Schell v. Prose ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 6 1997
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOSEPH EDWARD SCHELL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 97-1012
vs. (D.C. No. 95-Z-2625)
(D. Colo.)
K. E. PROSE,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. **
Mr. Schell, an inmate appearing pro se, appeals from the grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Defendant police officer. The district court determined
that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. Our jurisdiction arises under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.
Mr. Schell was arrested during a traffic stop on an Arizona felony warrant.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel
has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
It is uncontroverted that a computer check by the officer revealed that the vehicle
was registered to an Ohio owner. The officer had the vehicle towed and
impounded. In his complaint, Mr. Schell alleges that the officer unlawfully
seized his property (the vehicle and personal property inside) rather than allow a
passenger to drive the vehicle away. I R. doc. 3 at 3. He alleges that subsequent
attempts to get his property back have been unsuccessful. Id.We review the grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity de
novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Latta v. Keryte, 118 F.3d
693, 697 (10th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court considers all
evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986). The nonmoving party, however, may not rely upon
unsupported allegations without “‘any significant probative evidence tending to
support the complaint.’” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290
(1968)). Factual disputes about immaterial matters will not preclude summary
judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Government officials performing discretionary government functions are
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entitled to qualified immunity if their “conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Once a qualified
immunity defense is raised, a plaintiff must show that a defendant violated a
constitutional or statutory right, and that the right was clearly established such
that a reasonable person in the officer’s position would have known that the
conduct violated the right. Garramone v. Romo, 94 F.3d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir.
1996). Though fact-specific, qualified immunity is a legal inquiry. Pueblo
Neighborhood Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 646 (10th Cir. 1988).
In response to the officer’s summary judgment motion, Mr. Schell filed
sworn responses indicating that he asserted ownership of the vehicle and that he
provided “verification,” “proper documentation,” and “proof of ownership” to the
officer. I R. docs. 26 at 2; 27 at 2; 28 at 1. He neither specified nor attached this
documentation. He also contended that, contrary to the officer’s affidavit, the
passengers in the vehicle requested that they be allowed to drive the vehicle. I R.
doc. 27 at 2. The officer contends that the vehicle was returned to its lawful
owner; Mr. Schell maintains on appeal that the vehicle was sold--a dispute that is
not material.
Mr. Schell has not come forth with specific facts showing a violation of
either the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment by this defendant.
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“We have held that law enforcement officers may impound an automobile until
the ownership of the vehicle can be ascertained.” United States v. Shareef, 100
F.3d 1491, 1508 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Long, 705 F.2d 1259,
1262 (10th Cir. 1983)). Here, it is uncontroverted that the vehicle was registered
to an Ohio owner. Mr. Schell’s provision of unspecified documents concerning
ownership does not render the discretion exercised by the officer objectively
unreasonable. Given that the car was registered to another and that neither of the
passengers could produce evidence of ownership, the officer was not required to
allow them to drive it away. Cf. United States v. Agofsky, 20 F.3d 866, 873 (8th
Cir.) (“Nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires a police department to allow
an arrested person to arrange for another person to pick up his car to avoid
impoundment and inventory.”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 909, 949 (1994). Insofar as
the due process claim, Mr. Schell neither alleged nor offered proof before the
district court of an inadequate post-deprivation procedure. See Summers v. Utah,
927 F.2d 1165, 1169 (10th Cir. 1991) (discussing minimum standards); Goichman
v. City of Aspen, 859 F.2d 1466, 1468-69 (10th Cir. 1988). Because Mr. Schell
has not established the violation of any right, we need go no further. See Siegert
v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232-33 (1991).
AFFIRMED. All pending motions are DENIED. The mandate shall issue
forthwith.
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Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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