Riddle v. Hickenlooper , 742 F.3d 922 ( 2014 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 23, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
JOELLE RIDDLE; GARY HAUSLER;
KATHLEEN CURRY; THE
COMMITTEE TO ELECT KATHLEEN
CURRY; THE LIBERTARIAN PARTY
OF COLORADO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 13-1108
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, in his official
capacity as Governor of the State of
Colorado; SCOTT GESSLER, in his
official capacity as Secretary of State of
the State of Colorado,
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 1:10-CV-01857-PAB-KMT)
William E. Zimsky, Abadie & Schill, P.C., Durango, Colorado, for Plaintiff -Appellants.
Matthew D. Grove, Assistant Attorney General, State of Colorado, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendants-Appellees.
Before GORSUCH, BALDOCK, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
In 2010, three individuals ran for the Colorado House of Representatives, House
District 61: Kathleen Curry, Roger Wilson, and Luke Korkowski. Ms. Curry was a
write-in candidate, Mr. Wilson was the Democratic nominee, and Mr. Korkowski was the
Republican nominee. Under Colorado law, individual contributions to Ms. Curry were
capped at $200, and individual contributions to each of her opponents were capped at
$400. Unhappy with this disparity, contributors to Ms. Curry’s campaign (along with
others) sued state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violation of the First
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The district
court rejected the claims and granted summary judgment to the state officials.
Appellant’s App., vol. I, at 146-78. We reverse on the equal-protection claim; and, in
light of this decision, we decline to address the summary-judgment ruling on the First
Amendment claims.
I. Colorado Law and the Disparity in Contribution Limits Among Candidates
for the Same Office
The disparity in contribution limits is affected by the State’s procedure for
determining which candidates can appear on the general-election ballot. For that
determination, the State of Colorado distinguishes between the major parties (Republican
and Democrat) and all other parties. Republican and Democratic candidates can obtain a
place on the general-election ballot only by running in (and winning) a primary even
when there is only one candidate seeking the nomination. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-4-
101(1) (2010) (stating the general rule that “only a major political party . . . shall be
entitled to nominate candidates in a primary election”). But write-ins, unaffiliated
2
candidates, and minor-party nominees run in a primary only when multiple candidates vie
for the nomination. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-4-1304(1.5)(c) (2010) (stating that a primary
will be used to nominate a candidate in a minor party if more than one candidate is
designated by assembly or a combination of assembly and petition); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-
4-802(1) (2010) (stating that unaffiliated candidates can qualify for a general election
“other than [through] a primary election or a convention”); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-4-1101(1)
(2010) (allowing candidates to obtain votes at a general election through write-in).
Against this backdrop, Colorado amended its state constitution. The amendment,
known as “Amendment 27,” set limits for the amount that could be given by a single
contributor to candidates for state offices in the primaries and general elections. For
candidates running for the state legislature, the limit was $200 for the primary and $200
for the general election.
In 2004, the legislature adopted the statute (Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1-45-103.7(3)-(4))
being challenged here. The statute effectively removed any potential time limitations on
when a candidate committee could accept contributions when a primary is involved. For
money ostensibly given for the primary, the candidate committee could accept the
contribution and spend it during the general election; and, for money ostensibly given for
the general election, the committee could accept the contribution and spend it even before
the primary. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-45-103.7(4) (2010).
The Secretary of State interprets Amendment 27 and the state statute to: (1) allow
candidates with primaries to receive up to $400 from a single contributor and spend it
3
before or after the primary, and (2) disallow this flexibility for candidates without
primaries.1
II. The Lawsuit, the Appeal, and Our Decision
The disparity in limits led to the filing of the present suit, with the Plaintiffs
claiming an equal-protection violation for contributors to write-ins, unaffiliated
candidates, and nominees for the minor parties.2 The federal district court held, as a
matter of law, that the state statute did not violate the contributors’ constitutional rights
and granted summary judgment to the state officials.
The Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the state statute violates the rights to equal
protection, political expression, and association for individuals contributing to write-ins,
unaffiliated candidates, and nominees for the minor parties. We hold that the state
statute, as applied, violates the contributors’ rights to equal protection.3 Thus, we reverse
and remand with instructions to grant summary judgment to the Plaintiffs on their equal-
protection claim as applied here, when each candidate runs unopposed for the
nomination.
1
The Plaintiffs do not question the correctness of the Secretary’s interpretation;
instead, they challenge the constitutionality of the state statute when interpreted in this
manner.
2
The Plaintiffs are challenging the disparity rather than the amount of the
contribution limit. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262-63 (2006).
3
We need not decide whether the state statute is facially unconstitutional because
the consequences of the decision would be the same. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 376 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
4
III. The Statutory Classification and the Denial of Equal Protection
The equal-protection claim requires us to decide whether the state statute
improperly discriminates among contributors when the major- and minor-party
candidates are unopposed for their nominations. This inquiry involves three questions:
1. Are contributors to Ms. Curry similarly situated to persons contributing to
her Republican and Democratic opponents?
2. If the contributors are similarly situated, what is the appropriate level of
scrutiny?
3. Depending on the appropriate level of scrutiny, is the State’s purpose
sufficiently important and is the statutory classification sufficiently
connected to that purpose?
In addressing these questions, we conclude:
1. Contributors to Ms. Curry’s campaign are similarly situated to contributors
supporting her Republican and Democratic opponents.
2. Because the statutory classification affects a fundamental right, the right to
political expression, we apply a standard that is at least as rigorous as the
standard applied under the First Amendment.
3. Under this standard, the statutory classification would fail.
A. Standard of Review
All parties sought summary judgment, and the district court granted the
Defendants’ motion and denied the Plaintiffs’ motion. For both rulings, we engage in de
novo review. Constitution Party of Kan. v. Kobach, 695 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir.
2012). And in considering the district court’s rulings on both motions, we view the
5
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and determine whether that party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.B. Determining Whether Ms. Curry’s Contributors Are Similarly
Situated to the Contributors Supporting Her Republican and
Democratic Opponents
The threshold issue is whether the “disfavored parties” (contributors to Ms.
Curry’s campaign) are similarly situated to the “favored parties” (contributors to the
Republican and Democratic nominees). We conclude that the favored and disfavored
contributors are similarly situated.
We must begin by determining the meaning of the phrase, “similarly situated.”
The contributors are considered “similarly situated” if they are alike in “‘all relevant
respects.’” Coal. for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Ritter, 517 F.3d 1195, 1199 (10th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)). Contributors to the legislative race
were alike “in all respects” because no relevant distinctions existed between an individual
wanting to donate money to Kathleen Curry and another individual wanting to donate to
Ms. Curry’s opponent.
The Defendants argue to the contrary, but they confuse:
● the contributors with their preferred candidates, and
● the state constitution with the statute being challenged.
The Defendants do not question the similarities among the contributors. Instead,
the Defendants focus on the candidates, saying that Ms. Curry and her opponents are not
similarly situated. Perhaps the Defendants are right, for the Republican and Democratic
candidates had to run in primaries and Ms. Curry did not. But the equal-protection claim
6
was asserted by the contributors, not Ms. Curry. They simply want to contribute to their
preferred candidate.
The Defendants’ distinction also confuses the Colorado Constitution with the
Colorado statute. Focusing on the Colorado Constitution, the Defendants insist that the
Republican and Democratic candidates had primaries and the write-in candidate (Ms.
Curry) didn’t have a primary. Thus, the Defendants argue that the State should be able to
set different contribution limits for candidates running in primaries and those not running
in primaries. But this argument confuses the state constitution with the state statute being
challenged.
