Bingham v. Apfel ( 2000 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    OCT 30 2000
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    LYNDA J. BINGHAM,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                   No. 99-4221
    (D.C. No. 98-CV-94)
    KENNETH S. APFEL, in his capacity                      (D. Utah)
    as Commissioner of the Social
    Security Administration,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT            *
    Before BRORBY, PORFILIO,           and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Claimant Lynda J. Bingham appeals from the denial of social security
    disability and supplemental security income benefits. We have jurisdiction under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g). We review the agency’s decision on
    the whole record to determine only whether the factual findings are supported by
    substantial evidence and the correct legal standards were applied.     See Goatcher
    v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.      , 
    52 F.3d 288
    , 289 (10th Cir.
    1995). We reverse and remand for additional proceedings.
    Claimant was born in 1964 and is thirty-six years old now. She alleged a
    disability due to mental impairments, obesity, and other physical impairments.
    The ALJ denied benefits at step five of the evaluation sequence.      See Williams v.
    Bowen , 
    844 F.2d 748
    , 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussing steps in detail).
    Claimant argues on appeal that the ALJ: (1) did not properly evaluate her mental
    impairments at step three; (2) erred in his assessment of her credibility; and
    (3) did not support with substantial evidence his finding at step five that she
    could perform work other than her past work.
    Claimant has medical documentation of her mental impairments.         See
    Appellant’s App. at 159-66. The ALJ expressly accepted this evidence as “being
    based on objective signs and laboratory testing.”     Id. at 16. It shows that
    claimant’s mental aptitude equals that of an eight-year-old to an eleven-year-old
    child, depending on what skill was being measured.       See id. at 162. She also has
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    numerous other mental problems, such as extreme impulsivity, severe problems
    getting along with supervisors and coworkers, inability to control her anger,
    defensiveness, insecurity, et al.       See id. at 164. The psychologist had a “guarded”
    opinion that she would be employable if she received vocational rehabilitation
    and individual psychotherapy, considering her mental impairments and obesity.
    Id. at 165.
    The ALJ made two legal errors with respect to this evidence at step three.
    First, in contravention of   Clifton v. Chater , 
    79 F.3d 1007
    , 1009-10 (10th Cir.
    1996), the ALJ did not specify which listings he reviewed at step three or discuss
    the evidence he accepted or rejected with respect to the requirements of those
    specific listings. Rather, as in    Clifton , the ALJ simply stated that claimant did
    not meet the criteria of any listing.      See Appellant’s App. at 13. As this court
    stated in Clifton , “[s]uch a bare conclusion is beyond meaningful judicial
    review.” 
    79 F.3d at 1009
    .
    Second, the ALJ failed to follow the specific analysis for mental
    impairments required by the agency’s regulations, as stated in       Cruse v. United
    States Dep’t of Health & Human Serv.         , 
    49 F.3d 614
    , 617 (10th Cir. 1995). Even
    though the ALJ completed a Psychiatric Review Technique Form (PRTF) and
    attached it to his decision, that is not enough. Rather, the ALJ was obligated to
    discuss in his decision the evidence as it related to his conclusions on the PRTF.
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    “[I]f the ALJ prepares the form himself [instead of having a psychiatrist or
    psychologist do it], he must ‘discuss in his opinion the evidence he considered in
    reaching the conclusions expressed on the form.’”     
    Id. at 617-18
     (quoting
    Washington v. Shalala , 
    37 F.3d 1437
    , 1442 (10th Cir. 1994)). The ALJ did not
    discuss the evidence of mental impairments, except in the most cursory fashion.
    The only specific statement the ALJ made about this evidence, other
    than accepting it as well-supported, was that he did not accept the psychologist’s
    assessment of claimant’s vocational limitations because of claimant’s work
    evaluations in Exhibit 3D.   See Appellant’s App. at 16, 48-61. The ALJ’s
    statement implies that her work evaluations were acceptable. However, the first
    page of Exhibit 3D shows that the evaluator would not have hired claimant if he
    had the decision to make that day.   See id. at 48. The evaluator marked her
    performance as unacceptable on numerous items, including requiring excessive
    supervisory support, inability to complete work without prodding, poor quality
    work, inability to control herself and cope with annoyances at work, failure to
    punch in and out of work, inability to work as fast as coworkers, failure to show
    up at work each day, poor quantity of work output, lack of stamina displayed at
    work, and a poor attitude towards work and herself.     See id. The whole of
    Exhibit 3D is a warning that claimant could be fired for poor performance.     See
    id. at 48-61. It states that claimant had a limited amount of time to bring her
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    performance up to par or she would be reassigned or discharged.       See id. at 51,
    54, 55. This evidence thus contradicts the ALJ’s implied finding that claimant
    received acceptable evaluations at work, and does not provide a valid reason to
    reject the psychologist’s assessment of claimant’s vocational limitations.
    Clifton and Cruse teach that the evidence must be analyzed by the ALJ in
    the first instance at step three. It is unnecessary to address claimant’s other
    arguments.
    The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Utah is
    REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for additional proceedings.
    Entered for the Court
    Wade Brorby
    Circuit Judge
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