Crawford v. United States ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 24, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TOMMIE PERRIS CRAWFORD,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 15-3320
(D.C. No. 2:15-CV-09291-CM)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (D. Kan.)
Defendant - Appellee.
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before KELLY, McKAY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
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Tommie Perris Crawford, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,1 seeks a
certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b) motion. Crawford also seeks leave to proceed on appeal in forma
pauperis (IFP). We deny Crawford’s request for a COA, deny his IFP motion, and
affirm.
*
After examining Crawford’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The
case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment
is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value. See
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
Because Crawford appears pro se, we liberally construe his pleadings.
Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir. 2009).
Crawford was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota and is currently incarcerated in the United States Penitentiary in
Leavenworth, Kansas. Crawford initiated this civil proceeding in state court by filing
a petition to enforce a “Satisfaction of Judgment.” R. vol. 1, 8-9. Crawford identified
the plaintiff in the purported in rem proceeding as “a foreign state and international
organization” and sought release of that organization’s property—i.e., Crawford—
under a theory of immunity. Id. The government removed the case to federal court
and sought dismissal.
The district court construed Crawford’s petition as an attack on his federal
sentence. The court first noted that if Crawford intended to file a 28 U.S.C. § 2255
motion he should have done so in the district that imposed his sentence. The court
then pointed out that, in limited circumstances, a federal prisoner may challenge the
legality of a federal sentence in the district of incarceration under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
The court recognized that Crawford didn’t invoke either § 2241 or § 2255 in his
petition. The court nevertheless concluded that even if it construed the petition as one
seeking relief under § 2241, Crawford failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to
such relief. The court ultimately dismissed Crawford’s claim as legally frivolous.2
2
The district court should have immediately screened and dismissed
Crawford’s claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Plunk v. Givens, 234 F.3d 1128,
1129 (10th Cir. 2000). Section 1915A’s screening process “applies to all prison
litigants, without regard to their fee status, who bring civil suits against a
governmental entity, officer, or employee,” and is “to be applied sua sponte and as
early as possible in the litigation.” Id. (quoting Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d
Cir. 1999)).
2
Crawford then filed a Rule 60(b) motion seeking relief from the district court’s
dismissal order and asserting for the first time that he should be allowed to proceed
under § 2241(c)(4) because his remedy under § 2255 was ineffective and inadequate.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (permitting a federal prisoner to apply for relief under
§ 2241 only if § 2255 remedy “is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention”); Abernathy v. Wandes, 713 F.3d 538, 547 (10th Cir. 2013) (explaining
that § 2255 remedy “has been found to be ‘inadequate or ineffective’ only in
‘extremely limited circumstances’” (quoting Caravalho v. Pugh, 177 F.3d 1177, 1178
(10th Cir. 1999))).
The district court construed the Rule 60(b) motion as one seeking relief under
§ 2241 through § 2255(e)’s “savings clause,” concluded Crawford failed to
demonstrate that the remedy provided by § 2255 was inadequate or ineffective
merely by asserting such a motion would be time-barred or potentially subject to
filing restrictions in the district of his conviction, and denied relief. The district court
also denied Crawford’s motion to proceed IFP on appeal.
Crawford renews his request for leave to proceed IFP on appeal, and asks us
for a COA to appeal the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion. For the following reasons,
we deny both requests and affirm the district court’s ruling.
We decline to issue a COA because Crawford doesn’t need one. The district
court construed Crawford’s Rule 60(b) motion as a § 2241 application and
determined Crawford failed to demonstrate he could invoke § 2255(e)’s “savings
clause” to attack the validity of his federal sentence under § 2241. A federal prisoner
3
doesn’t need a COA to appeal a final judgment in a § 2241 case. Eldridge v.
Berkebile, 791 F.3d 1239, 1241 (10th Cir. 2015). And we affirm the district court’s
ruling because we agree that Crawford hasn’t demonstrated—simply by asserting his
ability to file a § 2255 motion is barred by timing or filing restrictions—that his case
presents one of those “rare instances” in which a federal prisoner may use § 2241,
rather than § 2255, to attack the validity of his federal sentence. Sines v. Wilner, 609
F.3d 1070, 1073 (10th Cir. 2010); see, e.g., Haynes v. Maye, 529 F. App’x 907, 910
(10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (noting fact that § 2255 motion is time-barred doesn’t
render § 2255 remedy inadequate or ineffective); Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722,
727 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“It is the inefficacy of the [§ 2255] remedy, not a personal
inability to utilize it, that is determinative, and appellant’s difficulty here is simply
that his circumstances preclude him from invoking it.”).
Finally, we deny Crawford’s IFP motion because his appeal is clearly
frivolous. See DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting
that to succeed on IFP motion, movant must show “a reasoned, nonfrivolous
argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal”).
Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz
Circuit Judge
4