The Plaintiffs stated in oral argument that they are not challenging the Colorado
Constitution. Instead, the Plaintiffs confine their challenge to the Colorado statute. This
statute does not set contribution limits based on who has a primary and who doesn’t.
Instead, the statute blurs the distinction by allowing Republican and Democratic
candidates to collect and spend the entire $400 after the primary. Thus, a Republican or
Democratic candidate can obtain $400 from a single contributor and spend all of the
money in the general election. For the same general election, a write-in candidate can
obtain only $200 from a single contributor.
To illustrate: Assume that three individuals want to make all of their potential
contributions one week after the primaries and that each individual would support a
different candidate. The supporter of Ms. Curry could contribute only $200, but
supporters of Ms. Curry’s opponents could contribute twice as much. How are the
supporters different aside from their political preferences? According to the Defendants,
7
the supporters are different because the Republican and Democratic nominees had to win
a spot on the general-election ballot through a primary and Kathleen Curry did not. But
the Defendants’ distinction (based on who has a primary and who doesn’t) has nothing to
do with the statutory classification, which creates different contribution limits after the
primary has already ended.
Without any meaningful differences between the three contributors, we conclude
that they are similarly situated.
C. Determining the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
With this conclusion, we must determine the appropriate level of scrutiny.
Courts ordinarily scrutinize statutory classification under a deferential test, called
“rational basis.” See Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1207 (10th Cir. 1996).
Exceptions exist for statutory classifications that turn on suspect differences (such as
race) or that affect a fundamental right. Price-Cornelison v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103, 1109
(10th Cir. 2008). In these circumstances, we would ordinarily apply strict scrutiny. Id.The district court declined to apply strict scrutiny, reasoning that the contributors
did not belong to a suspect class and that all contributors were treated alike because the
same limitations applied to candidates running in a primary. We conclude that the
district court should have applied greater scrutiny to the statutory classification.
It is true that the statute does not differentiate between contributors based on a
suspect classification such as race. But the statute does classify contributors in a way that
impinges on a fundamental rightthe right to contribute as a form of political
expression. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988); see also Buckley v. Valeo,
8
424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976) (per curiam) (stating that the law imposed contribution limitations
that “implicate[d] fundamental First Amendment interests”).
The district court did not question the fundamental nature of this right. Instead,
the court reasoned that Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-45-103.7 had not treated individuals
contributing to Ms. Curry any differently than the individuals contributing to the
Republican and Democratic candidates. This reasoning is incorrect. After the primary, a
supporter of Ms. Curry could give her only $200. At the same time, others could
contribute $400 each to the Republican and Democratic candidates, and the candidates
could spend that money in the general election. In this way, the statute treated
contributors differently based on the political affiliation of the candidate being supported.
And by treating the contributors differently, the statute impinged on the right to political
expression for those who support Ms. Curry or other nominees who are unable to obtain
funds prior to nomination.
As a result, we conclude that the statutory classification impinged on a
fundamental right.
D. Strictly Scrutinizing the Statutory Classification
This conclusion would ordinarily require us to apply strict scrutiny. See Austin v.
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990) (“Because the right to engage in
political expression is fundamental to our constitutional system, statutory classifications
impinging upon that right must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
9
interest”);4 see also Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972) (“The Equal
Protection Clause requires that statutes affecting First Amendment interests be narrowly
tailored to their legitimate objectives.”). Generally, this scrutiny involves two inquiries:
● whether the State’s asserted interest is compelling, and
● whether the means chosen are narrowly tailored to advance that interest.
Price-Cornelison v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103, 1109 (10th Cir. 2008).
In the First Amendment context, the Supreme Court has applied a less rigorous
test for contribution limits, examining whether they are closely drawn to a sufficiently
important governmental interest. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 247 (2006).
For the sake of argument, we can assume that this form of intermediate scrutiny applies
when contributors challenge contribution limits based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause rather than the First Amendment. Even under this form of
intermediate scrutiny, however, the state officials would bear the burden of proof. See
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000).
