United States v. Gonzalez-Chavez , 651 F. App'x 725 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 23, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 15-2094
(D.C. No. 1:14-CR-04062-MCA-1)
RENE GONZALEZ-CHAVEZ, (D. N. Mex.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before MATHESON, SEYMOUR, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
In 2010, Immigration and Custom Enforcement (“ICE”) removed Rene Gonzalez-
Chavez (“Mr. Gonzalez”) from the United States because he had illegally entered the
country. In 2012, New Mexico authorities arrested him for attempted first-degree
murder. In 2014, a New Mexico state court dismissed the charges on a procedural error,
and he was released from state custody. Approximately one month later, ICE arrested
him for being a removed alien within the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b). After Mr. Gonzalez pled guilty, the district court rejected his argument that
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
his sentence should be reduced by 28 months to account for the time he spent in pretrial
custody before his state charges were dismissed.
On appeal, Mr. Gonzalez contends the district court imposed a procedurally and
substantively unreasonable sentence. Exercising jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
In April 2010, ICE removed Mr. Gonzalez for his illegal presence in the United
States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 and for having been convicted of an aggravated
felony. Mr. Gonzalez returned to the United States, and on April 2, 2012, New Mexico
authorities arrested him and charged him with state crimes, including attempted
first-degree murder. The next day ICE discovered Mr. Gonzalez’s presence in the United
States.
ICE promptly issued a detainer, requesting officials at the Metropolitan Detention
Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico, where Mr. Gonzalez was being held, to notify ICE
within 30 days of Mr. Gonzalez’s release and hold him for 48 hours after the release date
so that ICE agents could detain him.
On September 18, 2014, an assistant district attorney in New Mexico told ICE
officials that Mr. Gonzalez had been released 34 days earlier after the state’s charges
were dismissed without prejudice because the state failed to transport Mr. Gonzalez to a
motion hearing.
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On September 25, 2014, ICE arrested Mr. Gonzalez for being a removed alien in
the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326 (a) and (b).
B. Procedural History
In January 2015, Mr. Gonzalez pled guilty. The U.S. Probation Office’s
presentence investigation report (“PSR”) calculated his Guidelines range to be 70 to 87
months of imprisonment.
Mr. Gonzalez objected to the PSR’s failure to account for time he spent in state
custody and argued this time should have been credited to his federal sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 3585 and United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 5G1.3.
The United States countered that the state pretrial detention should not be credited
because (1) it does not affect a federal prison term, (2) the state planned to refile its
charges against Mr. Gonzalez, and (3) if Mr. Gonzalez were convicted, the time would be
credited to the state sentence.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court asked if either party had objections to
the PSR. Neither party objected, but Mr. Gonzalez did alert the court to the dismissal of
the state charges. The court adopted the PSR’s calculation of Mr. Gonzalez’s Guidelines
range.
Mr. Gonzalez again argued for a 28-month reduction. The Government again
reported the state planned to refile the charges.
The Government then presented Mr. Gonzalez’s criminal history, which also
appears in the PSR, including the following statement of the state charges:
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The defendant got on top of the victim, Ms. Sosa, grabbed her by her hair,
and began to slam her head into the ground. She was begging him to stop.
However, he continued to punch her in the head – excuse me – in the face.
At some point, the defendant removed the victim’s shoes, took the
shoelaces out to tie her wrists and ankles together so she could not escape.
During this time, the defendant was telling her that he hated her, and was
spitting on her face.
At that time, the defendant left the room and returned with a garbage bag,
tape, and paint thinner. The defendant placed the garbage bag over her head
and taped the bag closed around her neck, causing her to suffocate. The
defendant told the victim, “You’re going to die today,” at which time she
lost consciousness.
When the victim later awoke, she felt something wet on her face and
realized the defendant had torn the bag open and was covering her face and
legs with paint thinner. The defendant stated to the victim, “You think
you’re going to live,” while playing with the lighter, causing her to believe
he would kill her by setting her on fire.
The victim stated the defendant was on top of her, and at one point he had
cut the clothing from her body and penetrated her vagina with his penis.
During the course of the sexual assault, the victim stated she was still tied
up, when the defendant stopped and became sick, throwing up on her and
the carpet.
ROA, Vol. 3 at 24-25.
Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel did not object to this account, but Mr. Gonzalez made the
following pro se statement to the court:
Your Honor, I understand all of these accusations that are before the State.
But also, there has been two trials, and throughout these trials it was found
that this person had been lying. There have been two mistrials, and in the
end, it was all dismissed because she lied. It turned out that this person did
not live with me at all. I understand that the prosecutor is just reading off
what he sees on a paper, but he doesn’t really know the facts.
