Dawson v. Coffman , 651 F. App'x 840 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 8, 2016
U N I T E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E AElisabeth
LS A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________
JAMES R. DAWSON, JR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 15-1365
(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-01919-MSK-NYW)
CYNTHIA COFFMAN, (D. Colo.)
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before L U C E R O , M A T H E S O N , and B A C H A R A C H , Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Mr. James Dawson, Jr. filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging denial of due process and equal protection. The district court
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a valid claim, and we affirm.
*
The parties have not requested oral argument, and it would not
materially aid our consideration of the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P.
34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Thus, we have decided the appeal
based on the briefs.
Our order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
I. The Taking of Blood and Urine Samples, the Conviction, and
Amendment of State Law
Facing state charges involving violent crimes, Mr. Dawson alleged
diminished capacity based on intoxication and a drug-related mental
impairment. In light of these allegations, the state trial court ordered law
enforcement officers to take blood and urine samples from Mr. Dawson.
The samples were collected but not tested.
The jury found Mr. Dawson guilty of second-degree murder,
attempted second-degree murder, second-degree assault, and commission
of a crime of violence. Mr. Dawson’s blood and urine samples were
subsequently lost or destroyed.
Many years later, Colorado amended its laws to authorize judicial
remedies when law enforcement officials negligently lose or destroy
biological evidence. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-414(b). Mr. Dawson
learned that his blood and urine samples were no longer available and
invoked the new law, but the state courts denied relief on grounds that
the new law (1) did not apply when a criminal suspect presents a
diminished-capacity defense because the law applies only to a defense of
actual innocence and (2) applies only to DNA evidence, not to blood and
urine samples collected to test the presence of intoxicants.
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II. Mr. Dawson’s Claims and Our Disposition
Dissatisfied with the state-court outcome, Mr. Dawson brought the
present action, claiming that the limitations on the new law constituted
denials of due process and equal protection. 1 With these claims, Mr.
Dawson requested leave to avoid prepayment of the filing fee.
The district court denied relief from the prepayment obligation and
dismissed the claims. Mr. Dawson renews his request for leave to proceed
without prepayment of the filing fee and appeals the dismissal.
We grant Mr. Dawson relief from the prepayment obligation but
affirm the dismissal.
III. Leave to Avoid Prepayment of the Filing Fee
Ordinarily, appellants must prepay the filing fee before we will
entertain an appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 3(e). An exception exists for
1
Mr. Dawson also argues that the district court erred by
(1) recharacterizing his claims as challenges to the state court judgment,
(2) recharacterizing his § 1983 suit as an application for relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2254, and (3) holding that his claims were time barred. The
district court did none of these things. The district court
! expressly declined to construe Mr. Dawson’s claims as
challenges to the state-court judgment,
! held that § 1983, rather than § 2254, was the proper vehicle
for Mr. Dawson’s claims, and
! declined to decide whether the claims were time barred.
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indigent litigants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (2012). This exception applies
because Mr. Dawson is indigent, preventing him from prepaying the
filing fee. As a result, we grant relief from the prepayment obligation. 2
IV. Dismissal of the Due Process and Equal Protection Claims
The district court concluded that the statutory limitations on relief
did not violate Mr. Dawson’s right to due process or equal protection.
2
As a prisoner, Mr. Dawson is subject to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act. This statute restricts relief from the prepayment obligation
when a prisoner has brought at least three “prior” suits that had been
dismissed based on frivolousness, maliciousness, or failure to state a
valid claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012).
Before filing this appeal, Mr. Dawson brought two suits that had
been dismissed for frivolousness or failure to state a valid claim. This
appeal involves Mr. Dawson’s third dismissal for frivolousness,
maliciousness, or failure to state a valid claim.
The Supreme Court recently noted the existence of an open question
on whether the appeal of a prisoner’s third dismissal triggers the
statutory restriction on relief from the prepayment obligation. Coleman
v. Tollefson, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1765 (2015). But we had
previously held in Pigg v. FBI that a third dismissal does not trigger the
statutory restriction when the third dismissal is the ruling being
appealed. Pigg v. FBI, 106 F.3d 1497, 1498 (10th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam). For this holding, we relied on the common understanding of the
word “prior” in § 1915(g). Id. A dismissal would not be considered
“prior” if it is the decision underlying the appeal. Id.; accord Richey v.
Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding that the
appeal of a third dismissal should not count as a “prior occasion,” relying
in part on Coleman v. Tollefson, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1759 (2015)).
Under Pigg, this appeal of Mr. Dawson’s third dismissal does not
restrict his eligibility for relief from the prepayment obligation.
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Accordingly, the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a valid claim.
We review this dismissal de novo. Janke v. Price, 43 F.3d 1390,
1391 (10th Cir. 1994). In conducting de novo review, we accept as true
all of Mr. Dawson’s well-pleaded factual allegations and view them in
the light most favorable to Mr. Dawson. See Smith v. United States, 561
F.3d 1090, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009). The resulting question is whether the
complaint contains facts stating a plausible claim for relief. Id.The district court’s explanation for the dismissal is thorough and
persuasive. As the district court explained, Colorado may set rational
limits on its newly authorized judicial remedy for the loss or destruction
of biological evidence. These statutory limits precluded Mr. Dawson
from obtaining a judicial remedy because he did not claim actual
innocence in his state-court criminal proceedings, and his blood and
urine samples did not involve DNA evidence. As the district court
explained, Mr. Dawson’s inability to obtain a judicial remedy did not
result in a denial of due process or equal protection. Accordingly, we
affirm the dismissal.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
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