United States v. Moya-Breton , 652 F. App'x 721 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT June 21, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 15-4185
(D.C. No. 2:06-CR-00672-DB-EJF-2)
ALFONSO MOYA-BRETON, (D. Utah)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before KELLY, HOLMES, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Alfonso Moya-Breton appeals, pro se, from the district court’s denial of his
motion for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).1 He also seeks leave to
proceed on appeal in forma pauperis (IFP). We grant Moya-Breton’s IFP motion. But
because the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion for a reduced
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1;
10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
Because Moya-Breton appears pro se, we liberally construe his pleadings.
But we won’t act as his advocate. James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir.
2013).
sentence, we vacate the district court’s order denying the motion and remand with
directions to instead enter an order dismissing the motion.
Moya-Breton pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute methamphetamine. The parties agreed to, and the district court imposed,
a 180-month prison sentence. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) (providing that
government may agree to specific sentence or sentencing range and that agreed-upon
sentence or range binds court once it accepts plea agreement). Moya-Breton later
moved for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), asserting that his
sentence was based on a Guidelines sentencing range that the U.S. Sentencing
Commission subsequently lowered through an amendment to the Guidelines. The
district court denied the motion, noting that when a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement
reflects that the parties “agree[d] to a particular sentence . . . that was not tied to a
particular [G]uideline[s] range,” the sentence isn’t based on a sentencing range and
§ 3582(c)(2) doesn’t authorize a reduced sentence. R. vol. 3, 165.
Section 3582(c)(2) authorizes a district court to reduce a prison sentence if the
sentence was “based on a sentencing range that has been subsequently lowered by the
Sentencing Commission” and the reduction is consistent with the Commission’s
applicable policy statements. We ordinarily review a district court’s denial of a
§ 3582(c)(2) motion for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Hodge, 721 F.3d
1279, 1280 (10th Cir. 2013). But we review de novo the district court’s interpretation
of a statute, including its determination of whether § 3582(c)(2) authorizes the court
to consider a particular request for a reduced sentence. Id.
2
When, as here, a defendant enters into a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, the
defendant is eligible for a reduced sentence under § 3582(c)(2) only if the
“agreement expressly uses a Guidelines sentencing range to establish the term of
imprisonment, and that range is subsequently lowered by the Commission.” Freeman
v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 539 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the
judgment).2 The use of a Guidelines sentencing range must be “evident from the
agreement itself.” Id. For example, the agreement “may call for [a] defendant to be
sentenced within a particular Guidelines sentencing range,” id. at 538, or may
otherwise “make clear that the basis for [a] specified term is a Guidelines sentencing
range applicable to the offense to which the defendant pleaded guilty,” id. at 539.
Here, the district court relied on Freeman to deny Moya-Breton’s motion.
Specifically, the court reasoned that Moya-Breton’s 180-month prison term was
based solely on the parties’ “express stipulation” to that sentence in the plea
agreement and “was not tied to a particular [G]uideline[s] range.” R. vol. 3, 165.
Moya-Breton argues the district court erred in finding that his 180-month
sentence wasn’t based on a Guidelines sentencing range. He points out the plea
agreement expressly states, “[T]he Court must consider, but is not bound by, the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, in determining [his] sentence.” R. vol. 3, 138.
Citing this provision, Moya-Breton insists that “[a]ny reasonable person . . . would
2
Freeman is a plurality opinion. Because “Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence is
the narrowest grounds of decision,” it “represents the Court’s holding.” United States
v. Graham, 704 F.3d 1275, 1278 (10th Cir. 2013).
3
have concluded that his sentence was based, however imprecisely,” on the
Guidelines. Aplt. Reply Br. 2.
But this general reference to the Guidelines, without more, doesn’t “make
clear” that the parties based the stipulated 180-month sentence on any particular
Guidelines sentencing range. Freeman, 564 U.S. at 539 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
the judgment). Compare id. at 542-43 (concluding that it was evident sentence was
“based on” Guidelines range when plea agreement (1) stated that defendant agreed to
have sentence determined by Guidelines; (2) noted defendant’s offense level and
anticipated criminal history category; (3) cited applicable Guidelines range; and
(4) agreed to sentence within that range), with United States v. Jones, 634 F. App’x
649, 651-52 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (concluding that it wasn’t evident from
plea agreement itself that sentence was based on Guidelines sentencing range when
agreement neither stated that defendant agreed to have sentence determined pursuant
to Guidelines nor “provided all the information necessary to independently calculate
the applicable Guidelines sentencing range”).
Here, as the government points out, the plea agreement doesn’t call for Moya-
Breton to be sentenced within a particular sentencing range. Instead, it states that
Moya-Breton agreed to plead guilty under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) and that “[p]ursuant to
that rule, the government and [Moya-Breton] agree[d] that a sentence of 180 months”
was “reasonable.” R. vol. 3, 140. And the agreement doesn’t identify any specific
Guidelines sentencing range as the basis for that specified term or provide any
information from which the district court could have calculated the applicable
4
sentencing range. Thus, it isn’t evident from the agreement itself that Moya-Breton’s
sentence was based on a Guidelines sentencing range. We therefore agree with the
district court’s determination that Moya-Breton isn’t eligible for a reduced sentence.
See United States v. Graham, 704 F.3d 1275, 1278 & n.5 (10th Cir. 2013)
(concluding that defendant’s sentence wasn’t based on Guidelines sentencing range
and that defendant was therefore ineligible for § 3582(c)(2) reduction when plea
agreement “called for a 25 year term of imprisonment without reference to any
Guideline[s] sentencing range”).
Nevertheless, the district court should have dismissed Moya-Breton’s motion
rather than denying it. See id. at 1278-79.3 Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s
order denying Moya-Breton’s motion and remand with directions to instead enter an
3
Citing Graham, the government correctly points out that it is settled in this
circuit that a district court must dismiss a § 3582(c)(2) motion for lack of jurisdiction
when a defendant is ineligible for a reduced sentence. While we are governed by
precedent, we have previously acknowledged that some circuits take a different
approach. United States v. Banyai, 2016 WL 1732293, at *1 n.2 (10th Cir. May 2,
2016) (unpublished). See United States v. Taylor, 778 F.3d 667, 668, 670 (7th Cir.
2015) (noting Graham’s view that defendant’s ineligibility for reduced sentence
implicates jurisdiction, but concluding that Ҥ 3582(c)(2) does not limit a district
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to consider a motion brought under that statute,
even a motion that the court would not be authorized to grant”); United States v.
Johnson, 732 F.3d 109, 116 n.11 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating that defendant’s ineligibility
for relief under § 3582(c)(2) isn’t a jurisdictional defect). And, in fairness to the
district court, we note that the standard form for an order disposing of a § 3582(c)(2)
motion—the AO 247—doesn’t provide a check box for dismissal; rather, it provides
district courts with only two options for disposing of the motion: “DENIED,” and
“GRANTED.” See R. vol. 3, 165.
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order dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction.
Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz
Circuit Judge
6