United States v. Mendoza-Guardiola ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 21, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 05-2296
(D. New M exico)
JA V IER ME ND O ZA -G U A RD IOLA, (D.Ct. No. CR-05-690-JH)
Defendant - Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before H E N RY, BR ISC OE, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
On M ay 5, 2005, Javier M endoza-Guardiola pled guilty to one count of
illegal reentry following deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). The
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
district court sentenced him to twenty-four months’ imprisonment. That sentence
was in accord w ith the recommendation in the Presentence Investigation Report
(PSR ), which recommended a twelve-level enhancement because the defendant
had a prior felony drug trafficking conviction. 1 See United States Sentencing
Commission, Guidelines M anual, § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B) (2004). Defendant objected to
the PSR, arguing that he was not subject to the twelve-level enhancement because
his prior felony conviction, although an “aggravated felony,” was not a felony
“drug trafficking offense” for purposes of USSG §2L1.2(b)(1)(B). The district
court disagreed. It also rejected M endoza-Guardiola’s argument that a sentence
within the applicable guideline range was unreasonable and denied his request for
a downward departure. Judgment was entered on September 2, 2005. M endoza-
Guardiola timely appealed. He raises the same argument on appeal that he did
below, i.e., his prior conviction was not a “felony drug trafficking offense,” and
adds that the district court’s sentence was unreasonable. W e exercise jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM .
1
The PSR determined Mendoza-Guardiola’s base offense level was eight pursuant
to USSG §2L1.2(a). Twelve levels were added for his prior felony “drug trafficking”
conviction. Mendoza-Guardiola also received a three level downward adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility pursuant to USSG §3E1.1. Thus, his total offense level was
seventeen, with a criminal history category of I, resulting in a guideline range of twenty-
four to thirty months.
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Discussion:
W e review the district court’s application and interpretation of the
Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela, 170 F.3d
1038, 1039 (10th Cir. 1999). H owever, w e review factual findings for clear error.
United States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886, 906 (10th Cir. 2005). The classification
of a prior conviction is a question of law we review de novo. United States v.
M artinez-Villalva, 232 F.3d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 2000). W e review sentences
imposed after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), for reasonableness.
United States v. Glover, 413 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2005). W e note that the
district court “is not required to consider individually each factor listed in §
3553(a) before issuing a sentence.” United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1305
(10th Cir. 2004). “If . . . the district court properly considers the relevant
Guidelines range and sentences the defendant within that range, the sentence is
presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th
Cir. 2006). “The defendant may rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the
sentence is unreasonable in light of the other sentencing factors laid out in [18
U.S.C.] § 3553(a).” Id.
Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(B) calls for a twelve-level enhancement to the base
offense level if the defendant was deported after having been convicted of a
“felony drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed was 13 months or
less . . . .” The sentencing guidelines define a “[d]rug trafficking offense” as “an
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offense under federal, state, or local law that prohibits . . . the possession of a
controlled substance . . . with intent to distribute . . . .” USSG §2L1.2, comment.
(n.1(B)(iv)). To determine whether M endoza-Guardiola’s prior conviction
constitutes a “drug trafficking offense,” the court must first look to the statutory
definition of the crime. See U nited States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379
(10th Cir. 1993). W e employ a “categorical approach” to determine whether
M endoza-Guardiola’s prior conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1952 is a “drug
trafficking offense.” United States v. Herrera-Roldan, 414 F.3d 1238, 1240-41
(10th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. M artinez-Hernandez, 422 F.3d 1084,
1088 (10th Cir. 2005) (characterizing Herrera-Roldan as applying the categorical
approach). By its terms, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 reaches different types of conduct. 2
2
Section 1952 provides:
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any
facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent to --
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the
promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful
activity,
and thereafter performs or attempts to perform --
(A) an act described in paragraph (1) or (3) shall be fined under this
title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both; or
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United States v. Rodriquez-Duberney, 326 F.3d 613, 617 (5th Cir. 2003). Thus,
the court “may look to the charging paper and judgment of conviction” to
determine how the offense should be classified. United States v. Venegas-
Ornelas, 348 F.3d 1273, 1275 (10th Cir. 2003).
