Williams v. Neet , 5 F. App'x 804 ( 2001 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 21 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DALTON LOYD WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 00-1414
GARY NEET; GLORIA (D.C. No. 00-Z-1619)
MASTERSON; JOHN HYATT; (D.Colo.)
CHARLES TAPPE; KEN MAESTAS;
PAUL CARRERAS; DAVID BELL;
ARISTEDES ZAVARAS; JOHN
SUTHERS,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY , BRISCOE and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
*
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Dalton Loyd Williams, a Colorado state prisoner appearing pro se, appeals
the district court’s dismissal of his complaint without prejudice, as well as the
court’s refusal to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis in district court. We
grant Williams’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal and dismiss his
appeal. In doing so, we agree with the district court that Williams is properly
classified as a “frequent filer” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
On August 14, 2000, Williams filed a civil rights complaint asserting (1) he
was deprived of due process and equal protection rights during two prison
disciplinary proceedings, both of which allegedly resulted in loss of earned-time
credits and other benefits; and (2) the Director of the Colorado Department of
Corrections deprived him of due process and equal protection rights by issuing an
administrative order banning the use and possession of all tobacco products by
inmates. His complaint sought relief in the form of compensatory and punitive
damages, costs, and restoration of “all rights, privileges, classification points, and
time credits.” Complaint at 6. Williams also filed a motion and affidavit for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
On August 30, 2000, the magistrate judge issued an order noting that
Williams had filed eight civil actions that had been dismissed by the district court
under former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). The order directed Williams to show cause
why he should not be denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1915(g), the so-called “three strikes” provision. Williams filed a response
denying that any of the cases cited by the magistrate could be counted as
“strikes” for purposes of § 1915(g), claiming one of the actions was a habeas
proceeding and the remaining seven actions were voluntarily dismissed by him
with permission of the court.
On September 22, 2000, the district court denied Williams’ motion to
proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed his complaint without prejudice. In
doing so, the district court effectively disagreed with Williams and concluded
that three or more of the prior civil actions filed by Williams had been dismissed
as frivolous under former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). The court subsequently denied
Williams’ motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.
On October 16, 2000, this court issued an order notifying Williams that,
according to records submitted by the district court clerk’s office, he had at least
three strikes for purposes of § 1915(g). Williams was directed to show cause
why his appeal should not be dismissed for failure to prepay the entire filing fee
as required by § 1915(g) or to show that the provisions of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act did not apply to this proceeding. Williams responded that he did not
recall filing one of the actions and that the remaining actions cited in the order
were not dismissed as frivolous but were “voluntarily withdrawn and dismissed
without prejudice” by him.
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Section 1915(g) prohibits a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis in
a civil action in federal court “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions,
while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal” in
federal court “that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
This prohibition does not apply to habeas proceedings, see United States v.
Simmonds , 111 F.3d 737, 741 (10th Cir. 1997), nor does it apply where the
“prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g).
We agree with the district court that Williams has at least three “strikes”
and is properly considered a “frequent filer” for purposes of § 1915(g).
According to the record on appeal, Williams has had at least three, and possibly
more, civil actions dismissed as frivolous by the Colorado federal district court.
Although Williams disputes that any of these prior actions were dismissed as
frivolous, the record on appeal irrefutably demonstrates otherwise. As a result,
Williams must prepay all necessary filing fees before the federal courts may
consider his civil actions and appeals. White v. Colorado , 157 F.3d 1226, 1232
(10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied , 526 U.S. 1008 (1999).
For purposes of this appeal, Williams’ status as a “frequent filer” prohibits
him from proceeding in forma pauperis on part but not all of the claims asserted
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in his complaint. To the extent he is seeking damages and costs for
constitutional deprivations, he is seeking civil relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and must comply with § 1915(g). In other words, he must prepay all
necessary filing fees before pursuing those claims in district court or on appeal. 1
Williams’ complaint also seeks habeas relief in the form of restoration of his
earned-time credits and the subsequent reduction of the length of his
confinement. See Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (noting that
“habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the
fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even
though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”). Because
those claims do not fall within the scope of § 1915(g), Williams may pursue them
in federal court without prepayment of filing fees. Although the district court
erred in concluding otherwise, we find it unnecessary to reverse and remand the
habeas claims because there is no indication in the record that Williams has
exhausted his state court remedies with respect to those claims.
1
We note, however, that a portion of Williams’ § 1983 claims are barred
by Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477 (1994). When judgment for a plaintiff in a
§ 1983 suit “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,
. . . the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 487. Before
Williams can seek damages for the alleged unconstitutional deprivation of
earned-time credits, he must first establish that the revocation has been
invalidated by a state or federal court.
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Williams’ motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
Williams’ motion for a free copy of the records of his federal district court cases
is DENIED. The appeal is DISMISSED. A copy of this order shall be filed in
the records of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit related to
repeat frivolous filers. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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