The Defendants rely solely on the State’s interest in preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption. This interest is sufficiently important. See Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 67-68 (1976) (per curiam). But this interest has little to do with Colorado’s
statutory distinction among contributors.
4
In 2010, the Supreme Court overruled a separate part of Austin. Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 347-65 (2010). But the Court has not overruled the
equal-protection analysis in Austin. See Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717
F.3d 576, 603 (8th Cir. 2013) (following Austin’s equal-protection analysis (because it
had not been overruled) to determine the constitutionality of a classification involving a
ban on political contributions).
10
In evaluating the connection to the statutory distinction, we must determine
whether it is closely drawn to advance the State’s interest in preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption. We conclude that the means chosen are ill-conceived to
advance these interests.
The statutory classification might advance the State’s asserted interest if write-ins,
unaffiliated candidates, or minor-party nominees were more corruptible (or appeared
more corruptible) than their Republican or Democratic opponents. But the Defendants
have never made such a suggestion. In the absence of a link between the differing
contribution limits and the battle against corruption, the means chosen are not closely
drawn to the State’s asserted interest.
Rather than tie the statute to the anticorruption goal, the state officials argue that
Republican and Democratic candidates must frequently spend money before the primary
to “clear the field” of others wanting the nomination. In contrast, write-ins, unaffiliated
candidates, and minor-party candidates need not clear the field of rivals; thus, these
candidates arguably need less funds than their Republican or Democratic opponents
before earning a place on the general-election ballot.
But this arguable distinction does not affect our inquiry. The state officials do not
rely on the cost of a primary as a separate governmental interest. Instead, the officials
rely solely on the State’s asserted interest in fighting corruption. And that interest is not
advanced by a law that allows Republicans or Democrats to collect larger donations than
write-ins, unaffiliated candidates, or minor-party nominees. See Russell v. Burris, 146
F.3d 563, 571-72 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that a statute was not narrowly tailored to
11
combat corruption when it allowed some political action committees to contribute 2.5
times the amount that most others could contribute).
The statute creates a basic favoritism between candidates vying for the same
office. Ms. Curry’s campaign provides a vivid example. Ms. Curry, as a write-in, had no
opponent until she earned a place on the general-election ballot. The same was true of
the Republican and Democratic nominees, for they were unopposed in their primaries.
Unlike Ms. Curry, however, the Republican and Democratic candidates could collect
$400 after earning a place on the general-election ballot. In contrast, Ms. Curry could
collect only $200.
This classification does what the Supreme Court has never countenanced: It
creates different contribution limits for individuals running against one another. See
Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 738 (2008) (“We have never upheld the
constitutionality of a law that imposes different contribution limits for candidates who are
competing against each other . . . .”). These discriminatory limits are not closely drawn
to the State’s interest in battling corruption or the appearance of corruption. As a result,
the classification does not survive strict scrutiny.
The Supreme Court addressed similar circumstances in Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S.
724 (2008). There, the Court addressed a First Amendment challenge to a law that
allowed candidates to obtain more from individual contributors when an opponent had
spent more than $350,000 in personal funds. Davis, 554 U.S. at 728, 736. The Court
struck down the law on First Amendment grounds, holding that the classification between
candidates was not closely drawn to the stated interest in preventing corruption or the
12
appearance of corruption. Id. at 737-44. Though a uniform contribution limit would
have been constitutional, the Court noted its difficulty in imagining how Congress would
advance its “anticorruption goals” by creating more severe contribution limits for
candidates financing their own campaigns. Id. at 741. Ultimately, the law failed because
it imposed “different contribution . . . limits on candidates vying for the same seat.” Id. at
743-44.
