Preston v. CitiMortgage ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT July 17, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
DONETTA PRESTON; ISAIAH
PRESTON,
Plaintiffs–Appellants,
No. 13-6015
v. (D.C. No. 5:12-CV-01220-R)
(W.D. Okla.)
CITIMORTGAGE,
Defendant–Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before LUCERO, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Donetta and Isaiah Preston, proceeding pro se, appeal from the district court’s
dismissal of their quiet title action. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
affirm.
*
After examining appellants’ brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not
binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed.
R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I
In 2010, the Prestons executed a promissory note for $254,000 in favor of
Midwest Mortgage Capital, LLC (“Midwest”) in relation to a property in Edmond,
Oklahoma. Midwest endorsed the note to CitiMortgage, Inc. (“CitiMortgage”), making
CitiMortgage the holder of the note. After the Prestons defaulted on their payment
obligations, CitiMortgage initiated a foreclosure action in Oklahoma state court on June
2, 2011.
On September 16, 2011, CitiMortgage moved for summary judgment.
CitiMortgage’s motion was granted on April 13, 2012, and a sheriff’s sale of the Edmond
property took place on June 7, 2012. CitiMortgage subsequently filed a Motion to
Confirm Sale. The Prestons filed a variety of motions in state court seeking to halt or
reverse the sale, all of which were denied. On November 9, 2012, the state court entered
a final order confirming the sale of the Edmond property.
On November 15, 2012, the Prestons filed a complaint to quiet title in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, contending that they were the
rightful owners of the Edmond property at issue in their state court proceedings. The
district court granted CitiMortgage’s motion to dismiss, concluding that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). The Prestons
timely appealed.
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II
On appeal, the Prestons contend that the district court erroneously applied the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the district court judge was biased, and the court did not
provide them with due process. Because the Prestons proceed pro se, we construe their
filings liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam).
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction to review a previously entered state-court judgment. Feldman, 460 U.S. at
476; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415-16. In their complaint before the district court, the Prestons
challenge the validity of CitiMortgage’s mortgage on the Edmond property and request
that title be quieted in their favor. However, CitiMortgage’s ownership of the mortgage
and validity of the foreclosure action were conclusively resolved in the earlier state court
action. The state court’s final entry of judgment explicitly states that “[t]he Court further
finds that [CitiMortgage] was the holder of the Note at the time the case was filed” and
that CitiMortgage “is entitled to a foreclosure of its mortgage sued upon in this case.”
For the Prestons to prevail in the case before us, we would have to “review and reject[]
those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005). The Prestons’ claims are therefore “inextricably intertwined” with the state
court’s conclusions and barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Mann v. Boatright, 477
F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007).
We are not persuaded by the Prestons’ claim that the district court’s judgment was
infected by bias. Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a federal judge must “disqualify himself in
any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” However,
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“judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). In its final order, the district
court concluded that “[t]his is a case ‘brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by [a] state-court judgment[ ] rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of . . . [that]
judgment [ ].’” The Prestons claim that the court displayed bias against them by calling
them “state-court losers,” but that statement was quoted from Campbell v. City of
Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284).
This isolated statement, taken from prior caselaw, is insufficient to establish that the
district court had “such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair
judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555.
The Prestons also claim in a cursory fashion that the district court erred because
“to ascertain the truth a judge must allow for Due Process.” Although the Prestons argue
generally that the Constitution requires that citizens be afforded due process before
deprivation of life, liberty, or property, they fail to identify any defect in the district court
proceedings. Although we must construe a pro se litigant’s arguments liberally, we may
not “assume the role of advocate” and make the Prestons’ arguments for them. Yang v.
Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). Because the
Prestons have not explained how they believe the district court denied their due process
rights, this claim is waived. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th
Cir. 1998) (“Arguments inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived . . . .”).
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III
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. We construe the Prestons’
untimely reply as a motion to file a late reply, which we GRANT.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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