Menge v. AT & T, Inc. ( 2014 )


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  •                                                              FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS       Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                      December 17, 2014
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    KENT D. MENGE,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                                         No. 14-1210
    (D.C. No. 1:11-CV-00728-PAB-KLM)
    AT&T, INC., a Delaware corporation;                         (D. Colo.)
    AT&T UMBRELLA BENEFIT PLAN
    NO. 1; AT&T OPERATIONS, INC.,
    a Delaware corporation; THE AT&T
    DISABILITY INCOME PROGRAM,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    Before HOLMES, BACHARACH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
    Kent D. Menge appeals pro se from a district court order that upheld the denial
    of his claim for short-term disability benefits under the Employee Retirement Income
    Security Act (ERISA). We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
    appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
    estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    BACKGROUND
    Mr. Menge began working for AT&T in April 2007 as an account manager.
    His “core responsibilities [were] to answer calls and emails from his [assigned]
    customers,” and he was required to “develop[ ] and appl[y] knowledge of the
    clients[’] business drivers and goals and [create] innovative solutions to address the
    customers[’] need[s].” R., Vol. I at 73, 74.
    As an AT&T employee, Mr. Menge was covered by the company’s Umbrella
    Benefit Plan No. 1. That plan includes a Disability Income Program (DIP), which
    provides short-term disability benefits, here, for twenty-six weeks, when an employee
    is “unable to perform all of the essential functions of [the] job or another available
    job assigned by [AT&T] with the same full-time or part-time classification for which
    [the employee is] qualified.” 
    Id. at 315
    .
    Although AT&T funds and administers the DIP, it has delegated its claims
    administration responsibilities to Sedgwick Claims Management Services. To fulfill
    its responsibilities, Sedgwick operates an Integrated Disability Service Center (IDSC)
    and a Quality Review Unit (QRU). AT&T gives Sedgwick “sole discretion to
    interpret the [DIP]” and it insulates Sedgwick’s coverage and benefits determinations
    from attack unless they are arbitrary and capricious. 
    Id. at 347
    .
    On September 26, 2007, Mr. Menge was driving his car into the AT&T
    parking lot, when he was rear-ended by another vehicle. He suffered a mild
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    concussion and he developed neck pain. He underwent physical therapy for several
    weeks but discontinued it in November 2007.
    In January 2008, Mr. Menge saw his primary-care physician, Kari Kearns,
    M.D., for depression, insomnia and anxiety. He also submitted a short-term
    disability claim under the DIP, as directed by his supervisor. The IDSC denied his
    claim, and Mr. Menge returned to work in early February 2008. The QRU
    subsequently denied Mr. Menge’s appeal, citing a progress note by Dr. Kearns
    indicating that Mr. Menge was “overall feeling much better” and that his depression
    was “slowly improving.” 
    Id.,
     Vol. VII at 140.
    Mr. Menge began seeing Evan Katz, D.C., for continuing neck pain. Dr. Katz
    opined that Mr. Menge “had a loss of cervical lordosis,” “facet injury,” and a “slight
    disc bulge with some disc herniation in [the] low back, which [would] cause some
    significant pain with radicular-type symptoms.” 
    Id. at 619
    . Orthopedist Elizabeth
    Yurth, M.D., evaluated Mr. Menge and found cervical inflammation with pain, in
    addition to concentration and memory deficits, headaches, and “probable mild
    traumatic brain injury.” 
    Id. at 410
    .
    In April 2008, Mr. Menge submitted another claim for short-term disability
    benefits. The IDSC granted the claim, but for only a one-month period: April 18,
    2008, through May 18, 2008. In denying benefits subsequent to that period, the
    IDSC stated that it had reviewed medical records from Drs. Kearns, Katz, and Yurth,
    and despite the presence of depression, “some suicidal ideations,” “distracted and
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    delayed response[s] to questions,” “mild disc protrusion at C5-6,” and “capsular
    distention [of the facet joints] at C3-4, C4-5, and C5-6,” there was no data or
    documentation showing “significant emotional or cognitive deficits” or physical
    limitations that would preclude the performance of Mr. Menge’s job duties.
    
    Id. at 464
    .
    When his disability benefits expired, Mr. Menge took unpaid leave under the
    Family and Medical Leave Act until July 10. He notified AT&T that he would be
    unable to return to his job, and he then utilized vacation and personal days for the
    remainder of the month. AT&T responded, granting him the opportunity at full
    salary and benefits to search for another job until September 14, 2008. Mr. Menge
    was unable to find a new position, and he was terminated on September 15, 2008.
    Mr. Menge continued consulting with various medical professionals. His
    psychiatrist, Dr. Frederick Sakamoto, proffered an additional diagnosis of bipolar
    disorder. He recommended that Mr. Menge not work due to problems with “memory,
    concentration, focusing, depression, [and] anxiety.” 
    Id. at 452
    . But Dr. Sakamoto
    noted improvements in Mr. Menge’s mood and anxiety during July and August 2008
    visits, and he later questioned whether Mr. Menge may have exaggerated answers to
    cognitive questions.
