Calvert v. Midwest Restoration Services, Inc. , 35 F. App'x 798 ( 2002 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    MAY 22 2002
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    ADDIE CALVERT,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                                   No. 01-5201
    (D.C. No. 00-CV-1019-B)
    MIDWEST RESTORATION                                (N.D. Oklahoma)
    SERVICES, INC., an Oklahoma
    corporation,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT           *
    Before HENRY , Circuit Judge, BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge, and        BRISCOE ,
    Circuit Judge.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Plaintiff Addie Calvert appeals from the district court’s order granting
    summary judgment in favor of defendant Midwest Restoration Services, Inc.
    (Midwest) on her complaint alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII
    of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and 42 U.S.C.
    § 1981. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
    Plaintiff, an African-American woman, was employed by Midwest during
    the years 1999 and 2000. She claims that during the course of her employment,
    Midwest discriminated against her on the basis of her race. She alleges
    discrimination based on both disparate treatment and a racially hostile work
    environment. Plaintiff’s complaint and her response to Midwest’s motion for
    summary judgment specifically state that her action is brought under both Title
    VII and § 1981.
    In its summary judgment order, the district court incorrectly recited that
    “[a]ll of Plaintiff’s claims are brought under Title VII.” Aplt. App. at 164 n.1. It
    then granted summary judgment for Midwest, finding that it was uncontroverted
    that Midwest had not employed fifteen or more employees each working day of
    twenty or more calendar weeks in either 1999 or 2000, as required by Title VII.
    See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining “employer” for Title VII purposes).
    “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
    the same legal standard used by the district court.”   Hollins v. Delta Airlines ,
    -2-
    
    238 F.3d 1255
    , 1257 (10th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is proper if the moving
    party shows “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
    party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “When
    applying this standard, we view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences
    therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”     Scull
    v. New Mexico , 
    236 F.3d 588
    , 595 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted).
    1. Section 1981 claims
    Midwest properly concedes that plaintiff’s § 1981 claims are not subject to
    the “fifteen or more employee” restriction applicable to her Title VII claims.
    Rivers v. Roadway Express , Inc. , 
    511 U.S. 298
    , 304 n.3 (1994). The rationale on
    which the district court granted summary judgment is therefore inapplicable to
    these claims.
    Midwest urges us, however, to affirm the grant of summary judgment on
    plaintiff’s § 1981 claims on the alternative ground that it is entitled to judgment
    on these claims as a matter of law. In determining the appropriateness of
    summary judgment, this court is not limited to the grounds relied upon by the
    district court, but may affirm summary judgment on any proper grounds found in
    the record.   FDIC v. Noel , 
    177 F.3d 911
    , 916 (10th Cir. 1999).
    Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim for disparate treatment rests on two separate
    events. First, she claims that on one occasion, white employees received their
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    paychecks ahead of time, while she was paid on the scheduled date. Plaintiff does
    not complain that she was not paid when scheduled or that she was harmed by
    receiving her check at the scheduled time. She also makes no showing that this
    was a recurring incident. We hold that the alleged harm is      de minimus and will
    not give rise to relief under § 1981.   Cf. Bell v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 
    172 F. Supp. 2d
    933, 939-40 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (interpreting state civil rights law, construed       in
    pari materia with Title VII, to find that forcing African-American plaintiff to
    wait one day before having his request for vacation approved was        de minimus and
    not actionable, even though white employees allegedly received more immediate
    action on their requests).
    Second, plaintiff complains that Midwest failed to lay her off from
    employment when it laid off white employees. The white employees began
    drawing unemployment insurance. She was retained but had her hours cut. She
    eventually asked to be laid off, but Midwest refused.
    This claim, which seems to urge that plaintiff should have been laid off and
    allowed to draw unemployment insurance, raises interesting issues of public
    policy. Fortunately, we need not resolve these issues. Even assuming that
    plaintiff made a prima facie case of disparate treatment, Midwest advanced
    legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. Plaintiff represented to
    Midwest’s owner that she had cancer and needed to continue working. Aplt. App.
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    at 22. The record also shows that Midwest believed, whether incorrectly or not,
    that it had enough work to do to keep plaintiff busy when it decided not to lay her
    off, and that Midwest cut plaintiff’s hours because its business had slowed.
    Plaintiff fails to point to evidence that would undermine these stated reasons.