Id. at 27.
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The district court sentenced Mr. Gonzalez to 80 months in prison and explained its
reasons:
I have reviewed and considered the Presentence Investigation Report. I
have incorporated each of the statements, the findings, and the averments
set forth therein in this proceeding here for purposes of sentencing, and I’ve
considered the guidelines, noting they are advisory, and I’ve considered
each of the sentencing factors under Title 18 Section 3553 Part (a).
Here, the offense level is 21 and the criminal history category is V. The
advisory guideline imprisonment range is 70 to 87 months.
This defendant was found to be in the United States after having been
previously deported. He was previously deported on April 28, 2010. . . .
I arrived at this sentence in consideration of the sentencing factors, noting
with emphasis your significant criminal history. You are at a criminal
history category of V.
I believe the sentence of 80 months is sufficient but not greater than
necessary to satisfy the sentencing goals inherent in the statute.
I understand the plea that you make, sir, through your attorney about the
amount of custody that you have served, and I feel that a sentence of 80
months, a few months short of the higher end of the guidelines, which I
think you deserve given the facts of your history here, is reasonable under
the circumstances and in consideration of that request.
Id. at 27-29.
II. DISCUSSION
Mr. Gonzalez challenges his sentence on appeal as procedurally and substantively
unreasonable.1
1
To the extent Mr. Gonzalez challenges the district court’s decision not to depart
downward from his Guidelines range, we lack jurisdiction to consider his arguments. See
United States v. Chavez-Diaz, 444 F.3d 1223, 1224 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[W]hile we do not
have jurisdiction to review the district court’s discretionary decision to deny a downward
Continued . . .
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A. Procedural Unreasonableness
Mr. Gonzales argues his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the
district court did not (1) apply U.S.S.G. §§ 5G1.3 and 2L1.2 and related application
notes; (2) explain its sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c); and (3) comply with Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i) because it failed to resolve whether his sentence should
have been reduced based on his state pretrial detention. He also argues the court
(4) violated due process by relying on the prosecution’s uncorroborated statements about
his state court charges.2
We generally review the procedural reasonableness of a defendant’s sentence
using “the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of review,” United States v. Halliday,
665 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted), “under which we review de
novo the district court’s legal conclusions regarding the [G]uidelines and review its
factual findings for clear error,” United States v. Gantt, 679 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir.
2012). See also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 56 (2007).
departure, we have jurisdiction post-Booker to review the sentence imposed for
reasonableness.”).
2
These challenges all concern the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. See
United States v. Geiner, 498 F.3d 1104, 1108 (10th Cir. 2007) (application of the
Guidelines reviewed for procedural reasonableness); United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d
1173, 1175-79 (10th Cir. 2007) (18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) challenge reviewed for procedural
reasonableness);United States v. Warren, 737 F.3d 1278, 1283-87 (10th Cir. 2013) (Rule
32 argument reviewed for procedural reasonableness); United States v. Ruby, 706 F.3d
1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2013) (due process argument regarding hearsay at sentencing
reviewed for procedural reasonableness because “unreliable hearsay evidence can result
in a sentence based on erroneous facts”).
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“If, however, [Mr. Gonzalez] did not preserve the procedural challenge below, we
review only for plain error.” Gantt, 679 F.3d at 1246. Under this standard, we “will only
vacate the sentence if: (1) there is error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights,
or in other words, affects the outcome of the proceeding; and (4) substantially affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Chavez,
723 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 2013).
In district court, Mr. Gonzalez raised U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 in his objections to the
PSR, but he did not raise the other issues he now argues on appeal. We nonetheless
review for plain error only his arguments regarding U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 because we would
affirm on all the other procedural unreasonableness issues under either the abuse of
discretion or plain error standard.
1. Guidelines Arguments
In district court, Mr. Gonzalez argued his sentence should have been reduced by
28 months based on U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3. On appeal, he also contends the court should
have considered Application Notes 4(E) to § 5G1.3 and 8 to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. We
affirm as to all of these provisions.
a. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 and Application Note 4(E)
Mr. Gonzalez argues the district court erred by failing to apply § 5G1.3 and
Application Note 4(E) to reduce his sentence.
Section 5G1.3 is titled “Imposition of a Sentence on a Defendant Subject to an
Undischarged Term of Imprisonment or Anticipated State Term of Imprisonment.” It has
four subsections. Three of them—(a), (b), and (d)—as well as Note 4(E), concern how
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an undischarged term of imprisonment for another offense should affect the sentence for
the instant offense. None of them applies here because Mr. Gonzalez had not been
convicted on the state charges and therefore had not received a term of imprisonment for
those charges.