    Mr. Menge also saw neuropsychologist Mark Zacharewicz, Ph.D., who opined
    that Mr. Menge was “experiencing symptoms consistent with a persistent post
    concussion syndrome and associated psychological adjustment issues.” 
    Id. at 642
    .
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    He conducted a four-day neuropsychiatric evaluation of Mr. Menge and concluded
    that the results “clearly reflect[ed] that he is experiencing very significant levels of
    psychological distress including significant levels of depression and anxiety.” 
    Id. at 654-55
    . Dr. Zacharewicz further noted, however, that during the evaluation
    Mr. Menge had shown “poor or variable effort” on one day due to family-health
    problems and that there were some signs of “possible symptom exaggeration.” 
    Id. at 653, 655
    . Further, he attributed some of Mr. Menge’s neuropsychological difficulties
    to a medication change, pain, fatigue, psychological issues, and psychosocial issues.
    In regard to Mr. Menge’s ability to work, Dr. Zacharewicz stated that “Mr. Menge’s
    current neuropsychological presentation and his reported physical symptoms strongly
    indicate that he is currently unable to be reliably employed in most competitive work
    environments at this time [September 2008].” 
    Id. at 656
    .
    In November, Mr. Menge appealed the denial of benefits. The QRU denied
    the appeal in February 2009, finding that he had not established a qualifying
    disability for the period of May 19, 2008, through July 10, 2008. In doing so, the
    QRU reviewed Mr. Menge’s medical records from January to October 2008 and
    obtained the opinions of five independent physician advisors that Mr. Menge was not
    disabled.
    In 2011, represented by counsel, Mr. Menge filed suit against AT&T, the
    Umbrella Benefit Plan and the DIP concerning the denial of benefits subsequent to
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    May 18, 2008. The district court reviewed the QRU’s decision and concluded that
    the decision was not arbitrary and capricious.
    DISCUSSION
    I. Standards of Review
    “We review a plan administrator’s decision to deny benefits to a claimant, as
    opposed to reviewing the district court’s ruling.” Holcomb v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of
    Am., 
    578 F.3d 1187
    , 1192 (10th Cir. 2009). Because AT&T granted a third party,
    Sedgwick, discretion to determine benefits eligibility and to construe the terms of the
    DIP, we review the decision denying Mr. Menge benefits to determine only if it was
    arbitrary and capricious. See Murphy v. Deloitte & Touche Grp. Ins. Plan, 
    619 F.3d 1151
    , 1157 (10th Cir. 2010). Under that standard, “there is no requirement that the
    basis relied upon be the only logical one or even the superlative one.” Eugene S. v.
    Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 
    663 F.3d 1124
    , 1134 (10th Cir. 2011)
    (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, the decision need only be “reasonable
    and made in good faith.” 
    Id. at 1133
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    In deciding whether the decision to deny Mr. Menge benefits was arbitrary and
    capricious, we must also take into account the fact that AT&T both funds and
    administers the plan. See Cardoza v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 
    708 F.3d 1196
    ,
    1202 (10th Cir. 2013). But such an inherent conflict of interest has little bearing in
    this case, given that (1) the QRU relied on the medical opinions of independent
    physician advisors in upholding the denial of benefits, and (2) the QRU was operated
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    by Sedgwick, rather than AT&T. See Holcomb, 
    578 F.3d at 1193
     (giving limited
    weight to conflict of interest because plan administrator sought independent
    examination of claimant and independent review of her records); Eugene S., 
    663 F.3d at 1133
     (observing that when “an insurer delegates its authority to review claims to
    an independent third-party plan administrator[,] [s]uch a delegation can mitigate what
    otherwise would be a dual-role conflict of interest”).1
    II. Denial of Short-Term Disability Benefits
    Mr. Menge challenges the benefits decision on a number of grounds. First, he
    claims that the neuropsychologist and the physiatrist who reviewed his case
    “submit[ed] [in]accurate statements on [his] physical and mental conditions” because
    they tried, but were unable, to teleconference with Dr. Yurth and Dr. Zacharewicz.
    Aplt. Opening Br. at 3. But Mr. Menge fails to indicate how a teleconference would
    have provided information different than what the independent physician advisors
    reported following their review of his medical records. Further, a plan administrator
    may reasonably rely on the opinions of its own doctors who have reviewed the
    1
    To the extent Mr. Menge argues that he is entitled to a de novo standard of
    review based on 
    Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1116
    (3), he is mistaken. Although that
    statute requires Colorado issued disability-benefit plans to include a de novo
    review provision, the statute was enacted in August 2008—sixteen months after
    Mr. Menge’s coverage began. Thus, even if the statute encompasses plans like
    AT&T’s Umbrella Benefit Plan, the statute is not retroactive. See McClenahan v.
    Metro. Life Ins. Co., 416 F. App’x 693, 696 (10th Cir. 2011); Mustain-Wood v. Nw.
    Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
    938 F. Supp. 2d 1081
    , 1084-85 (D. Colo. 2013). Because we
    conclude that the statute is inapplicable here, we need not decide whether it is
    preempted by ERISA.
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    claimant’s medical file but not consulted with the claimant’s treating physicians.
