Smallwood v. Martin ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 3, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
ALPHONZO RAY SMALLWOOD,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 13-5004
v. (D.C. No. 4:12-CV-00407-GFK-TLW)
TERRY MARTIN, Warden, (N.D. of Okla.)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit
Judges.
Alphonzo Smallwood, an Oklahoma state prisoner, seeks a certificate of
appealability (COA) to enable him to appeal the district court’s denial of his
28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), and we construe Smallwood’s filings liberally
because he is proceeding pro se. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 & n.3
(10th Cir. 1991).
We conclude the district court correctly disposed of Smallwood’s petition
and therefore deny the application for a COA and dismiss this appeal.
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. Background
A. Timeline of Relevant Events
The proper disposition of this case turns on a what-happened-when
analysis. This is particularly helpful in this case given the corruption charges
eventually filed against some of the Tulsa police officers involved in
Smallwood’s prosecution. The relevant facts are therefore best presented in a
timeline:
Jan. 8, 2007 Smallwood pleads guilty to drug charges and is
sentenced to prison by the Tulsa County District
Court.
Jan. 19, 2007 Smallwood’s conviction becomes “final” for
purposes of § 2254. See Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals (OCCA) Rule 4.2(A) (“to
appeal from any conviction on a plea of guilty . . .
the defendant must have filed . . . an application
to withdraw the plea within ten (10) days from the
date of the pronouncement of the Judgment and
Sentence”).
June 14, 2007 Smallwood files a “Motion for Judicial Review
and for Sentence Modification” with the Tulsa
County District Court. R. at 44.
June 21, 2007 The Tulsa County District Court denies
Smallwood’s motion because he is “not eligible
for Judicial Review.” R. at 46.
Sept. 12, 2007 Smallwood files a second “Motion for Judicial
Review and for Sentence Modification” with the
Tulsa County District Court. R. at 47. It is not
clear when or if the state court ruled on this
motion.
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July 20, 2010 Five Tulsa police officers (including some who
were involved in Smallwood’s arrest) are indicted
in federal court on corruption charges, including
charges of planting drugs.
June 10, 2011 After a jury trial of three of the Tulsa police
officers, a federal jury convicts one and acquits
the other two.
Aug. 25, 2011 After a jury trial of the remaining two police
officers, a federal jury convicts one (who had also
been involved in Smallwood’s arrest) and acquits
the other.
Nov. 15, 2011 Smallwood files an application for post-conviction
relief with the Tulsa County District Court,
alleging grounds for relief based in part on the
Tulsa police officers’ corruption.
Mar. 19, 2012 The Tulsa County District Court denies
Smallwood’s application for post-conviction
relief.
June 25, 2012 The OCCA affirms the lower court’s denial of
Smallwood’s application for post-conviction
relief.
July 23, 2012 Smallwood files for § 2254 relief in federal court.
B. Smallwood’s § 2254 Petition
Smallwood’s § 2254 petition asserts five grounds for relief. Ground One
claims the police who arrested him violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
Grounds Two and Three are ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims based on
Smallwood’s trial counsel’s purported failure to prepare adequately for a
suppression hearing. Grounds Four and Five argue that the police officers who
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arrested him (and were later charged with corruption) violated Brady by not
disclosing their involvement in criminal activity.
C. The District Court’s Disposition
The district court did not analyze Smallwood’s grounds for relief
individually. Rather, the court disposed of all grounds on two alternative
arguments.
First, the district court concluded that Smallwood failed to bring his claims
within the appropriate statute of limitations. Second, to the extent Smallwood
might deserve tolling because he could not have discovered the basis for his
claims (i.e., the Tulsa police officers’ corruption) within the statute of limitations,
the court held that Smallwood still waited too long. The court reasoned that
Smallwood should have known about the police officers’ corruption on or about
the time they were indicted in July 2010. But Smallwood did not file his § 2254
petition until two years later, and therefore not within any reasonable construction
of the one-year limitations period.
