United States v. Courtois ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
DEC 11 1997
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 96-5105
DONALD COURTOIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. 95-CR-138-2-B)
Submitted on the briefs:
Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, Jill M. Wichlens, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Stephen C. Lewis, United States Attorney, Allen J. Litchfield, Assistant United
States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before PORFILIO and LUCERO, Circuit Judges, and MARTEN, * District
Judge.
*
The Honorable J. Thomas Marten, District Judge, United States
District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
We are required in this sentence appeal to decide whether the use of
language by the United States in a plea agreement stating that “the discretion [to
file a downward departure motion for substantial assistance] rests solely with the
government” requires that the government give defendant the opportunity to
provide substantial assistance. 1 Because we conclude that the specific language
of the agreement at issue did not place such an obligation on the government, we
affirm defendant’s sentence.
Defendant-appellant Donald Courtois was arrested and charged with
possession of heroin with intent to distribute and conspiracy. Upon the
government’s motion, he was detained without bond. Defendant subsequently
agreed to plead guilty to the possession charge and to cooperate with the
government, pursuant to a plea agreement. This agreement obligated the
government to “make the nature and extent of [defendant’s] cooperation known”
to the trial court at sentencing, and contained the following provision:
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
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At this time, the defendant has been de-briefed by federal agents and
is making a good faith effort to cooperate in the government’s
continuing investigation. To insure defendant’s continuing
cooperation, this plea agreement specifically leaves potentially
available all sentencing possibilities contemplated by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), (b) and (e) and § 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.
However, the discretion and decision to file any motion under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (departure below the mandatory minimum
sentence) or a motion pursuant to § 5K1.1 (downward departure for
substantial assistance) rests solely with the government.
Attachment “A” to Appellant’s Opening Br.
It is undisputed that defendant gave truthful information to the government,
which included identifying several potential buyers of the seized heroin. The
government stated at the sentencing hearing, however, that it was unable to
capitalize on the defendant’s cooperative efforts and eventually terminated the
investigation for the following reasons: (1) it could not utilize defendant’s
assistance due to the manner in which defendant intended to distribute the heroin;
(2) defendant was in custody without bond and therefore unable to complete any
prearranged deliveries; and (3) due to time pressures and a subsequent transfer to
Honduras, the Tulsa DEA agent was unable to interview the defendant and pursue
the investigation after defendant was transferred to a facility forty miles from
Tulsa for security reasons.
At sentencing, the government recommended that defendant be given the
benefit of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which permits the court to impose a sentence
of less than the ten-year statutory minimum if the defendant has truthfully
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provided all information and evidence he has concerning offenses that were part
of the same course of conduct, common scheme, or plan. The government also
recommended that defendant be sentenced to the minimum sentence in the range
required by the Sentencing Guidelines based on his cooperation. The government
did not, however, move for a downward departure pursuant to § 5K1.1 of the
Sentencing Guidelines, because defendant had not actually rendered substantial
assistance. The government acknowledged that this was due to circumstances
beyond the defendant’s control. Defendant made no claim at sentencing that
the plea agreement had been breached.
On appeal, defendant argues that the government obligated itself to give
him the opportunity to render substantial assistance and that the government’s
failure to do so denied him the benefit of his bargain. See, e.g., United States v.
Laday, 56 F.3d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ringling, 988 F.2d 504,
506 (4th Cir. 1993). Whether the government has breached a plea agreement is a
question of law which we review de novo. See United States v. Belt, 89 F.3d
710, 713 (10th Cir. 1996). 2
Ordinarily, the court’s review of the government’s decision not to move for
a substantial assistance downward departure is limited to determining whether the
2
Because the failure to object to an alleged breach of a plea agreement
does not waive the issue, we may review defendant’s claim de novo rather than
for plain error. See Belt, 89 F.3d at 712-13.
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decision was animated by an unconstitutional motive or was not rationally related
to a legitimate government end. See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86
(1992). Even if a defendant undeniably renders substantial assistance, the
government retains discretion to decide whether to request a § 5K1.1 downward
departure. See id. at 185 (holding § 5K1.1 “gives the Government a power, not
a duty, to file a motion when a defendant has substantially assisted”).
The government may bargain away this discretion, however, in a plea
agreement. See id. at 185; United States v. Price, 95 F.3d 364, 368 (5th Cir.
1996). We agree with the other circuits that have considered this issue and have
found that whether a plea agreement unequivocally obligates the government to
provide defendant with the opportunity to provide substantial assistance turns on
the specific language of the agreement. Compare Laday, 56 F.3d at 25 n.1, 26
(holding language providing government “will file” motion if defendant provides
substantial assistance obligates government to give defendant opportunity to do
so) with Price, 95 F.3d at 366, 368-69 (holding agreement committing decision to
move for downward departure to “sole discretion” of government does not
obligate government to give defendant opportunity to provide substantial
assistance); compare Ringling, 988 F.2d at 506 (holding government’s promise
that it “will make known at the time of sentencing the full nature and extent of
Defendant’s cooperation” obligates government to interview defendant so that it
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can comment on the value of his cooperation) (emphasis added) with United
States v. Lockhart, 58 F.3d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that where plea
agreement grants government discretion to seek assistance and move for
downward departure, agreement is not breached by failure to provide defendant
with an opportunity to render assistance, unless this decision is motivated by
impermissible animus or is not rationally related to a legitimate government end).
Here, the government promised Courtois that it would make his cooperation
known to the court, which it did. Based on defendant’s cooperation, the
government recommended both that he be exempt from the statutory ten-year
minimum sentence and that he be sentenced at the bottom of the range required
by the Sentencing Guidelines. The government did not, however, obligate itself
to move for a § 5K1.1 downward departure. The language of the agreement
merely left this possibility open, expressly leaving the decision to file such a
motion in the sole discretion of the government. The government decided to
terminate the drug investigation, rendering defendant’s cooperation unnecessary.
As defendant has not alleged that the government terminated its investigation for
impermissible or irrational reasons, he has alleged no ground for relief.
The judgment is AFFIRMED.
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