Castillo v. Jones-Cooper , 660 F. App'x 614 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 26, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
CRYSTAL CASTILLO; LISA GARELL;
ANGELA GAYTAN; DANA REEDER;
NANCY ROBINSON,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 15-6203
(D.C. No. 5:12-CV-00448-HE)
RUBY JONES-COOPER; JOHN (W.D. Okla.)
LARSEN; BUD DOLAN,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
ANTHONY BOBELU, in his individual
capacity, a/k/a Tony Bobelu; JANE DOE;
RUSSELL HUMPHRIES, in his individual
capacity; MARY PAVLISKA; JOHN
DOE,
Defendants.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before LUCERO, GORSUCH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Appellants Crystal Castillo, Lisa Garell, Angela Gaytan, Dana Reeder, and
Nancy Robinson appeal the grant of summary judgment dismissing, on qualified-
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
immunity grounds, their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Appellees Ruby Jones-
Cooper, an Oklahoma Department of Corrections (DOC) supervisor; John Larsen, a
DOC supervisor; and Bud Dolan, the State Capitol Park Administrator. Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellants Crystal Castillo, Lisa Garell, Angela Gaytan, Dana Reeder, and
Nancy Robinson are former inmates of the DOC at Hillside Correctional. As part of
the prison’s offsite prison work program (PPWP), Appellants did landscaping and
grounds-maintenance work at the Oklahoma Governor’s Mansion. All five women
participated in the program at various times between February 2008 and August
2009. While at the Mansion, Appellants’ offsite supervisor was Anthony Bobelu, the
Mansion’s groundskeeper. No guards remained with the inmates at the Mansion.
Appellants allege that Bobelu and Russell Humphries, a cook at the Mansion,
harassed and sexually assaulted them. The issue before this court does not directly
concern Bobelu and Humphries, so we will not recount the allegations Appellants
have made against them. At issue here is what Appellees knew and when they knew
it.
Bobelu began working at the Mansion in 2006. Sometime in 2007, a temporary
employee (non-inmate) at the Mansion alleged, during a discussion Dolan initiated
about her poor-performance issues, that Bobelu had earlier referred to her as a
“switch hitter,” apparently meaning bisexual. R. vol. 3 at 559. Dolan investigated the
allegation but concluded that Bobelu had not said that. According to Dolan, that
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particular employee had constant performance problems, unlike Bobelu, who had
been an exemplary employee. Dolan believed that the employee was attempting to
divert attention from her performance issues. The employee was reassigned to
another location, and the investigation closed with no repercussions for Bobelu.
In May 2009, Dolan twice observed Bobelu having a one-on-one interaction
with two different female inmates. He removed one inmate, Callie Johnson, from the
Mansion until she agreed that she would no longer be in one-on-one situations with
Bobelu. Dolan also issued verbal and written warnings to Bobelu, reminding him that
he should not be in one-on-one situations with inmates. In April 2009, Dolan saw a
woman he thought was Johnson driving Bobelu’s car. He reported the incident to his
supervisor but, because Johnson had been released eight months earlier, they decided
that the relationship “was not any of [their] business.” Id. at 566. At worst, they
considered it “poor judgment.” Id.
On May 29, 2009, Gaytan, who had already been released, requested a letter of
recommendation from Dolan. Dolan agreed to write the letter and told her that she
could pick it up from either him or Bobelu. Gaytan told him that she didn’t want to
pick the letter up from Bobelu because she was offended by his actions. When
Gaytan came to pick up the letter, Dolan asked for more information, and Gaytan told
him about an incident when Bobelu came into an office where Gaytan was alone, shut
the door, and made unwelcome sexual advances. Gaytan also told him that Bobelu
had done the same to other inmates.
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Dolan immediately changed Bobelu’s work assignment and told Bobelu about
Gaytan’s allegations. On June 1, Dolan notified the DOC about the situation, and its
Administrator of Internal Affairs authorized an investigation. The investigation
uncovered a number of other Bobelu incidents, including one in which two inmates
alleged that Bobelu had raped them. Bobelu denied all of the allegations. Ultimately,
the Department of Central Services (DCS) terminated Bobelu and recommended
prosecution.
Appellants appeal the grant of summary judgment to Dolan, Jones-Cooper, and
Larsen, which the district court had based on qualified-immunity grounds.
DISCUSSION
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Hinds v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523 F.3d 1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 2008). In doing so, we view
the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Smothers v. Solvay Chems., Inc., 740 F.3d 530, 533 (10th Cir.
2014). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
All Appellees have asserted a qualified-immunity defense. Qualified immunity
protects government officials from suit, not just from liability. Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985). “In resolving a motion to dismiss based on qualified
immunity, a court must consider whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged make
out a violation of a constitutional right, and whether the right at issue was clearly
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established at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Brown v. Montoya, 662
F.3d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Leverington v. City of Colo. Springs, 643
F.3d 719, 732 (10th Cir. 2011)).
To succeed on their claims, Appellants must show that the Appellees acted
with deliberate indifference to the risk that the inmates would be sexually assaulted.
Deliberate indifference requires that the official know of and disregard a substantial
risk of serious harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In other words,
the official must know of facts that would allow the inference and must actually infer
that there is that risk. Id.
