Inuwa v. Jones , 545 F. App'x 731 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 10, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
AMINU ZEGARIAH TIJUAN INUWA,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 13-5067
(D.C. No. 4:10-CV-00430-JHP-PJC)
JUSTIN JONES, Director, (N.D. Oklahoma)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before HARTZ, O’BRIEN and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Aminu Inuwa filed an application for relief under 24 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma on October 21, 2010. He
raised 27 claims, all of which were denied. He now requests a certificate of appealability
(COA) from this court so that he can pursue an appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A)
(requiring a COA to appeal denial of habeas application). We deny a COA and dismiss
the appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Inuwa pleaded nolo contendere in Oklahoma state court to charges of robbery
with a firearm and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. His motion to withdraw
his pleas was denied after a hearing. He appealed the denial to the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals (OCCA), and was granted a new hearing, but with the same result. The
OCCA denied a second appeal, after which Mr. Inuwa filed a pro se application for
postconviction relief in the state district court. The court denied his petition and the
OCCA dismissed his appeal as untimely. Mr. Inuwa then filed his § 2254 application in
federal district court.
The district court addressed 27 claims raised by Mr. Inuwa. Four claims were
dismissed as moot because they concerned the conduct of the first hearing on
Mr. Inuwa’s application to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere.1 Nineteen claims were
procedurally barred.2 They were raised in Mr. Inuwa’s state petition for postconviction
relief, but the state trial court rejected them on the merits and the OCCA dismissed his
appeal as untimely.
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The claims dismissed as moot were: (1) “Because defense counsel notified court
of a conflict of interest the trial court erred by not appointing new counsel to represent
petitioner at the hearing on his request to withdraw pleas,” R., Vol. I at 60, 62; (2)
“Because the trial court granted petitioner’s request to withdraw his pleas in open court,
the trial court deprived the petitioner of his due process rights when it rescinded its
decision,” id. at 61; (3) “Petitioner was deprived of his right to effective assistance of
counsel at hearing on the motion to withdraw pleas,” id. at 64; and (4) “Because the trial
court initially granted petitioners [sic] request to withdraw pleas in open court, the trial
court deprived the petitioner of his due process rights when it later rescinded its
decision,” id. at 68.
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Mr. Inuwa did not describe these 19 claims individually, but rather cross-
referenced his Oklahoma state-court application for postconviction relief. All the claims
alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for “failure to raise errors which
affected outcome of trial court process.” Aplt. Br. at 5.
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That left only four claims to be addressed on the merits. First, Mr. Inuwa claimed
that his nolo contendere pleas were not voluntary because he knew that his attorney was
not prepared to go to trial. But the district court found that the record supported the
OCCA’s conclusion that the pleas were knowing and voluntary. Second, he claimed that
the prohibition of double jeopardy precluded his being convicted of both offenses. But
the court ruled that the OCCA properly decided as a matter of state law that the
convictions were for distinct offenses. Third, Mr. Inuwa claimed that he must be allowed
to withdraw his pleas because there was no factual basis to support them. But the court
rejected this claim because the OCCA’s finding of a sufficient factual basis was a matter
of state law and did not unreasonably apply federal law. Finally, the court considered
Mr. Inuwa’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney
filed a motion to withdraw pleas which did not comply with the rules of the Oklahoma
court. The court dismissed the claim, agreeing with the OCCA that Mr. Inuwa was
unable to demonstrate prejudice because he had been given two hearings at which he
could explain why he sought to withdraw his pleas without any limitations arising from
the motion’s failure to comply with the rule.
Mr. Inuwa’s brief is almost impossible to navigate. As best we can understand,
however, he appears to be making the following claims in his request for a COA from
this court: (1) at his first hearing to withdraw his pleas, the Oklahoma district court was
biased because it relied only on selective portions of the record; (2) at the same hearing,
the Oklahoma district court erred when it did not appoint new defense counsel after being
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notified of a conflict of interest; (3) the Oklahoma district court granted the withdrawal of
his pleas during that hearing, but then improperly changed its decision; (4) his appellate
counsel was ineffective in various respects, including not properly objecting to various
constitutional violations regarding his plea and his hearings, and never raising the issue of
his innocence; (5) he has cause to be excused from missing his filing deadline for
postconviction relief in the OCCA because of interference by prison officials; (6) he is
actually innocent; (7) there is no factual basis to support his pleas; (8) he received
ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney did not list the legal grounds for his
motion to withdraw pleas; (9) his pleas were coerced because he knew that his attorney
had failed to prepare for trial; (10) the district court erred when it did not consider the
totality of the circumstances in evaluating his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel;
(11) his pleas were flawed because he was not informed of the elements of the crimes
charged; and (12) the use of an 18-year-old out-of-state conviction to enhance his
punishment denied him due process.
