United States v. Burciaga , 661 F. App'x 925 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 28, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 16-2121
(D.C. Nos. 1:15-CV-00460-MV-GBW
FRANCISCO BURCIAGA, and 1:08-CR-01541-MV-1)
(D. New Mexico)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
_________________________________
Before GORSUCH, BALDOCK, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Francisco Burciaga, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (COA) under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) granting him permission to
appeal from the district court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2255. Because Mr. Burciaga is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings
liberally, see Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991), but “our role is
not to act as his advocate,” Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir.
2009). Mr. Burciaga is serving a federal sentence for possession with intent to
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive
value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
distribute 1,000 grams and more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) &
(b)(1)(A). He argues in his § 2255 petition that his conviction and sentence are
unconstitutional based on a litany of alleged errors, including his counsel’s failure to
poll the jury. The district court denied his petition, as well as his application for a
COA. Mr. Burciaga has now filed a combined merits brief and application for a COA
in this court. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), we
deny Mr. Burciaga’s application for a COA and dismiss his appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 24, 2008, Mr. Burciaga was stopped along Interstate 40 for a traffic
violation. During a consensual search of his vehicle, officers discovered a hidden
compartment carrying 17.7 kilograms of heroin. He was then charged with possession
of heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A).
Mr. Burciaga was tried twice on these charges. His first trial in November 2009
ended in a mistrial. Prior to re-trial, Mr. Burciaga filed a motion to suppress the
heroin found in his vehicle during the traffic stop, which the district court granted.
The government appealed that decision and this court reversed and remanded. As a
result, the evidence was presented to the jury during Mr. Burciaga’s re-trial on
May 31, 2013, which resulted in a conviction.
Mr. Burciaga subsequently sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on ten
separate grounds, including alleged defects in the information filed against him, as
well as his counsel’s decision to not poll the jury. A magistrate judge recommended
denying the petition, finding that most of the allegations failed to assert a violation of
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a constitutional right, and that the rest of the claims were without merit. Mr. Burciaga
filed objections, which the district court overruled, adopting the magistrate judge’s
findings and recommendations in full. The district court also denied Mr. Burciaga’s
subsequent motion to amend pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
In response, Mr. Burciaga timely filed a petition for a COA with the district
court,1 claiming again that there were defects in the information and that his counsel
provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to poll the jury. The district
court denied the petition. Mr. Burciaga also filed a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis (IFP) with the district court, on which the district court did not rule. He has
renewed his request for IFP status before this court on appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
In seeking a COA from this court, Mr. Burciaga raises the same arguments he
raised in the district court: namely, that the government failed to properly file a 21 U.S.C.
§ 851 information, in violation of his due process rights; and that his counsel failed to
poll the jury, in violation of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. We agree with
1
Mr. Burciaga’s petition for a COA with the district court was due on May 27,
2016. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (requiring that notice of appeal be filed within
sixty days after “entry of the judgment or order appealed from”); Martin v. Rios, 472
F.3d 1206, 1207 (10th Cir. 2007) (treating an application for a COA as the
“functional equivalent” of a notice of appeal). Because his petition was not docketed
by the district court until May 31, 2016, the question was raised whether he was
entitled to the prisoner mailbox rule. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1) (“If an inmate
confined in an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil or a criminal case,
the notice is timely if it is deposited in the institution’s internal mail system on or
before the last day for filing.”). Mr. Burciaga has attested to the fact that he deposited
his petition in the prison mail on May 25, 2016, and the tracking history for his
certified mail proves that his petition was in the mail by May 26, 2016, at the latest.
Accordingly, we deem his petition to be timely filed.
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the district court that Mr. Burciaga has failed to make a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right, and we therefore deny his request for a COA. A
federal prisoner must obtain a COA as a jurisdictional prerequisite to challenge a
federal district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B);
United States v. Harper, 545 F.3d 1230, 1233–34 (10th Cir. 2008). And we will issue
a COA “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This requires a habeas petitioner to
“show[] that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that)
the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1. Jury Polling
First, Mr. Burciaga explains that he vocally requested a jury poll after the
verdict was read, but that his counsel told the court “no,” and the trial judge either
did not hear or ignored his request.2 In essence, he claims ineffective assistance of
counsel based on his counsel’s failure to poll the jury, which requires him to establish
that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”
and “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). In the jury polling context, if “there is
2
Mr. Burciaga’s counsel concedes that he did not heed Mr. Burciaga’s
instruction to request that the jury be polled.
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nothing in the record to indicate any juror was uncertain of the verdict, counsel’s
failure to request a poll does not fall outside the range of competence expected of
attorneys in criminal cases.” See United States v. Tucker, 596 F. App’x 616, 619
(10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2847
(2015).
Here, Mr. Burciaga challenges several aspects of the trial and investigation,
including instances of alleged destruction of evidence and prosecutorial misconduct,
to argue that the circumstances indicate a possible lack of unanimity. Mr. Burciaga
also claims the jurors were displeased because they were unable to see the entire
course of a dashcam video used at trial, which was allegedly altered. But Mr.
