to suppress
evidence by failing to make a motion for abuse of discretion. See United States
v. Chavez-Marquez, 66 F.3d 259, 261 (10th Cir. 1995).
A trial court is not required to hold a hearing on voluntariness when the
issue is not timely raised. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C); United States v. Miller,
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987 F.2d 1462, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993). Here, Vasquez did not move to suppress
his statement until after its admission at trial and did not object to its admission
when it was offered. See Miller, 987 F.2d at 1465. His failure to bring a pretrial
motion amounted to a waiver under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e). See United States v.
Hamilton, 587 F.3d 1199, 1213-14 (10th Cir. 2009). Mr. Vasquez’s argument that
we should consider the waiver under plain error is no longer viable; we recently
held that Rule 12(e)’s “good cause” standard is exclusive. United States v.
Burke, 633 F.3d 984, 991 (10th Cir. 2011).
B. Mr. Vasquez’s Possession and Sale of Cocaine and Marijuana.
Mr. Vasquez challenges the admission of evidence regarding marijuana and
cocaine. His challenge concerns (1) the admission of small quantities seized in
his home and (2) Mr. Hoffman’s references to sales of marijuana and cocaine
implicating Mr. Vasquez. Aplt. Br. 12. He asserts that this evidence led the jury
to reach the “inescapable conclusion that [Mr. Vasquez] was well versed in drug
dealing and that he was likely to have committed the crimes as charged in the
indictment.” Aplt. Reply Br. 6. We review a district court’s decision on the
admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d
1151, 1162 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Under this standard we reverse
“only if we have a firm and definite belief that the trial court made a clear error in
judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of other “crimes, wrongs, or acts” is not
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admissible to prove character, although it may be admissible for other proper
purposes. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Even if otherwise admissible, the court may
exclude such evidence if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.
The district court noted that the physical evidence of the cocaine and
marijuana would not be excluded under Rule 404(b) because their presence
indicated a lack of mistake or innocent purpose. Aplt. App. 473. But in making
its determination the court relied on the principle that “Rule 404(b) does not
apply to other act evidence that is intrinsic to the crime charged.” United States
v. Parker, 553 F.3d 1309, 1314 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). The district court thus concluded that the uncharged acts
involving cocaine and marijuana were inextricably intertwined with the
conspiracy involving methamphetamine and therefore outside the ambit of Rule
404(b). Aplt. App. 521. The evidence was relevant because it tended to elucidate
the relationships among the members of the conspiracy and tended to show their
course of dealings. The district court did not abuse its discretion in making this
determination. See, e.g., United States v. Nicholson, 17 F.3d 1294, 1298 (10th
Cir. 1994). Likewise, the testimony showing that Mr. Hoffman was first
introduced to Mr. Blake as a source for marijuana within the time frame of the
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charged conspiracy does not fall into the scope of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts”
under Rule 404(b) because the marijuana and cocaine transactions were part and
parcel of the conspiracy.
Mr. Vasquez also asserts that the probative value of the evidence regarding
his possession and sale of cocaine and marijuana is substantially outweighed by
the danger of undue prejudice. “Our deferential review applies both to a trial
court’s threshold determination of relevance under Rule 401 and to its conclusion
under Rule 403 that relevant evidence should nonetheless be excluded due to its
tendency to cause jury confusion or unfair prejudice.” Tanberg, 401 F.3d at 1162
(citation omitted). To the extent that Mr. Vasquez argues the physical evidence
of cocaine was prejudicial, this challenge is waived because he stipulated to the
trace amounts of methamphetamine and cocaine found in his bedroom. Aplt.
App. 314; see United States v. Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir.
2009). And as noted, the testimony including Mr. Vasquez’s sale of marijuana
and cocaine was highly relevant to demonstrating the course of dealing between
Mr. Hoffman and Mr. Vasquez. We therefore conclude it was not an abuse of
discretion for the district court to determine that the danger of unfair prejudice
did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.
C. Mr. Blake and Mr. Hoffman’s Out-of-Court Statements.
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides that “a statement by a co-
conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy” is
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not hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Accordingly, statements of co-
conspirators are admissible as substantive evidence against all other members of
the conspiracy. To establish a foundation for admission of evidence pursuant to
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) the government must prove the requisite facts by a
preponderance of the evidence. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175
(1987); United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1517 (10th Cir. 1995). Mr.
Vasquez argues that the district court erred in admitting the testimony of Mr.
Hoffman and Ms. Cate because (1) no adequate foundation was provided under
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and (2) Mr. Vasquez was denied the right to cross-examine Mr.
Blake, the alleged co-conspirator, in violation of the Confrontation Clause. Aplt.
Br. 13-14. “[W]hile the ultimate issue of the admission or exclusion of evidence
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, preliminary foundational determinations,
such as whether statements offered under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) were made ‘during
the course of’ and ‘in furtherance of’ a conspiracy, are factual findings, reviewed
for clear error.” Williamson, 53 F.3d at 1517 (citation omitted).
“Under Tenth Circuit law, a district court can only admit coconspirator
statements if it holds a James hearing or conditions admission on forthcoming
proof of a predicate conspiracy through trial testimony or other evidence.”
United States v. Townley, 472 F.3d 1267, 1273 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). We conclude the district court did not
abuse its discretion in making its Rule 801(d)(2)(E) findings following the
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admission of the statements in question and that its findings were not clearly
erroneous. See, e.g., United States v. Cesareo-Ayala, 576 F.3d 1120, 1125 (10th
Cir. 2009). The government put forth evidence showing that Mr. Hoffman dealt
with Mr. Vasquez both directly and through Mr. Blake. Aplt. App. 132, 148-49.
The statements of Mr. Blake and Mr. Hoffman describe direct participation in the
conspiracy and, therefore, are not hearsay. See Townley, 472 F.3d at 1275.
The statement of Mr. Blake does not implicate the Confrontation Clause
because it is neither hearsay nor testimonial. Accord Giles v. California
554 U.S. 353, 374 n.6 (2008). And even assuming Mr. Blake’s statement were
improperly admitted, any error would be harmless. See United States v. Burke,
571 F.3d 1048, 1057-58 (10th Cir. 2009). The prosecution put forth ample
evidence, and the in-court testimony of Mr. Hoffman and Ms. Cate proved that
Mr. Vasquez regularly sold methamphetamine to Mr. Hoffman between 2006 and
2009 regardless of any alleged sale to Mr. Blake.
Finally, Mr. Vasquez waived his challenge on appeal to the admission of
Mr. Hoffman’s out-of-court statement to Ms. Cate regarding the significance of
the term “drillbits” by failing to object during trial and to argue for plain error
review in this appeal. See United States v. Solomon, 399 F.3d 1231, 1237-38
(10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Perez, 989 F.2d 1574, 1582 (10th Cir. 1993) (en
banc).
We conclude the district court’s determination that the defendant waived
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his right to suppress his own statements was not an abuse of discretion and its
determination that the additional statements in question were made during the
course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy and that the declarants were members
of that conspiracy was not clear error.
AFFIRMED. Appellant’s motion to withdraw his claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel is GRANTED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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