Section 5G1.3(c) concerns “a state term of imprisonment [that] is anticipated to
result from another offense that is relevant conduct to the instant offense,” but it does not
apply here either because Mr. Gonzalez seeks a sentence reduction for pretrial detention,
not a term of imprisonment, and because the conduct underlying Mr. Gonzalez’s state
charges is not relevant conduct to his illegal reentry offense.
Section 5G1.3 and Application Note 4(E) do not apply to Mr. Gonzalez’s case.
The district court did not err in failing to apply them to his sentence.
b. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 and Application Note 8
Mr. Gonzalez argues the district court erred in failing to apply § 2L1.2 to reduce
his sentence. Because Mr. Gonzalez did not raise § 2L1.2 in district court, we review his
argument for plain error.
Application Note 8 to this guideline allows a district court to depart under certain
circumstances based on time served “in state custody, whether pre- or post-conviction.”
It identifies the defendant’s criminal history as the key factor in deciding whether to
depart.
The district court, in determining Mr. Gonzalez’s sentence, “not[ed] with
emphasis [Mr. Gonzalez’s] significant criminal history.” ROA, Vol. 3 at 28. This
indicates either (1) the court properly applied § 2L1.2 and Application Note 8 or (2) even
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if it erred by not specifically citing § 2L1.2, the court likely would have imposed the
same sentence if it had. In either case, Mr. Gonzalez fails to show the district court
committed plain error. See Chavez, 723 F.3d at 1232 (Under plain error review, plaintiffs
must show error that “affects substantial rights, or in other words, affects the outcome of
the proceeding. . . .”).
2. Reasons for Mr. Gonzalez’s Sentence
Mr. Gonzalez argues the district court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) by not
explaining its reasons for declining to depart from the Guidelines.
For within-Guidelines sentences, the district court needs only to provide “a general
statement of the reasons for its imposition of a particular sentence” to satisfy § 3553(c).
United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations
omitted). Further, the court is not required to respond to every argument for leniency.
See United States v. Martinez-Barragan, 545 F.3d 894, 903 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting a
court “need not explicitly refer to either the § 3553(a) factors or respond to every
argument for leniency that it rejects in arriving at a reasonable sentence.” (quotations
omitted)). The general statement the district court gave, as recounted above, is sufficient
to show it complied with § 3553(c) for its imposition of a within-Guidelines sentence.
3. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32
Mr. Gonzalez argues the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32(i) by not addressing his argument that his sentence should be reduced by 28 months.
Rule 32(i)(3)(B) requires a sentencing court to make one of two possible
determinations when any portion of a PSR is factually “disputed.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
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32(i)(3)(B). A court must either “rule on the dispute” or “determine that a ruling is
unnecessary.” Id. But “Rule 32 is not a vehicle for advancing legal challenges to
sentencing,” and the district court is “not obligated to make Rule 32[(i)(3)(B)] findings”
when “the issues the defendant raises . . . do not involve factual inaccuracies in the report
but, rather, legal objections to the district court’s determination of his sentence.” United
States v. Furman, 112 F.3d 435, 440 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Warren, 737 F.3d at 1286.
Here, the district court did not err for three reasons.
First, Mr. Gonzalez did not dispute any portion of the PSR. The district court
invited him to object to the PSR. He declined.
Second, Mr. Gonzalez’s Rule 32 argument does not challenge the PSR’s or the
district court’s factual findings. It is a legal challenge to the district court’s decision not
to credit his sentence or depart from the Guidelines. See Warren, 737 F.3d at 1286. The
only dispute Mr. Gonzalez points to is whether his federal sentence should be offset or
reduced by the time he spent in state custody. He does not identify any disputed facts the
district court would need to resolve.
Third, even assuming the argument about a 28-month credit or reduction could be
considered a factual objection to the PSR,3 the district court acknowledged the “plea” that
3
It is unclear if Mr. Gonzalez appeals whether the district court should have
credited his sentence by 28 months under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). In any case, the Supreme
Court held § 3585(b) does not authorize district courts to credit a sentence based on time
spent in presentence state custody. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333-34
(1992). The Supreme Court explained the Attorney General, and by extension the
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), has sole authority to credit sentences for uncredited time
spent in presentence state custody because “the District Court cannot perform the
Continued . . .