Burciaga’s qualms about the government’s conduct before and during trial is not
evidence that the jurors expressed uncertainty over the verdict.
He further claims that during his first trial (in which a mistrial was declared),
“one of the jurors said to another juror out loud ‘I don’t know,’” and another “used
the hand protection cross sign (crossmund) accompanied with a sigh of relief.” These
events at his first trial, however, have no bearing on the unanimity of the different
jury that sat in his second trial and actually returned a verdict. In sum, Mr. Burciaga
cites to nothing in the record indicative that any juror was uncertain over the verdict,
which is required to establish that counsel performed deficiently by not polling the
jury. We therefore decline to issue a COA on this claim.
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2. Challenge to Prior 10th Circuit Panel Decision
Second, Mr. Burciaga claims this court erred in issuing United States v.
Burciaga, 687 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2012), which reversed the district court’s
suppression of evidence in his trial. He argues that the word “heroin” was improperly
mentioned in certain trial documents potentially considered by the panel issuing that
decision, and that the panel misapplied New Mexico law. He takes particular issue
with language from the decision remanding the case “for further proceedings not
inconsistent with th[e] opinion.” Id. at 1235. He complains that this fairly standard
remand instruction granted the prosecution “broad reach.” But Mr. Burciaga fails to
demonstrate how the prior panel’s allegedly “broad” instruction on remand or
potential exposure to the word “heroin” denied him a constitutional right.
Accordingly, he is not entitled to a COA on this issue.
3. Defects in the Information
Third, and finally, Mr. Burciaga claims the government failed to file and serve
a new information under 21 U.S.C. § 851 in advance of his re-trial, which he claims
violated his right to due process. The magistrate judge addressed these arguments in
recommending a denial of Mr. Burciaga’s § 2255 petition, concluding “the statute
does not expressly require such a re-filing after a mistrial, and the undersigned is
unaware of any case law creating such a requirement.” Mr. Burciaga filed objections,
but they were not stated with specificity and the district court deemed his challenges
waived. The district court also denied a COA on his claims. We deny a COA as well,
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because Mr. Burciaga fails to make a substantial showing that the government’s
filing and service of the § 851 information denied him his right to due process.
Section 851 requires the government, “before trial,” to “file[] an information
with the court (and serve[] a copy of such information on the person or counsel for
the person) stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon.” 21 U.S.C.
§ 851(a)(1). It may be true that the government did not re-file an information under
§ 851 prior to the second trial, or serve Mr. Burciaga or his counsel for a second time
with the information before the re-trial. But § 851 does not require as much, despite
Mr. Burciaga’s contentions to the contrary. See United States v. Mayfield, 418 F.3d
1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he government’s initial filing of the information
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(a) and its compliance with the notice provision of that
statute before [the defendant’s] first trial complied with the statute and satisfied [the
defendant’s] due process rights; refiling the information and regiving the notice after
the first trial and before the second trial was not required.”); United States v. Willis,
102 F.3d 1078, 1085 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that re-filing before second trial was
unnecessary); but see United States v. Blevins, 755 F.3d 312, 323 (5th Cir. 2014)
(requiring the government to re-file and re-serve after the dismissal of an indictment
under the Speedy Trial Act, because this amounted to a “new criminal prosecution”).
Although there is a legitimate question whether the information was filed and served
in enough time before Mr. Burciaga’s first trial,3 Mr. Burciaga actually concedes that
3
The government filed its § 851 information on November 15, 2010, and it
was stamped as “Filed” by the district court at 2:07 PM that same day. The jury was
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the initial filing was proper. ROA 19 (“There [was] no filing before trial as was done
in the previous trial.”). And he also appears to concede that service was properly
effectuated at that time. ROA 8 (“If the prosecution filed and served Burciaga with
the [21 U.S.C. § 851] notice before the first trial which was declared a mistrial is it
reversible error for the prosecution to not file before the second trial?”). Regardless,
the information was filed and served well in advance of Mr. Burciaga’s second trial,
and he fails to make a substantial showing—indeed, he cites no authority for the
proposition—that under these circumstances he was deprived of his constitutional
right to due process.
III. CONCLUSION
Because Mr. Burciaga has failed to make a “substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), we DENY his request for a COA
and DISMISS this appeal. The district court did not rule on Mr. Burciaga’s motion
for IFP status, so we deem it denied. See Boling-Bey v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 559
F.3d 1149, 1155 n.8 (10th Cir. 2009). But we GRANT his renewed motion for IFP
status on appeal, as he has demonstrated “a financial inability to pay the required fees
and the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in
sworn in, however, at 1:41 PM that day. The trial court minutes do show that the
court confirmed the § 851 filing at 12:05 PM that day, prior to when the jury was
sworn in, but it is unclear from the briefing on appeal whether the filing and notice
were proper for purposes of Mr. Burciaga’s first trial, either as a statutory matter or
as a matter of due process.
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support of the issues raised on appeal.” McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d
809, 812–13 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge
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