    Davis v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
    444 F.3d 569
    , 577 (7th Cir. 2006).
    Next, Mr. Menge argues that in other contexts he has been found disabled
    “based upon the same medical records.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 3. Specifically, he
    points out that the Social Security Administration awarded him disability-insurance
    benefits and that the Department of Education discharged his student loan due to
    disability. He also states that he obtained a personal-injury settlement for the injuries
    he suffered in the car accident.
    But Mr. Menge’s social-security award did not occur until ten months after the
    QRU denied his appeal. Thus, the award could not even have been considered by the
    QRU as evidence of a disability under the DIP. Mr. Menge does not indicate when
    he received the personal-injury settlement or when the Department of Education
    discharged his student loan, and, based on our review of the administrative record,
    those matters are absent from the record. “[I]n reviewing a plan administrator’s
    decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the federal courts are limited to
    the administrative record.” Murphy, 
    619 F.3d at 1157
     (internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    Mr. Menge also contends that the benefits denial is arbitrary and capricious
    because the QRU “did not obtain a release or ‘return to work’ statements from any of
    [his] medical providers,” and instead, it relied on the opinions of the independent
    physician advisors. Aplt. Opening Br. at 7. But ERISA does not require plan
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    “administrators automatically to accord special weight to the opinions of a claimant’s
    physician[s].” Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 
    538 U.S. 822
    , 834 (2003).
    Indeed, plan administrators may, without explanation, “credit reliable evidence that
    conflicts with a treating physician’s evaluation.” 
    Id.
    Next, Mr. Menge maintains he was denied “a full and fair assessment of [his
    disability] claims” because the independent physician advisors “cherry picked”
    information in his medical records to find him not disabled. Aplt. Opening Br. at 7.
    Granted, an administrator can act arbitrarily and capriciously by selectively
    reviewing the administrative record in order to justify a decision to deny benefits.
    See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 
    554 U.S. 105
    , 118 (2008). But that did not happen
    here.
    Specifically, the internal-medicine advisor acknowledged Mr. Menge’s
    anxiety, neck pain, and concentration difficulties, but concluded that they were
    insufficient “from an internal medicine standpoint to disable [him].” R., Vol. VII
    at 696. The neuropsychologist advisor extensively recounted Mr. Menge’s medical
    history and Dr. Zacharewicz’s test results, but observed, as did Dr. Zacharewicz, that
    Mr. Menge’s neuropsychological difficulties were partially attributable to medication
    changes, pain, fatigue, psychological issues, and psychosocial stresses, and that there
    were effort problems and symptom exaggeration during testing. The psychiatrist
    advisor noted Mr. Menge’s depression, anxiety, head injury, and suicidal ideation,
    but he questioned the severity of those conditions given the evidence of symptom
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    exaggeration, which was echoed by Dr. Sakamoto during a teleconference. The
    chiropractor advisor recognized Mr. Menge’s neck pain, loss of cervical lordosis, and
    muscle spasms, but concluded, based on Dr. Katz’s examination data, that Mr. Menge
    was suffering from no more than “a moderate strain/sprain.” Id. at 708. Finally, the
    physiatrist advisor referenced Mr. Menge’s cervical and lumbar spine issues and his
    head injury, but he found no “specific diagnosis anatomically to explain”
    Mr. Menge’s reports of pain. Id. at 719.
    We cannot conclude that the independent physician advisors selectively
    reviewed Mr. Menge’s medical records so as to render the denial of benefits arbitrary
    and capricious. An administrator’s decision to deny benefits need not be the most
    logical decision available. Nance v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 
    294 F.3d 1263
    , 1269
    (10th Cir. 2002). So long as the decision “falls somewhere on a continuum of
    reasonableness—even if on the low end”—we cannot disturb it. 
    Id.
     Because the
    QRU’s denial of Mr. Menge’s short-term disability benefits was a reasonable
    decision, it must stand.2
    2
    Mr. Menge’s request that AT&T be ordered to pay long-term benefits is not
    properly preserved in this court, as he has included no argument that long-term
    benefits were arbitrarily and capriciously withheld. See Adler v. Wal–Mart Stores,
    Inc., 
    144 F.3d 664
    , 679 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Arguments inadequately briefed in the
    opening brief are waived.”). And even without waiver, we note that under AT&T’s
    DIP, long-term disability benefits are available only if the claimant has “[r]eceived
    the [m]aximum [d]uration of [s]hort-[t]erm [d]isability [b]enefits”—here, twenty-six
    weeks. R., Vol. I at 325. Because we conclude that Mr. Menge was not arbitrarily
    and capriciously denied short-term benefits, any argument in support of long-term
    benefits would necessarily fail.
    - 10 -
    CONCLUSION
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Mr. Menge’s motion for leave
    to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. Mr. Menge’s request for appointed appellate
    counsel is denied. AT&T’s motion to submit its answer brief under seal, which was
    provisionally granted on September 3, 2014, is hereby permanently granted. We note
    too that on August 5, 2014, this court ordered that Volume VII of the Record remain
    sealed.
    Entered for the Court
    Carolyn B. McHugh
    Circuit Judge
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