The parties dispute whether a continuing-violations theory could apply in a
§ 1983 case. We assume without deciding that the continuing-violations theory
applies here. Thus, we will not address the parties’ discussion of whether these
incidents constitute discrete acts.
1. Dolan is Entitled to Qualified Immunity
Appellants allege that Dolan knew about Bobelu’s “multiple incidents of
inappropriate conduct.” Appellants’ Opening Br. at 15. They argue that Dolan
inadequately responded to Bobelu’s conduct by only issuing him oral warnings. Their
claims fail because Appellants have provided no evidence that Dolan knew that
Bobelu might sexually assault inmates.
As evidence that Dolan knew about the risks that Bobelu presented, Appellants
point to Bobelu’s allegedly calling a temporary employee a “switch hitter.” R. vol. 3
at 559. Appellants do not argue that Bobelu would have violated the Constitution
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with this statement, but instead argue that “Dolan’s response to this allegation
indicates why Defendant Bobelu believed [that he would be able to succeed] and was
able to succeed in a sexual predator manner of assaulting multiple female inmates.”
Appellants’ Opening Br. at 16. But nothing overcomes Dolan’s position that he
disbelieved that Bobelu made the statement because he thought that the temporary
employee was trying to deflect attention from her constant poor-performance issues.
Until then, Dolan had not heard any complaints against Bobelu.
In addition, Appellants rely on Dolan’s having seen Bobelu violate a rule
against being in one-on-one situations with female inmates, in particular, Johnson
and Garell. Again, nothing in the summary-judgment evidence suggests that these
interactions would reasonably cause Dolan to believe that Bobelu presented a risk of
sexual assault. At most, Dolan would be concerned about overfamiliarity between
Bobelu and the inmates. The deliberate-indifference standard is not a negligence
standard—Dolan had to actually know of the risk. We agree with the district court
that Appellants fail to show that Dolan knew of such a risk. Once he knew of the
risk—when Gaytan told him why she did not want to see Bobelu on May 29, 2009—
Dolan quickly removed Bobelu from his position. Apart from what Dolan learned
from Gaytan, Appellants rely only on their own beliefs that Dolan should have
inferred that Bobelu might sexually assault a worker based on unrelated disciplinary
incidents. Nothing in the record presents a genuine dispute of material fact that Dolan
knew of the risk of sexual assault before meeting with Gaytan. Thus, Appellants have
failed to show deliberate indifference sufficient to overcome qualified immunity.
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2. Jones-Cooper is Entitled to Qualified Immunity
Appellants allege that Jones-Cooper’s decision to require only eight hours of
training for PPWP supervisors was inadequate and exposed female inmates to an
unacceptable risk of sexual assault. We disagree.
We are unpersuaded that eight weeks of training, rather than eight hours of
training, would have prevented Bobelu’s behavior. People should understand without
training that they shouldn’t sexually assault people because it’s a criminal act. See
Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1308 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Specific or extensive
training hardly seems necessary for a jailer to know that sexually assaulting inmates
is inappropriate behavior.”); see also Flores v. Cty. of L.A., 758 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th
Cir. 2014) (“Given that the penal code prohibits sexual battery, it is not plausible that
inclusion in the Manual of [language instructing deputies not to sexually harass or
assault inmates] would have prevented the assault . . . .”); Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d
1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e cannot conclude that there was a patently obvious
need for the city to specifically train officers not to rape young women.”); Campbell
v. Anderson Cty., 695 F. Supp. 2d 764, 774 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) (“Here, the proper
course of conduct—refraining from sexual assault and rape—is patent and obvious;
structure[d] training programs are not required to instill it.” (quotation mark
omitted)). Thus, Jones-Cooper’s decision on the amount of training PWPP
supervisors received is irrelevant to the allegations here.
Appellants claim that Jones-Cooper caused the sexual assaults by not training
Dolan sufficiently so that he would have known to terminate Bobelu based on the
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earlier incidents. To succeed on a claim for failure to train, the Appellants must prove
at the outset that the person who was allegedly inadequately trained violated the
Constitution. See Thomson v. Salt Lake Cty., 584 F.3d 1304, 1322 (10th Cir. 2009)
(discussing excessive force claims); see also Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1002 (8th
Cir. 2010) (noting that “[t]he plaintiff must also prove that the alleged failure to train
‘actually caused’ the constitutional deprivation” (quoting Andrews, 98 F.3d at 1078)).
But as discussed above, Dolan was not deliberately indifferent and thus did not
violate any clearly established constitutional law in his reaction. Therefore Jones-
Cooper is also not responsible.
3. Larsen is Entitled to Qualified Immunity
Appellants claim that Larsen is liable for two separate reasons: first, for failure
to adequately train Bobelu and second, for deliberate indifference. Appellants’ claims
against Larsen for failure to train fail for the same reason the claims against Jones-
Cooper do.
Appellants’ remaining allegations of deliberate indifference against Larsen are
insufficient to overcome qualified immunity. Again, deliberate indifference requires
actual knowledge of the risk of a constitutional violation. And yet, Appellants
repeatedly refer to Larsen’s “reckless” behaviors. Appellants’ Opening Br. at 23.
They refer to what Larsen “should” have done. Id. at 22. But Appellants have
provided no evidence of actual knowledge. Therefore, Appellants have failed to show
deliberate indifference.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court.
Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips
Circuit Judge
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