United States v. Tenorio , 527 F. App'x 781 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 13, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 12-1294
v. (D. Colo.)
RONALD C. TENORIO, (D.C. No. 1:11-CR-00375-CMA-7)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, BRORBY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
I. Introduction
A multi-count indictment charged appellant Ronald C. Tenorio with drug
and firearm crimes. Tenorio entered into a written agreement with the
Government and pleaded guilty to Counts Two, Three, and Fourteen. Consistent
with that agreement, the Government filed a written motion pursuant to USSG
§ 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), agreeing to a downward departure from the
statutory minimum sentences for Counts Two and Three. After the Government
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
orally amended its motion during the sentencing hearing, the district court
granted the departure and sentenced Tenorio to sixty months’ imprisonment on
the two counts. In addition, the court imposed a consecutive eighty-four-month
sentence for the Count Fourteen firearm conviction. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Tenorio appeals, arguing the district court erred by refusing
to also depart downward from the statutory minimum sentence on Count
Fourteen.
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. §
3742(a), we affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.
II. Background
Tenorio was indicted on seven counts relating to his drug trafficking
activities. He pleaded guilty to three of those counts: two counts of knowing
possession with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of methamphetamine
(“Count Two” and “Count Three”) and one count of using a firearm during and in
relation to a federal felony drug trafficking crime (“Count Fourteen”). The
remaining counts were dismissed on the Government’s motion pursuant to the
terms of the written plea agreement. A Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”)
was prepared prior to sentencing. The PSR calculated a base offense level of
thirty-four. It then reduced the offense level three levels pursuant to USSG §
3E1.1(a) for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of
thirty-one. The PSR assigned two criminal history points which corresponded to
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a criminal history category of II. The offense level combined with the criminal
history category resulted in an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 121 to 151
months’ imprisonment. The PSR correctly noted that the statutory minimum
sentence for Counts Two and Three is 120 months’ imprisonment and the
statutory minimum for Count Fourteen is eighty-four months consecutive to any
other sentence imposed.
Before sentencing, the Government filed a motion asking the district court
to depart downward to forty percent below the bottom of the advisory guidelines
range for Counts Two and Three. The Government’s motion was consistent with
the terms of the plea agreement which states, in part: “[T]he Government
anticipates filing a § 5K1.1 and Section 3553(e) motion calling for a reduction of
the Defendant’s sentence to imprisonment from the otherwise applicable guideline
and statutory minimum mandatory sentences for Count Two and Count Three
based on substantial cooperation and assistance . . . .” Tenorio also filed a
presentencing motion, asking for both a downward departure and a downward
variance based on his extraordinary physical impairment. He requested a
sentence of not more than sixty months’ imprisonment.
During the sentencing hearing, the district court recognized it lacked
discretion to depart or vary below the statutory minimum of 120 months in the
absence of a motion by the Government based on Tenorio’s substantial assistance.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (“Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have
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the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a
minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.”);
see also United States v. A.B., 529 F.3d 1275, 1280 (10th Cir. 2008) (“As a matter
of law, the district court [is] not authorized . . . to consider factors other than
substantial assistance in sentencing below the statutory minimum.”). The
Government’s motion recommended a departure to approximately seventy-two
months’ imprisonment on the basis of substantial assistance. The Government,
however, orally amended its motion during the hearing to recommend a departure
of approximately fifty-one percent below the bottom of the advisory guidelines
range, or a sentence of sixty months. The district court indicated its inclination to
grant the Government’s motion and depart to a sentence of sixty months on
Counts Two and Three. It also clearly recognized the Government’s motion did
not authorize any departure from the consecutive, statutory minimum mandatory
sentence of eighty-four months on Count Fourteen.
Before imposing sentence, the court heard from Tenorio’s attorney who
argued the Government’s motion also related to the eighty-four-month
consecutive sentence on the firearm charge. The district court refused to depart
from the eighty-four-month sentence, stating it had no authority to depart below a
statutory sentence even if the Government so moved. But see United States v.
Campbell, 995 F.2d 173, 175 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding a district court may depart
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below a statutory mandatory minimum upon motion of the Government). The
court sentenced Tenorio to sixty months’ imprisonment as to Counts Two and
Three, both terms to run concurrently, and a term of eighty-four months as to
Count Fourteen, that term to run consecutively to the sixty months. Tenorio
appeals the sentence imposed as to Count Fourteen, arguing the district court
erred by refusing to depart below the statutory minimum of eighty-four months.
III. Discussion
This court reviews de novo a district court’s decision that it lacks authority
to grant a downward departure. See United States v. Maples, 95 F.3d 35, 37 (10th
Cir. 1996) (addressing downward departures from guidelines sentences); see also
United States v. Fonseca, 473 F.3d 1109, 1112 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding the
paradigm for reviewing downward departures continues to apply after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Booker). Tenorio argues the district court refused to
depart downward from the eighty-four-month sentence because it erroneously
believed it lacked discretion to depart from the minimum mandatory sentence
prescribed by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) even if the Government moved for a departure
pursuant to § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). He asserts the plain language of §
3553(e) permits such a downward departure and applies generally to all minimum
sentences established by statute, including the eighty-four-month sentence
established by § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). See United States v. James, 468 F.3d 245, 248
(5th Cir. 2006) (holding “the district court had the authority to depart below the
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statutory minimum of section 924(c) based on the Government’s section 3553(e)
motion”). The Government does not disagree. Instead, the Government asserts
any error committed by the district court was harmless because the court lacked
authority to depart downward for a wholly independent reason—the
Government’s § 5K1.1 motion does not apply to Count Fourteen.
Despite Tenorio’s assertions to the contrary, the record fully supports the
Government’s position. The plea agreement contemplates that the Government’s
§ 5K1.1 motion will not apply to Count Fourteen, stating, in part: “[T]he parties
stipulate and agree that as to Count Fourteen the defendant should receive the
seven year mandatory consecutive sentence for brandishing while using a firearm
during a drug trafficking offense.” The § 5K1.1 motion does not mention Count
Fourteen, and specifically states the reduction sought is “in accordance with the
plea agreement.” At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the district court asked
the Government whether its motion applied to the statutory mandatory sentence
for Count Fourteen and the Government confirmed that it did not. Tenorio asserts
the Government’s oral amendment of its motion extended the motion to
encompass Count Fourteen as well as Counts Two and Three. The record
provides no support for this assertion, instead confirming the motion was
amended only to increase the amount of the departure on Counts Two and Three.
In the absence of a motion from the Government or some other statutory
exception, a district court does not have authority to sentence a defendant below a
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statutory minimum. A.B., 529 F.3d at 1280. Because no such motion was made
with respect to Count Fourteen, the district court had no authority to depart below
the eighty-four-month sentence prescribed by § 924(c)(ii).
IV. Conclusion
The sentence imposed by the district court is affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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