Though the Court rested on the First Amendment rather than on the right to equal
protection,5 the rationale applies with even greater force here. See Richard Briffault,
Davis v. FEC: The Roberts Court’s Continuing Attack on Campaign Finance Reform, 44
Tulsa L. Rev. 475, 488 (2009) (discussing the Davis Court’s emphasis on equality, such
as the references to “‘discriminatory fundraising limitations,’” “‘fundraising advantages
for opponents,’” and “‘the unprecedented step of imposing different contribution and
coordinated party expenditure limits on candidates vying for the same seat’” (footnotes
omitted)).
Because the constitutional issue involved the First Amendment, the Davis Court
focused on whether the classification was closely drawn to the government’s
anticorruption goal. Davis, 554 U.S. at 737-44. Here we have the same statutory
anomaly of candidates running against each other with different contribution limits, and
the disparity is not closely drawn to the asserted interest in fighting corruption or its
5
The Court declined to address the equal-protection claim in light of the decision to
strike down the law on First Amendment grounds. Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554
U.S. 724, 744 n.9 (2008).
13
appearance. As a result, we follow the teaching of Davis and hold that the statutory
classification is unconstitutional because it is not closely drawn to the State’s
anticorruption goal.
IV. Conclusion
We do not suggest that the constitution would forbid any contribution limits based
on an election cycle. But here the State of Colorado has created different contribution
limits for candidates running against each other, and these differences have little to do
with fighting corruption. Indeed, even now, the Defendants have failed to articulate how
the statutory classification advances Colorado’s interest in preventing corruption. Thus,
we conclude that the statutory classification violates the right to equal protection for
individuals wishing to contribute to write-ins, unaffiliated candidates, and minor-party
candidates when each candidate runs unopposed for the nomination.
In these circumstances, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to
the Defendants. Instead, summary judgment should have been awarded to the Plaintiffs.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the judgment and to
award summary judgment to the Plaintiffs on their as-applied claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
14
13-1108, Riddle v. Hickenlooper
GORSUCH, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I confess some uncertainty about the level of scrutiny the Supreme Court
wishes us to apply to this contribution limit challenge, but I harbor no question
about the outcome we must reach. My colleagues are surely right that, as applied,
Colorado’s statutory scheme offends the Constitution’s equal protection
guarantee, whatever plausible level of scrutiny we might deploy. At the same
time, it’s no less clear to me that, with a little effort, Colorado could have
achieved its stated policy objectives (and might still) without offending the
national charter.
*
In at least one important way Colorado discriminates against minor party
contributors. An example illustrates the problem: contributors to state legislative
races can make two separate $200 contributions ($400 in all) to major party
candidates who face no primary opposition. One of these $200 contributions may
be nominally attributed to the (uncontested) primary, the other to the general
election, but under Colorado’s statutory scheme all the money can be spent in aid
of the general election contest. Meanwhile, contributors to minor party
candidates who face no opposition for their party’s nomination can make only one
$200 contribution. So it is that, in the particular situation we face, major party
contributors can channel twice as much money to their favorite candidate in the
general election as minor party contributors can.
The minor party contributors who bring this equal protection challenge
suggest (at least in places) that we should consider applying strict scrutiny to this
particular aspect of Colorado’s statutory scheme. They say that contributing in
elections implicates a fundamental liberty interest, that Colorado’s scheme favors
the exercise of that fundamental liberty interest by some at the expense of others,
and for this reason warrants the most searching level of judicial scrutiny. For my
part, I don’t doubt this line of argument has much to recommend it. The trouble
is, we have no controlling guidance on the question from the Supreme Court.
And in what guidance we do have lie some conflicting cues.
No one before us disputes that the act of contributing to political campaigns
implicates a “basic constitutional freedom,” one lying “at the foundation of a free
society” and enjoying a significant relationship to the right to speak and associate
— both expressly protected First Amendment activities. Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam). Even so, the Court has yet to apply strict scrutiny
to contribution limit challenges — employing instead something pretty close but
not quite the same thing. See id. (using a “closely drawn” rather than a strict
scrutiny standard); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 740 n.7 (2008); Republican Party
of N.M. v. King, No. 12-2015, slip op. at 8-9 (10th Cir. Dec. 18, 2013). Some
have questioned whether contribution limits should be subject to strict scrutiny.