The information to which M endoza-Guardiola pled guilty in the original
case specifically alleged he possessed marijuana with the intent to distribute it. 3
Although his plea agreement and the judgment may not have mentioned that
M endoza-Guardiola possessed marijuana with the intent to distribute, M endoza-
(B) an act described in paragraph (2) shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results
shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
(b) As used in this section (i) “unlawful activity” means (1) any business
enterprise involving gambling, liquor on which the Federal excise tax has not been
paid, narcotics or controlled substances (as defined in section 102(6) of the
Controlled Substances Act), or prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the
State in which they are committed or of the United States, (2) extortion, bribery, or
arson in violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of the United
States, or (3) any act which is indictable under subchapter II of chapter 53 of title
31, United States Code, or under section 1956 or 1957 of this title . . . .
3
The information stated:
Javier Mendoza, defendant herein, did travel in interstate commerce, from the state
of Oklahoma, to the state of Illinois, with intent to promote, manage, establish,
carry on [and] facilitate the promotion, management, establishment and carrying
on of unlawful activity, to wit, the knowing and intentional possession with intent
to distribute approximately 47 pounds of marijuana, a Schedule II Non-Narcotic
Controlled Substance, and thereafter, on April 19, 1989, did perform and cause to
be performed acts facilitating said unlawful activity; all in violation of [18 U.S.C.
§] 1952.
(Appellee’s Exh. 1 at 1.)
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Guardiola specifically pled guilty to the information and therefore admitted all
the allegations contained therein. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570
(1989); United States v. Hill, 53 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 1995). The
allegations in the indictment, to which M endoza-Guardiola admitted by pleading
guilty, are sufficient to establish that his prior conviction was for a “drug
trafficking offense.” Thus, the district court’s imposition of a twelve-level
enhancement was not error. 4
Nor is M endoza-Guardiola’s sentence unreasonable. M endoza-Guardiola
was sentenced within a correctly calculated guideline range. Thus, the sentence
imposed in this case is presumptively reasonable. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055. The
district court considered and applied the sentencing factors in § 3553(a) and relied
heavily upon the fact that M endoza-Guardiola had not received any criminal
4
Mendoza-Guardiola’s prior conviction need not be pled in the indictment or
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. Almendarez-Torrez v. United States, 523
U.S. 224, 226-27 (1998). Nor can we set aside the holding of Almendarez-Torres based
upon the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13(2005). Although Shepard casts some doubt on the continuing validity of Almendarez-
Torres, the Supreme Court has not overruled it and we continue to be bound by it. See
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 27 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that Almendarez-Torres “has
been eroded by this Court’s subsequent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and a majority
of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided”); United
States v. Moore, 401 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e are bound by existing
precedent to hold that the Almendarez-Torres exception to the rule announced in
Apprendi [v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 46 (2000)] and extended to the Guidelines in Booker
remains good law.”). Mendoza-Guardiola concedes this Court is still obligated to follow
Almendarez-Torres, but raises the issue “in order to preserve the claim for further
review.” (Appellant’s Br. at 27.)
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history points for his prior conviction. Additionally, the district court deemed
M endoza-Guardiola’s “family situation, [] financial situation, [] illegal status, and
[] reasons for returning to the United States are not factors that take his case
outside of the heartland of cases, of those who are similarly situated” and
sentenced him at the bottom of the sentencing range. (R. Vol. III at 35, 36.)
M endoza-Guardiola has failed to adequately rebut the presumption of
reasonableness by establishing the sentence was unreasonable in light of the
sentencing factors in § 3553(a).
A FFIRME D.
Entered by the C ourt:
Terrence L. O ’Brien
United States Circuit Judge
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