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Mr. Gonzalez made “about the amount of custody that [he] served,” ROA, Vol. 3 at 28,
and then decided an 80-month sentence was reasonable under the circumstances. This
satisfied Rule 32(i)’s requirement to rule on the dispute.
For these reasons, the district court did not violate Rule 32.
4. Due Process
Mr. Gonzalez asserts the district court violated due process by relying, at least
partially, on the Government’s statements at sentencing (1) recounting the underlying
state charges and (2) reporting the state intended to re-file charges.4
“At sentencing, the district court may rely on facts stated in the PSR unless the
defendant files an objection.” United States v. Ary, 518 F.3d 775, 787 (10th Cir. 2008).
“When a defendant objects, the government must prove that fact at the sentencing hearing
by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. “While the due process clause protects a
defendant’s right not to be sentenced on the basis of materially incorrect information,
hearsay statements may be considered at sentencing if they bear some minimal indicia of
reliability.” United States v. Cook, 550 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations
omitted).
necessary calculation at the time of sentencing and . . . the Attorney General, in
implementing the defendant’s sentence, cannot avoid computing the credit.” Id. at 336.
4
Mr. Gonzalez also complains the district court did not consider his objections to
these statements. His failure to alert the district court to any potential Rule 32 violation
or argue plain error on appeal renders this argument waived. See United States v. Fisher,
805 F.3d 982, 992 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1528 (2016).
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First, nothing in the record indicates the district court considered the
Government’s recounting of Mr. Gonzalez’s state charges as anything other than
allegations made in a state court charging document. The Government did not suggest
Mr. Gonzalez had been convicted. The district court did not treat the charges as fact or
even mention them in its reasons for Mr. Gonzalez’s sentence. The court stated it relied
generally on Mr. Gonzalez’s criminal history.
Second, as noted above, Mr. Gonzalez did not object to the PSR, which contained
the allegations underlying the state charges. After the Government restated the
allegations at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel did not object, and only then did
Mr. Gonzalez make a pro se statement that the Government “doesn’t really know the
facts” of his case. ROA, Vol. 3 at 27. He also said the state charges were dismissed
because a witness had lied, but he pointed to no evidence to support his statement. His
statement did not contest that the state had brought charges making these allegations
against him. Nor did he object to the Government’s statement that the state intended to
refile charges.
Third, even assuming (1) the district court relied on these statements in rendering
its sentence, and (2) Mr. Gonzalez properly objected to them, they bore at least a
“minimal indicia of reliability.” Cook, 550 F.3d at 1296 (quotations omitted). The PSR
corroborated them. The state indisputably had brought charges for first-degree murder
and other crimes against Mr. Gonzalez. The order dismissing these charges said it was
without prejudice because the state failed to transport Mr. Gonzalez to a hearing,
indicating the state could refile the charges. To the extent the district court relied on the
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Government’s statements in determining Mr. Gonzalez’s sentence, it did not violate Mr.
Gonzalez’s due process rights.
B. Substantive Unreasonableness
As with procedural reasonableness, we “review the substantive reasonableness of
a sentence for abuse of discretion.” Chavez, 723 F.3d at 1233. Under the abuse-of-
discretion standard, we will reverse a sentence if it is “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or
manifestly unreasonable.” United States v. Munoz–Nava, 524 F.3d 1137, 1146 (10th Cir.
2008) (quotations omitted).
Substantive reasonableness addresses “whether the length of the sentence is
reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Verdin–Garcia, 516 F.3d 884, 895 (10th Cir. 2008)
(quotations omitted). “A sentence within the correctly calculated Guidelines range is
presumed to be reasonable, [and] the burden is on the appellant to rebut the
presumption.” Id. at 898 (citation omitted); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
347 (2007) (“The first question is whether a court of appeals may apply a presumption of
reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the
Sentencing Guidelines. We conclude that it can.”).
Mr. Gonzalez must rebut the presumption that his sentence is substantively
reasonable. He attempts to do so by arguing the district court should have departed from
the Guidelines.
His attempt fails because, as the district court explained, Mr. Gonzalez has a
significant criminal history. This history includes convictions for reckless driving;
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aggravated assault against a household member; resisting, evading, and obstructing an
officer; possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance; aggravated assault
upon a police officer; attempted aggravated burglary; and conspiracy to commit
aggravated burglary.
The district court was therefore not “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or
manifestly unreasonable,” Munoz–Nava, 524 F.3d at 1146 (quotations omitted), in
imposing an 80-month and not reducing it by the time Mr. Gonzalez spent in state
custody.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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