II. Analysis
For somewhat different reasons than those articulated by the district court,
we believe it reached the correct outcome. We therefore deny a COA.
A. AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations
According to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),
a one-year statute of limitations applies to habeas petitions filed by state
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prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As relevant to this case, that statute of
limitations begins to run from the later of “the date on which the judgment
became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review” or “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.” Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A) & (D). In addition, the limitations period is
tolled for as long as “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is
pending.” Id. § 2244(d)(2).
B. Smallwood’s First, Second, and Third Grounds for Relief
Smallwood’s first, second, and third grounds for relief claim Fourth
Amendment violations 1 and ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to a
suppression hearing. These grounds have nothing to do with the subsequent
indictment and conviction of certain Tulsa police officers. Therefore, in seeking
to satisfy the statute of limitations as to these three grounds, Smallwood gains no
advantage from AEDPA’s extension until “the date on which the factual predicate
of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise
of due diligence.” Id. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Smallwood knew all the facts relevant to
1
If Smallwood had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth
Amendment claim in the trial court, he would be barred from raising it in a
habeas context. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976). But the record before
us does not suffice to determine whether he had a full and fair opportunity.
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these claims when or before he pleaded guilty. Thus, he had one year from “the
date on which the judgment became final” as modified by any time in which he
had a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral
review” pending. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A) & (d)(2).
Smallwood pleaded guilty and was sentenced on January 8, 2007. If he
wished to appeal notwithstanding his guilty plea, Oklahoma law required him to
file an application to withdraw his guilty plea within ten days—i.e., by January
18, 2007. See OCCA Rule 4.2(A). He did not do so. For AEDPA purposes, his
conviction therefore became final on January 19, 2007, requiring him to file a
§ 2254 petition by January 19, 2008 unless a tolling event intervened.
Within that year, Smallwood filed two motions styled “motion for judicial
review and sentence modification.” Neither one of these petitions was brought
under Oklahoma’s Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 22,
§§ 1080–89. Rather, the first motion—which comprises only a request for relief,
with no supporting allegations—was brought under an Oklahoma statute that
provides for judicial review of “prison disciplinary proceedings that result in the
revocation of earned credits.” Okla Stat. Ann., tit. 57, § 564.1(A). This first
motion would therefore not qualify as a “properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
The second motion was brought under Okla Stat. Ann., tit. 22, § 982a,
which permits the trial court to modify a prisoner’s sentence within two years of
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judgment, even if the court would normally lack jurisdiction because of a pending
appeal. See Dowdy v. Caswell, 43 P.3d 412, 413–14 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002).
There is no indication that this is a collateral review mechanism, and
Smallwood’s general argument under it is that he had behaved well in prison so
far. But Smallwood also asserted that his sentence is excessive, followed
somewhat incongruently by the assertion, “Wherefore there is a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.” R. at 47. Smallwood also argued that he
would have never pleaded guilty had he “known the seriousness of the crime he
was being charged with.” Id.Assuming for the sake of argument that either motion was intended as a
petition for collateral review, the question then is whether they would qualify as
“properly filed” under Oklahoma law. “[A] ‘properly filed’ application [for
purposes of § 2244(d)(2)] is one filed according to the filing requirements for a
motion for state post-conviction relief.” Habteselassie v. Novak, 209 F.3d 1208,
1210 (10th Cir. 2000). The requirements can include “conditions precedent that
the state may impose upon the filing of a post-conviction motion.” Id. at 1211.
In Oklahoma, such conditions precedent include the need to raise an
argument on direct appeal before asserting it on collateral review. See Pickens v.
State, 910 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996) (“this Court does not
consider . . . an issue which could have been raised on direct appeal but which
was not (and is therefore waived)”); Jones v. State, 704 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Okla.
