Martin v. Simmons , 4 F. App'x 652 ( 2001 )


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  •                                                                        F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FEB 16 2001
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    FREDERICK MARTIN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    CHARLES SIMMONS, Secretary of
    No. 00-3294
    Corrections, DAVID MCKUNE,
    (D.C. No. 98-CV-3259)
    Warden, DARREL KERR, Business
    (D. Kan.)
    Manager, LISA MENDOZA, Attorney,
    Department of Corrections, and
    MARTIN ASHER, District Court
    Judge,
    Defendant-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before EBEL, KELLY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
    Plaintiff-Appellant Frederick Martin (“Martin”), is an inmate in the Kansas
    State Penitentiary in Lansing, Kansas. Because Martin’s complaint was dismissed
    *
    After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
    determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
    determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
    34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
    Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
    the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
    citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be
    cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    at the pleading stage, we assume the facts in his complaint are true. See, e.g.,
    Freeman v. Dep’t of Corr., 
    949 F.2d 360
    , 361 (10th Cir. 1991).
    This action arises out of an earlier suit Martin filed in Kansas state district
    court alleging that prison officials had unlawfully deprived him of the use of
    money in his prison trust account by preventing him from sending more than $30
    out of the prison each month. (Complaint at 2.) Citing prison regulations, the
    officials had refused Martin permission to send his mother $300 to pay for living
    expenses. (Id. at 3.) Martin filed suit in state court seeking an injunction to
    prevent prison officials from enforcing the regulation. (Id.) Kansas District
    Judge Martin Asher (“Asher”) dismissed the case the case on the merits and
    denied Martin’s motion for in forma pauperis status to file certain post-judgment
    motions. Therefore, pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (b), prison officials deducted
    $55 to pay a filing fee for post-judgment motions as well as $63.50 in
    “unspecified costs” associated with his case. (Id. at 4-5.) 1
    Martin then filed suit against the same group of prison officials as well as
    Asher himself in federal district court. (Id. passim.) In this second suit, Martin
    renews his claim for injunctive relief and damages arising from the regulation
    limiting his use of funds in the prison trust account, and he sought damages for an
    1
    This additional deduction was apparently the result of a clerical error.
    According to the district court’s order of February 2, 1999, the money was later
    returned to Martin’s account.
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    alleged conspiracy by Asher and the prison officials to deprive him of money in
    his prison trust account by confiscating filing fees. (Id.)
    The federal district court dismissed the action on February 18, 1999,
    holding that Martin’s objection to the regulation was barred by principles of res
    judicata, and that he failed to allege a cause of action with respect to the alleged
    conspiracy to confiscate funds to pay filing fees in the earlier action. (Order of
    2/18/99) Martin filed a “Motion to Rescind” the order on February 25,
    questioning the district court’s disposition of the case and seeking a hearing
    before a magistrate on the merits of his claim. The district court construed the
    filing as a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e),
    and denied the motion in an order dated Sept. 29, 1999. Although Plaintiff did
    not file timely notice of appeal of this order, he filed four additional post-
    judgment motions which the district court denied in an order dated July 24, 2000,
    incorporating the reasoning of the September 29, 1999 order by reference.
    Martin did not appeal the July order, but instead filed a “Motion for
    Specific Findings of Fact” which the district court denied on August 25, 2000.
    Martin filed timely notice of appeal from this order on September 1, 2000.
    DISCUSSION
    Because Martin has filed timely notice of appeal only with respect to the
    district court’s August 25 order denying his “Motion for Specific Findings of
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    Fact,” this court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s prior
    orders. See Fed. R. App. P. 4 (“In a civil case . . . the notice of appeal required
    by Rule 3 must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment
    or order appealed from is entered.”). Moreover, while Martin styled his motion as
    one for relief from the February 18, 1999 order pursuant to Rule 59(e), we note
    that it was filed far outside the ten-day deadline for such a motion. See Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 59(b). Therefore, we construe his filing as a motion for relief from
    judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). See Weitz v. Lovelace Heath System, Inc., 
    214 F.3d 1175
    , 1181 (10th Cir. 2000). We review a district court’s disposition of a
    Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. See 
    id.
     In reviewing such an order,
    this Court typically reviews only the order denying the motion, and we do not
    address the merits of the underlying judgment. See Amoco Oil Co. v. United
    States E.P.A., 
    231 F.3d 694
    , 697 (10th Cir. 2000). “Under this standard, we will
    not reverse unless the trial court has made an ‘arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or
    manifestly unreasonable judgment.’” Woodworker’s Supply, Inc. v. Principal
    Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
    170 F.3d 985
    , 992 (10th Cir. 1999).
    We affirm the district court’s dismissal for substantially the reasons set
    forth in its orders of July 24, 2000, September 29, 1999, and February 18, 1999.
    While we do not rule on the merits of the district court’s order dismissing
    Martin’s complaint, its decisions on the merits were not arbitrary, capricious or
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    whimsical. (Order 2/18/99.) See, e.g., 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (b) (requiring courts to
    assess and collect fees from prisoners filing suits in forma pauperis); Hall v.
    Stone, 
    170 F.3d 706
    , 707-08 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Custodians must remit under §
    1915 without regard to the prisoner’s wishes.”); Allen v. McCurry, 
    449 U.S. 90
    ,
    95 (1980) (holding that principles of res judicata will preclude parties from
    litigating issues in federal court that have already been decided in a state forum).
    Moreover, given that Martin had unsuccessfully challenged the February 18
    order in a prior Rule 59(e) motion and failed to appeal that decision, it was not an
    abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse to revisit those issues in a
    subsequent Rule 60(b) motion.
    Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s order of August 25.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    David M. Ebel
    Circuit Judge
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