    We move on to plaintiff’s § 1981 claim for a racially hostile work
    environment. To survive summary judgment, plaintiff must show “that a rational
    jury could find that the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
    ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
    of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”
    McCowan v. All Star Maint., Inc.   , 
    273 F.3d 917
    , 923 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations
    omitted). Plaintiff presented a significant amount of evidence of discriminatory
    intimidation, ridicule and insult, from which a jury could conclude that the
    conditions of her employment had been altered and that her working environment
    had become abusive. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that
    Midwest failed to demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment on this claim.
    Accordingly, we will reverse summary judgment on plaintiff’s § 1981 hostile
    work environment claim.
    2. Title VII claims
    Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in rejecting her argument that
    she was employed by an “integrated enterprise” with more than fifteen employees.
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    Although Midwest did not have fifteen or more employees, plaintiff argues that
    we should factor in the employees of a related business, D&K Janitorial (D&K),
    for purposes of meeting this requirement. If Midwest and D&K are considered a
    “single employer” or “integrated enterprise,” D&K’s employees can be included.
    See, e.g., Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc.         , 
    189 F.3d 1177
    , 1184 & n.8 (10th Cir.
    1999); 1 Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits Lab, Inc.         , 
    163 F.3d 1236
    , 1244 (11th Cir.
    1998).
    A threshold issue arises concerning the appropriate dispositional standard.
    The district court treated the “integrated enterprise” question as one for summary
    judgment disposition. We have stated, however, that the fifteen-employee
    requirement is jurisdictional.   Owens v. Rush , 
    636 F.2d 283
    , 287 (10th Cir. 1980).
    We therefore agree with the Eleventh Circuit that application of the “single
    employer” or “integrated-enterprise” test is a threshold jurisdictional issue that
    must be resolved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) rather than under summary
    judgment analysis.    Scarfo v. Ginsberg , 
    175 F.3d 957
    , 961 (11th Cir. 1999).        2
    1
    We have not formally adopted the “single employer” or “integrated
    enterprise” test in this circuit; however, since this test was applied in the district
    court and both parties contend for its use, we will apply it here.   Knowlton , 189
    F.3d at 1184.
    2
    This distinction is important in this case because on the record we have
    before us, we would be hard-pressed to say that plaintiff did not present sufficient
    evidence to survive summary judgment on the issue of whether the integrated
    enterprise standard was met. Where 12(b)(1) analysis is concerned, however, the
    (continued...)
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    Accordingly, we will treat the district court’s order as a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal
    for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We review a dismissal for lack of subject
    matter jurisdiction de novo , accepting the district court’s findings of jurisdictional
    facts unless they are clearly erroneous.   Stuart v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co.   ,
    
    271 F.3d 1221
    , 1225 (10th Cir. 2001).
    The integrated-enterprise test requires us to examine four factors:
    “(1) interrelation of operations; (2) centralized control over labor relations;
    (3) common management; and (4) common ownership or financial control.”
    Knowlton , 189 F.3d at 1184. “All four factors . . . are not necessary for
    single-employer status. Rather, the heart of the inquiry is whether there is an
    absence of an arm’s-length relationship among the companies.”         
    Id. There is
    some evidence of common management and ownership between
    Midwest and D&K. Keith Lunsford, the owner of Midwest, owns stock in D&K.
    He co-manages Midwest with Susan Collins, and D&K with Patsy Smith.
    The remaining factors, however, do not point to the existence of an
    integrated enterprise. Midwest and D&K have separate customers, separate
    payroll accounts, separate insurance policies, and separate bank accounts. They
    engage in separate lines of business, and employ separate supervisors. Although
    2
    (...continued)
    district court is permitted to resolve factual disputes and to reach a disposition on
    the ultimate issue in spite of conflicting evidence.  Scarfo , 175 F.3d at 961.
    -7-
    they use the same bookkeeper and outside accountant, the bookkeeper and
    accountant are paid separately by each entity for the work they perform.
    Although they shared a physical address during much of the time plaintiff was
    employed by Midwest, they currently have distinct phone numbers and physical
    addresses.
    On balance, we agree with the district court that Midwest and D&K should
    not be treated as a single employer or an integrated enterprise. Plaintiffs’ Title
    VII claims were properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
    The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District
    of Oklahoma granting summary judgment on plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim
    for a hostile work environment is REVERSED. The remainder of the district
    court’s order of summary judgment is AFFIRMED, and this case is REMANDED
    to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with this order and
    judgment.
    Entered for the Court
    Robert H. Henry
    Circuit Judge
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