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Crim. App. 1985) (“if an issue is bypassed on direct appeal, it may not be asserted
on application for post-conviction relief”). Accordingly, Smallwood’s petitions
were not “properly filed” because he never attempted to withdraw his guilty plea
and then appeal directly (assuming the trial court denied the motion to
withdraw). 2
Because Smallwood never “properly filed” a post-conviction application
within one year from his conviction, he did not satisfy AEDPA’s one-year
limitations period with respect to his first, second, and third grounds for relief. 3
C. Smallwood’s Fourth and Fifth Grounds for Relief
Smallwood bases his fourth and fifth grounds for relief in the revelation
that certain Tulsa officers (including some involved in Smallwood’s arrest) had
been involved in a corrupt scheme that included planting drugs on suspects. This
information, Smallwood argues, resets the one-year clock. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(D).
2
Oklahoma does not necessarily postpone ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims to the post-conviction stage. Rather, if the facts leading to the claim were
available to a direct appeal attorney, the ineffective-assistance claim must be
brought on direct appeal or it is forfeited. Hooker v. State, 934 P.2d 352, 354
(Okla. Crim. App. 1997). Smallwood’s papers make clear that the facts
underlying his dissatisfaction with his trial counsel were known to him at the time
he pleaded guilty.
3
Smallwood’s post-conviction applications filed in 2011 do not reset the
clock. Clark v. Oklahoma, 468 F.3d 711, 714 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Only state
petitions for post-conviction relief filed within the one year allowed by AEDPA
will toll the statute of limitations.”).
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If police officers had planted drugs on Smallwood, he would have the basis
for stating a due process violation. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)
(“a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by
representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment”).
Presumably Smallwood would have known at the time that officers had planted
drugs on him, raising the question of whether he was required to object on that
account in the trial court to preserve this issue for later review. But we need not
resolve that issue here because Smallwood does not allege that Tulsa officers
planted drugs on him. Instead, Smallwood attempts to connect the officers’
corrupt behavior to himself through the following cryptic assertion:
In Mr. Smallwood’s case the consent to search was not
voluntary and there were irregularities with the amount
of drugs allegedly recovered. It was reported he
[Smallwood?] tossed one cocaine rock baggie prior to
his arrest. By the time of the plea the claim was that in
excess of 5.81 grams was recovered.
R. at 10 (Ground Four); see also id. at 12 (repeating same assertion under Ground
Five).
The problem with these assertions is that Smallwood fails to deny having
tossed a baggy of cocaine or the amount of cocaine. He simply proclaims
“irregularities” and leaves the court to make the connection. While we construe
pro se pleadings liberally, our liberality can only stretch so far. As one court said
in a Rule 12(b)(6) context, “when a complaint omits facts that, if they existed,
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would clearly dominate the case, it seems fair to assume that those facts do not
exist.” O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 n.3 (1st Cir. 1976). The same
holds true for habeas relief. We therefore do not see the revelation of corruption
among certain Tulsa police officers as creating a new factual predicate for a due
process claim, thus potentially extending § 2244’s one-year limitations period.
Perhaps recognizing this, Smallwood actually frames Grounds Four and
Five not as general due process violations, but specifically as Brady violations.
In particular, because knowledge of the officers’ corruption would have been both
favorable and material to his defense, Smallwood concludes that the officers had
a Brady obligation to disclose their own corruption before testifying at a
suppression hearing. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (obligating
state to disclose evidence “favorable to an accused . . . where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment”); see also Youngblood v. West Virginia,
547 U.S. 867, 869–70 (2006) (confirming that Brady reaches evidence known to
the police but not the prosecutor).
Smallwood cites no authority for this novel interpretation of Brady, nor
could we locate any. On this record, we decline to adopt a rule that might require
courts to reopen every case in which a corrupt officer testified regardless of
whether the corruption extended to that case.
Because this is not a Brady claim based on information discovered post-
verdict, § 2244(d)(1)(D) does not apply, and we perceive no other basis in
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§ 2244(d) to extend the statute of limitations for Grounds Four and Five.
Accordingly, like Smallwood’s first three grounds, his last two are barred by
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY the application for a COA and
DISMISS the appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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