Villa v. D.O.C. Department of Corrections ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 9, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
REYNALDO Y. VILLA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 16-1308
(D.C. No. 1:16-CV-00729-LTB)
D.O.C. DEPARTMENT OF (D. Colo.)
CORRECTIONS,
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before GORSUCH, BALDOCK, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.**
_________________________________
Reynaldo Y. Villa, a Colorado prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis
(IFP), filed a complaint regarding the conditions of his confinement. A magistrate judge
reviewed his complaint and discerned that Plaintiff was attempting to allege cruel and
unusual punishment with respect to his medical needs and that he had been discriminated
against because of his disabilities, and thus was attempting to bring claims under the
Eighth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and disability discrimination under the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). But the magistrate judge found that Plaintiff’s
complaint failed to comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. The magistrate
judge explained that “to state a cognizable claim in federal court Mr. Villa must identify
the specific claims he is asserting, the specific factual allegations that support each claim,
and what each Defendant did that allegedly violated his rights.” R. at 20. The magistrate
judge also provided the legal standards for claims alleging Eighth Amendment violations
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and disability discrimination under the ADA.
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The district court acknowledged that
Plaintiff asserted “seven claims that his constitutional rights have been violated because
he has been denied adequate medical treatment and accommodations for his disabilities at
various prisons since 2006.” R. at 59. But the district court concluded that, despite the
magistrate judge’s “specific instructions,” Plaintiff’s amended complaint did not “provide
a short and plain statement of any claims showing he is entitled to relief.” R. at 59. The
district court dismissed Plaintiff’s action without prejudice, certified pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from the order would not be taken in good faith, and
thus denied IFP status for the purpose of the appeal. Plaintiff filed a letter which the
district judge construed as a motion to alter or amend the judgment. The district court
denied the motion and Plaintiff appealed.
Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint “must contain . . . a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” We review a dismissal
under Rule 8 for abuse of discretion, “[b]ut what we consider compliant with this
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standard depends” on “whether dismissal was ordered with or without prejudice to
subsequent attempts at amendment.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492
F.3d 1158, 1161–62 (10th Cir. 2007). Where, as here, a complaint is dismissed
without prejudice “a district court may, without abusing its discretion, enter such an
order without attention to any particular procedures.” Id. at 1162. Because Plaintiff is
proceeding pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally, but we do not serve as his
advocate. James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).
Reviewing the claims that Plaintiff raised both on appeal and below,1 we conclude
the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint without prejudice, specifically his claims under the ADA and 8th Amendment
for deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Because the district court dismissed
without prejudice, Plaintiff may attempt to bring his claims in a new action. We remind
him, as the magistrate judge and district court did, that to state a claim in federal court, “a
complaint must explain what each defendant did to him or her; when the defendant did it;
how the defendant’s action harmed him or her; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff
believes the defendant violated.” Nasious, 492 F.3d at 1163. As it stands, Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint rarely identifies what a particular Defendant did or did not do,
1
Plaintiff for the first time on appeal asserts that elderly inmates are treated
worse than other inmates and he complains about certain conditions of supervised
release. “[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, we do not consider arguments raised
for the first time on appeal.” Hill v. Kan. Gas Serv. Co., 323 F.3d 858, 866 (10th Cir.
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff has not alleged any extraordinary
circumstances that would allow us to consider these arguments.
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describes Plaintiff’s injuries, or connects the facts to the legal claim with more than a
conclusory statement.
Plaintiff alleges, for example, that he has carpal tunnel in his wrists and arthritis in
his knees; that unknown agents took away his custom-made wrist and knee braces; that
he has been given cheap braces that were either too small or one-size-fits-all instead; that
medical refuses to give him anything for his arthritis; and that his arthritis has gotten “so
bad” that he is basically a cripple. But other than simply repeating the phrases
“deliberate indifference” and “cruel and unusual punishment,” Plaintiff has not stated
anything to suggest the unknown agents or medical staff knew he faced a substantial risk
of harm and disregarded it. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (stating
that a prison official acts with deliberate indifference when that official “knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference”). “An official’s failure to
alleviate a significant risk of [serious harm] of which he was unaware, no matter how
obvious the risk or how gross his negligence in failing to perceive it, is not an
infliction of punishment and therefore not a constitutional violation.” Tafoya v.
Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff’s other claims that he was
denied adequate medical care likewise fail, again primarily because he makes
conclusory legal assertions without providing facts showing he is entitled to relief.
As for Plaintiff’s ADA claims, he explains in his Amended Complaint that he has
macular degeneration and is legally blind. He asserts he needs certain accommodations
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pursuant to the ADA to use the law library and complete his GED classes, including
bright lights and a computer dictation program. Although he has informed some of the
prisons of his need for accommodation, he has only received strong eye glasses and
apparently no accommodations from Limon Correctional Facility (LCF) where he is
currently housed.
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall,
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination
by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Prisons are “public entities” covered by Title II
of the ADA. See Robertson v. Las Animas Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 500 F.3d 1185, 1193
(10th Cir. 2007); Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998). To state a
claim, Plaintiff must allege (1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that
he was “either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some entity’s
services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public
entity,” and (3) “that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason”
of his disability. J.V. v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 813 F.3d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir.
2016). “Courts have recognized three ways to establish a discrimination claim:
(1) intentional discrimination (disparate treatment); (2) disparate impact; and
(3) failure to make a reasonable accommodation.” Id. “The ADA requires more than
physical access to public entities: it requires public entities to provide ‘meaningful
access’ to their programs and services.” Robertson, 500 F.3d at 1195. To effectuate this
mandate, “the regulations require public entities to ‘make reasonable modifications in
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policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid
discrimination on the basis of disability.’” Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)).2
Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to support a claim under the ADA. The
closest Plaintiff gets to alleging intentional discrimination is that there was
“discrimination against me because of my disabilities,” but he does not elaborate on this
conclusory statement. Plaintiff’s claims come closer to alleging a failure to
accommodate but still fall short. It is not clear from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
whether he already has meaningful access to the law library but simply wants more
accommodations than eye glasses, nor does it appear that he requested accommodations
at LCF or that his need for an accommodation was obvious. See J.V., 813 F.3d at 1299
(noting that the plaintiffs failed to request an accommodation or show that the need for an
accommodation was obvious).
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s case without prejudice for
failing to comply with Rule 8. We grant Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP on appeal and
remind him that he must continue making partial payments until the entire balance of the
appellate filing fee is paid.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
2
Title II of the ADA refers to “reasonable modifications,” which is essentially
equivalent to Title I’s use of the term “reasonable accommodation.” Robertson, 500
F.3d at 1195 n.8.
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