Nicolas v. Perkins ( 2002 )


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  •                                                                              F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    NOV 5 2002
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    __________________________                   PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    SHAMIRA NICOLAS and JANE DOE,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    ELVIN L. GENTRY, Special Administrator,                       No. 00-1457
    (D. Colo.)
    Plaintiff,                                       (D.Ct. No. 00-K-1414)
    v.
    WILFRED PERKINS; RONALD PETERSON;
    SPENCER J. CRONA; LYNN VANATTA;
    JOHN ROE,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    MICHAEL D. GROSS,
    Defendant.
    ____________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
    LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
    law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
    citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
    the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Shamira Nicolas, dissatisfied with her mother’s testamentary disposition,
    brought thirteen federal and state law claims against various defendants while the
    probate of her mother’s estate was pending in state court. The district court
    dismissed the action in its entirety with a brief order based generally on principles
    of comity and judicial economy. The district court also dismissed the federal
    claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b), and it declined
    to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Ms.
    Nicolas appeals the district court’s order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district
    court for further proceedings.
    FACTS
    Mary M.H. Pile died in 1998, leaving a will and a living trust 1 that
    apparently disinherited her daughter, the appellant, Ms. Nicolas. Because some
    provisions of the will conflicted with provisions of the trust, defendant Ms.
    Vanatta filed a motion to construe the trust in state probate court. While the state
    probate proceedings were pending, Ms. Nicolas filed this action in federal district
    1
    Although Ms. Vanatta attached them to her brief, neither document is part of the
    record on appeal. Ms. Vanatta filed two motions to append additional materials from the
    state probate proceedings. We granted her second motion August 30, 2002, and now
    grant the first motion, filed January 22, 2002.
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    court. At the time the complaint was filed, the state probate court had yet to
    appoint a personal representative for Mrs. Pile’s estate. Therefore, Ms. Nicolas
    brought the claims relating to her mother’s estate on behalf of Jane Doe, the
    unnamed personal representative of Mrs. Pile’s estate. 2 The defendants -- Mr.
    Perkins, Ms. Vanatta, Mr. Crona, Mr. Gross, and Mr. Peterson – were involved in
    the execution of the trust or the state probate proceedings, or both.
    In her complaint and amended complaint, Ms. Nicolas alleged the district
    court had jurisdiction over her various claims based on diversity of citizenship,
    federal question jurisdiction, or supplemental jurisdiction. All the defendants
    filed motions to dismiss the complaint. The district court dismissed the complaint
    in its entirety and Ms. Nicolas appeals.
    DISCUSSION
    Abstention
    In its order dismissing Ms. Nicolas’ claims, the district court found
    “Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants arise out of their conduct in the ... probate
    2
    The state probate court subsequently appointed a Special Administrator of Mrs.
    Pile’s estate. However, upon stipulation of the parties, we dismissed the Special
    Administrator as a party to this appeal.
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    proceedings ..., and they may be adequately addressed in state court.” The district
    court then determined “as a matter of comity and judicial economy, that [the
    claims] are inappropriate for review by this court.”
    In their appellate briefs, each party argues the district court relied on an
    abstention or related doctrine, perhaps the Colorado River doctrine, 3 when it
    dismissed the case based on principles of comity and judicial economy. Although
    the district court did mention abstention and related doctrines in an order to show
    cause and an addendum order, 4 its order dismissing the complaint in its entirety
    does not reveal which doctrine it relied upon and provides no reasoning for its
    decision. Given the lack of findings by the district court, we would be
    overstepping the limits of our review if we tried to make these findings in the first
    instance. Fox v. Maulding, 
    16 F.3d 1079
    , 1082 (10th Cir. 1994). Without findings
    3
    Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 
    424 U.S. 800
    , 817-20
    (1976).
    4
    The district court’s order to show cause required Ms. Nicolas to address the
    abstention principles developed in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 
    319 U.S. 315
     (1943), and the
    Rooker-Feldman doctrine (see District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 
    460 U.S. 462
     (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 
    263 U.S. 413
     (1923)). (App. at 91-92.)
    The district court’s addendum ordered Ms. Nicolas to distinguish her case from
    McKibben v. Chubb, 
    840 F.2d 1525
    , 1529-30 (10th Cir. 1988), and the cases cited
    therein. (App. at 95.) In doing so, the district court noted, “claims which are ancillary to
    the challenge of a will belong in the state court’s probate proceedings, not in federal
    court.” (App. at 95.)
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    by the district court, “‘we are left with no means by which to judge the exercise of
    the court’s discretion.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Griffen v. City of Oklahoma City, 
    3 F.3d 336
    ,
    340 (10th Cir. 1993)). Therefore, we must remand to the district court for more
    specific findings concerning: (1) which abstention doctrine it applied, if any; (2)
    which factors it considered in making its determination; and (3) the weight it gave
    to each of those factors.
    Dismissal of Federal Law Claims
    The Third, Fifth, and Sixth claims for relief are federal claims brought
    under either the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act or the Ku
    Klux Klan Act. The district court found Ms. Nicolas’ allegations failed to state a
    viable claim for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 9(b). We review the
    district court’s dismissal of Ms. Nicolas’ claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b)
    de novo. Scott v. Hern, 
    216 F.3d 897
    , 906 (10th Cir. 2000); Schwartz v. Celestial
    Seasonings, Inc., 
    124 F.3d 1246
    , 1251 (10th Cir. 1997). We accept all well-pled
    allegations in the complaint as true and construe the allegations in the light most
    favorable to the plaintiff. Scott, 
    216 F.3d at 906
    .
    Even taking all of Ms. Nicolas’ well-pled allegations as true, the
    defendants’ activities simply do not comport with the elements of those claims; in
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    addition, the allegations were not pled with the particularity necessary to satisfy
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the federal law
    claims.
    Diversity Jurisdiction
    Ms. Nicolas argues the district court had diversity jurisdiction over her state
    law causes of action, pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. §1332
    . She contends the district court
    “implicitly ruled that it lacked diversity jurisdiction over her claims.” 5 The
    defendants claim diversity of citizenship is lacking for these claims or, if diversity
    does exist, the probate exception to diversity jurisdiction applies.
    Because the district court’s order does not address diversity jurisdiction, we
    must remand to the district court to consider in the first instance whether diversity
    of citizenship exists between the parties necessary to these claims. See Amazon,
    Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 
    273 F.3d 1271
    , 1276-77 (10th Cir. 2001). If the district
    court finds diversity jurisdiction exists as to any of the state law claims for relief,
    it should then consider whether the probate exception to diversity jurisdiction
    applies and, if so, whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
    Ms. Nicolas is a citizen of New York and the named defendants are citizens of
    5
    Colorado.
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    state law claims.
    CONCLUSION
    Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Ms. Nicolas’
    federal law claims and REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of her state law
    claims. We REMAND to the district court for further proceedings consistent with
    this order and judgment.
    Entered by the Court:
    WADE BRORBY
    United States Circuit Judge
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