See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 266-67 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 241-45 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part
2
and dissenting in part). The Court itself now has under consideration a case in
which it may (or may not) choose to address the question. See McCutcheon v.
FEC, 133 S. Ct. 1242 (2013) (noting probable jurisdiction in a challenge to
aggregate contribution limits; oral argument was held October 8, 2013). But, to
date at least, the Court hasn’t gone so far. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310, 359 (2010).
Of course, all these teachings have come in the context of First Amendment
challenges to contribution limits — and in this appeal we are asked to decide a
Fourteenth Amendment claim. In the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection
context, the Supreme Court has clearly told us to apply strict scrutiny not only to
governmental classifications resting on certain inherently suspect grounds
(paradigmatically, race) but also governmental “classifications affecting
fundamental rights.” Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). Still, some
thoughtful judges have questioned whether it is appropriate to lift what is an
admittedly “fundamental right” found in the First Amendment and analyze its
infringement here, in the Fourteenth Amendment context, shorn of what the Court
has said about the appropriate level of scrutiny applicable to that right in its
native doctrinal environment. Isn’t the nature of the interest at issue (its
“fundamental-ness”) closely tied to the level of scrutiny afforded that interest in
its doctrinal home? Can an interest become more potent (“more” fundamental)
when viewed through the lens of equal protection analysis? See, e.g., Wagner v.
3
FEC, 854 F. Supp. 2d 83, 95-97 (D.D.C. 2012) (Boasberg, J.); Ill. Liberty PAC v.
Madigan, 902 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1125-26 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Feinerman, J.).
To these questions, I can imagine this (potential) reply. The plaintiffs
before us don’t complain that Colorado’s contribution limits violate their First
Amendment rights because, say, the limits are too low for everyone. Instead, they
complain that the State’s contribution limits violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s
equal protection guarantee by discriminating against minor party contributors.
And whatever level of scrutiny should apply to equal infringements of the right to
contribute in the First Amendment context, the strictest degree of scrutiny is
warranted under Fourteenth Amendment equal protection doctrine when the
government proceeds to discriminate against some persons in the exercise of that
right. On this account, there is something distinct, different, and more
problematic afoot when the government selectively infringes on a fundamental
right. Cf. Davis, 554 U.S. at 743-44 (suggesting that even in the First
Amendment context “imposing different contribution . . . limits on candidates
vying for the same seat” may call out for especially heightened scrutiny).
*
While there may be room in this case to debate the appropriate level of
scrutiny, there’s no room to debate the outcome. The various tiers of scrutiny
that occupy so much attention in contemporary constitutional litigation — rational
basis, strict scrutiny, something(s) in between — may sometimes provide
4
important heuristic help by illuminating the underlying question whether the State
has violated the text of the Equal Protection Clause (or the First Amendment or
some other constitutional guarantee). But this isn’t one of those cases. Whatever
level of scrutiny one might reasonably apply here — even spotting (without in
any way granting) Colorado its wish that we lift Buckley’s somewhat more
relaxed level of scrutiny from its First Amendment home and plunk it down into
this Fourteenth Amendment equal protection setting — the State’s statutory
scheme still pretty clearly flunks.
In Buckley, the Supreme Court held that contribution limits must be
“closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.”
424 U.S. at 25. But the Court also recognized that a state’s interest in preventing
political corruption and its appearance can (sometimes) satisfy this standard. See
id. at 25-29; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 345. Recognizing this line of defense
may represent its best available lifeline, Colorado insists in its brief (though ever
so briefly, just one paragraph in all) that its regulatory scheme is all about
warding off corruption, or at least corruption’s appearance. Yet the State never
even tries to tell us how those interests might be served by a scheme that
discriminates in favor of major party contributors. Let alone introduce evidence
to support such an argument. All we have is one stray, if insistent, assertion
found in a lawyer’s brief.
