United States v. McDonald ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 28 1997
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 96-1550
(D.C. No. 96-Z-244)
LARRY MCDONALD, (D. Colo.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Larry McDonald (“McDonald”) appeals from the district court’s
decision to dismiss his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 collateral attack on his 1990 conviction
of carrying a firearm during the commission of a criminal offense in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c). McDonald’s § 2255 motion was filed in district court on
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments;
nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th
Cir. R. 36.3.
February 2, 1996. As that date is prior to the April 24th, 1996 enactment of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), he is not
required to seek a certificate of appealability from this court. See Lindh v.
Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2063-68 (1997). Instead, we examine his appeal on the
merits.
McDonald’s appeal presents two questions: (1) whether the law governing
the statutory term “carry” has changed during the period of time between
McDonald’s direct appeal of his criminal conviction and his § 2255 challenge of
his sentence; and (2) whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as
to the legal definition of the term “carry” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
I.
In 1991, McDonald appealed his conviction to this court. United States v.
McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir. 1991). It is a well-established rule in this
circuit that § 2255 “‘is not available to test the legality of matters which should
have been raised on appeal.’” United States v. Allen, 16 F.3d 277, 378 (10th Cir.
1994) (quoting United States v. Walling, 982 F.2d 447, 448 (10th Cir. 1992)).
Under this rule:
A defendant who fails to present an issue on direct appeal
is barred from raising the issue in a § 2255 motion,
unless he can show cause for his procedural default and
actual prejudice resulting from the alleged errors, or
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can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice
will occur if his claim is not addressed.
Allen, 16 F.3d at 378. This rule is based upon the Supreme Court’s holding in
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). Therefore, in this action
McDonald carries the “exacting” burden of proving cause and actual prejudice or
the threat of a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Galloway,
32 F.3d 499, 500 (10th Cir. 1994). McDonald fails to shoulder this heavy burden.
An intervening change in the law may serve as cause for this court to
consider a § 2255 challenge of a conviction affirmed on direct appeal. See United
States v. Pritchard, 875 F.2d 789, 790 (10th Cir. 1989). McDonald asserts that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995) is
intervening law that justifies reconsideration of this court’s decision in
McDonald’s direct appeal. However, Bailey did not alter the “carry” prong of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1260 (10th Cir.
1996 (“We see nothing in Bailey that conflicts with our pre-Bailey “vehicular
carrying” line of cases.”); United States v. Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 1464-65 (10th
Cir. 1996)(listing pre- and post-Bailey cases illustrating that the “carry” prong of
§ 924(c) has remained unchanged).
In Spring we reiterated the rule in this circuit, undisturbed by Bailey, that
the term “carry” under § 924(c) involves “‘two elements: possession of the
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weapon through exercise of dominion or control; and transportation of the
weapon.” Id. at 1465 (quoting United States v. Martinez, 912 F.2d 419, 420 (10th
Cir. 1990)). 1 In Spring we reaffirmed our holding in McDonald’s direct appeal
that the term “carry” is satisfied if the defendant had easy access to and
knowledge of the weapon’s location. Spring, 80 F.3d at 1465 (citing McDonald,
933 F.2d at 1526).
In McDonald’s direct appeal we held that there was sufficient evidence
before the jury to convict McDonald of carrying a weapon under 18 U.S.C. §
924(c). Specifically, “[u]nder Defendant’s seat was the loaded pistol with the butt
pointing out for easy and quick access. Defendant knew the weapon was
there. . . . [C]onstructive possession is sufficient to sustain a firearm conviction.”
Id. at 1525 (citing United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1533 (10th Cir.
1989). As the law of this circuit defining the “carry” prong of 18 U.S.C.
1
McDonald also argues that the case of United States v. Cruz-Rojas, 101 F.3d
283 (2d Cir. 1996), provides intervening authority to support the appeal of his conviction.
However, Cruz-Rojas states the same rule as followed in this circuit: under the “carry”
prong of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) the jury must find beyond a reasonable that the defendant
transported and had easy access to the weapon in question. See id. at 286. Thus, Cruz-
Rojas is not intervening law that would support an exception to the Frady rule. What’s
more, in Cruz-Rojas the gun was secreted behind a “closed panel that required some
effort to open.” In McDonald’s case the gun was located underneath the front seat “for
easy and quick access.” McDonald, 933 F.2d at 1525. Even if Cruz-Rojas were
controlling law in this circuit it would not justify a reversal.
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§ 924(c)(1) has not changed since McDonald’s direct appeal, he fails to state an
exception to the Frady rule preventing him from attacking that appeal via
28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Prichard, 875 F.2d at 790; United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d
1244, 1259-60 (10th Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
Holland, 116 F.3d 1353 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that this circuit’s pre-Bailey rule
that “the government is required only to prove that defendant transported a
firearm in a vehicle and that he had actual or constructive possession of the
firearm while doing so” was not altered by Bailey); Cardenas, 864 F.2d at 1535-
36 (examining Congress’s intent in using the word “carry” and determining that
“carry” requires that the defendant both transport as well as exercise “dominion
and control” over the weapon).
II.
McDonald also argues that the trial court erred by failing to define the term
“carry” in its instructions to the jury. 2 As stated above, this circuit’s definition of
the term “carry” has remained unchanged since the time McDonald was convicted.
What’s more, in his direct appeal, McDonald raised two other challenges to the
jury instructions given at his trial. McDonald, 933 F.2d at 1526. Under the Frady
2
The trial court instructed the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt
“that the defendant, on or about April 7, 1989, carried a firearm . And . . . that the
defendant carried the firearm in relation to and during a drug trafficking crime for which
the defendant may be prosecuted in a court of the United States.”
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rule, he should have raised this issue as well. See Allen, 16 F.3d at 378.
Therefore McDonald is barred from raising the issue of the court’s jury
instruction with regards to the term “carry” for the first time in this § 2255 action.
Finally, McDonald requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. He has
provided sufficient proof of his inability to pay the required fees and so may
proceed in forma pauperis.
For the reasons mentioned above, McDonald’s request to proceed in forma
pauperis is GRANTED. The district court’s judgment dismissing McDonald’s
28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion is AFFIRMED.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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