II. DISCUSSION
A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This standard requires “a
demonstration that . . . includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or,
for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or
that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other
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words, the applicant must show that the district court’s resolution of the constitutional
claim was either “debatable or wrong.” Id. If the application was denied on procedural
grounds, the applicant faces a double hurdle. Not only must the applicant make a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, but he must also show “that
jurists of reason would find it debatable . . . whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.” Id. “Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is
correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either
that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be
allowed to proceed further.” Id.In order to obtain federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must “exhaust[ ] the
remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(A). “The exhaustion
requirement is satisfied if the issues have been properly presented to the highest state
court, either by direct review of the conviction or in a postconviction attack.” Brown v.
Shanks, 185 F.3d 1122, 1124 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). If an
applicant fails to exhaust state remedies and state courts “would now find the claims
procedurally barred[,] the claims are considered exhausted and procedurally defaulted for
purposes of federal habeas relief.” Thomas v. Gibson, 218 F.3d 1213, 1221 (10th Cir.
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). An applicant can overcome procedural default
by showing cause and prejudice. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 922 (2012).
“Cause for a procedural default exists where something external to the petitioner,
something that cannot fairly be attributed to him, impeded his efforts to comply with the
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State’s procedural rule.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Procedural
default can also be overcome if there has been a fundamental miscarriage of justice—that
is, if the applicant is actually innocent of the crime of conviction. See Black v. Workman,
682 F.3d 880, 915 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[T]o demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of
justice, a defendant must make a showing of factual innocence . . . .”).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), provides
that when a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in a state court, a federal court can
grant habeas relief only if the applicant establishes that the state-court decision was
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). Therefore, for those of Mr. Inuwa’s
claims that the state court adjudicated on the merits, “AEDPA’s deferential treatment of
state court decisions must be incorporated into our consideration of [his] request for [a]
COA.” Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 2004).
We decline to review Mr. Inuwa’s first, second, and third claims—which
challenge the conduct of the first hearing on his motion to withdraw his pleas—because,
as the district court explained below, they became moot when the OCCA granted him a
second hearing on the motion.
The fourth claim—ineffective assistance of appellate counsel—was properly held
by the district court to be procedurally barred. Mr. Inuwa attempts to overcome the
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procedural bar with his fifth and sixth claims—that his postconviction appeal to the
OCCA was impeded by prison officials and that he is actually innocent. But the district
court determined that he did not have cause for his procedural default because the reason
for the untimely filing was his own failure to file a timely pauper’s affidavit, and
Mr. Inuwa points to no evidence in the record that prison officials unreasonably
obstructed his ability to obtain a pauper’s affidavit. Further, he cannot show that there
has been a fundamental miscarriage of justice because he offers no new evidence of his
innocence. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1933 (2013) (“The miscarriage of
justice exception, we underscore, applies to a severely confined category: cases in which
new evidence shows it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted the petitioner.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus,
Mr. Inuwa has not shown that jurists of reason would find the district court’s procedural
ruling debatable. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
The seventh, eighth, and ninth claims were rejected by the district court on the
merits. Mr. Inuwa cannot show that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. Nor is there any merit
to Mr. Inuwa’s tenth claim—that the district court applied the wrong standard when
evaluating his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
Mr. Inuwa’s eleventh and twelfth claims, insofar as they are meant to be distinct
from the claims already discussed, were not raised below. We decline to address them
for that reason. See Grubbs v. Hannigan, 982 F.2d 1483, 1484 n.1 (10th Cir. 1993).
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III. CONCLUSION
We DENY the application for a COA and DISMISS the appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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