5
To be sure, Colorado tries a separate line of defense, suggesting that its
discriminatory contribution scheme is justified not only because of corruption but
also because of cost. Under Colorado law, major party candidates must always
participate in primaries. Even when unchallenged. Meanwhile, under Colorado
law minor parties may not conduct primaries when only one candidate seeks the
nomination. Because even unchallenged primaries can be expensive, the State
reasons, major party candidates who face no challenge for the nomination need
and deserve more money than similarly situated minor party counterparts.
This argument bears no shortage of curiosities, but consider just these two.
First, can a state really justify unequal treatment because of a “problem” of its
own creation? After all, to the extent unchallenged major party candidates may
incur more costs because they have to participate in primaries (an essential factual
premise for which Colorado has identified no evidence in our record), that’s only
because state statutory law requires them to do so. Second, what does the State’s
proffered rationale have to do with the rule it seeks to defend? Even if we accept
for argument’s sake the notion that major party candidates “need” more money to
secure their parties’ nominations because of the primary election process, that
speaks only to the primary election. Meanwhile, the challenge in this case
focuses on the fact Colorado’s regulatory regime allows major party contributors
greater influence in the general election. The State’s rationale and rule just don’t
jibe: it supplies a possible rationale for higher contribution limits for major party
6
candidates at the primary election stage but the challenge in this case focuses on
the fact the State effectively allows higher contributions to major party candidates
at the general election stage.
When it really comes down to it, the only reason I can imagine for
Colorado’s challenged regulatory scheme is a bald desire to help major party
candidates at the expense of minor party candidates. Whether that rationale could
save Colorado’s scheme seems to me highly doubtful. Of course, the Supreme
Court has suggested that states may enact “reasonable election regulations”
designed to foster a two-party system. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,
520 U.S. 351, 367 (1997). But the Court has never gone so far as to suggest the
states may pursue that interest by discriminating against contributors based on
their political allegiances. Cf. id. (a state’s interest in a two-party system “does
not permit [it] to completely insulate the two-party system from minor parties’ or
independent candidates’ competition and influence”). Neither has Colorado had
the audacity to suggest that we should uphold its regime on this basis — and
when deciding whether a law satisfies strict scrutiny or Buckley’s slightly less
demanding standard, this court is obliged to assess the law only in light of the
interests the State has sought to pursue, not those it hasn’t. See, e.g., Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000) (“[U]nder Buckley’s standard
of scrutiny, a contribution limit involving significant interference with
associational rights could survive if the Government demonstrated that
7
contribution regulation was closely drawn to match a sufficiently important
interest.” (emphasis added) (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
*
Having said this much, it is worth pausing to emphasize what isn’t said in
these pages. Nothing in what I’ve suggested or what the court holds intimates
that Colorado must adopt a per-election-cycle rather than a per-election approach
to the regulation of campaign contributions. The State represents that its
constitution requires some sort of statutory scheme regulating campaign
contributions on a per-election basis (disaggregating primary and general election
contributions and capping them separately) rather than on a per-cycle basis
(aggregating the two steps in one overall contribution limit). If we strike down
its current statutory regime, Colorado says it worries its constitutional command
may be imperiled too. But such fears are misplaced. The fact that Colorado’s
current statutory per-election scheme runs afoul of the federal equal protection
guarantee doesn’t mean all will. The federal government regulates campaign
contributions on a per-election basis and manages to do so without any of the
discrimination found in Colorado statutory law. Perhaps the State might follow
this model or some other. What we hold today is limited but no less essential for
it: a state cannot adopt contribution limits that so clearly discriminate against
minority voices in the political process without some “compelling” or “closely
drawn” purpose — and Colorado has articulated none.
8