Rains v. Apfel ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 7 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RAYMOND T. RAINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-7178
(D.C. No. CIV-97-413-S)
KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, (E.D. Okla.)
Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff appeals the district court’s decision affirming the Commissioner’s
denial of plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits. Plaintiff filed
for benefits in April 1993, alleging he had been disabled since February 1988 due
to back injury and neck impairments. Plaintiff’s insured status extended only
through June 30, 1993. In order to prevail, therefore, plaintiff must demonstrate
that he was under a disability on and before the date his insured status expired.
See Henrie v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. , 13 F.3d 359, 360
(10th Cir. 1993).
After plaintiff’s application was denied initially and on reconsideration,
he requested and received a de novo hearing before an administrative law judge
(ALJ). Plaintiff appeared at that hearing with a paralegal representative.
The ALJ issued his written decision on February 21, 1996. Based on
plaintiff’s consistent reports to treating physicians of lumbar and cervical pain,
the ALJ concluded, at step two of the sequential process, that plaintiff had severe
impairments. Despite plaintiff’s limitations, however, the ALJ concluded that he
retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) for a full range of light work.
While this RFC precluded plaintiff from returning to his past relevant work as a
painter or welder, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff could perform other work in
the national economy pursuant to the medical-vocational guidelines. Therefore,
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the ALJ denied plaintiff’s application for benefits at step five of the sequential
analysis. See id.Plaintiff then secured the services of an attorney and petitioned for review
before the Appeals Council. Additional medical records were submitted to the
Appeals Council, but that body concluded that the new records did not provide
a basis to alter the ALJ’s decision. The Appeals Council, therefore, denied
plaintiff’s petition for review, and the ALJ’s decision became the final decision
of the Commissioner. Thereafter, plaintiff appealed the Commissioner’s decision
to the district court, which affirmed the denial of benefits. This appeal followed.
Plaintiff raises three challenges to the Commissioner’s decision on appeal.
First, he contends that the ALJ failed to develop the record by obtaining various
physicians’ records and a copy of an MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory). Second, he maintains the ALJ failed to consider plaintiff’s mental
impairment. Finally, he argues that the ALJ failed to make a proper credibility
assessment.
We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the correct
legal standards were applied and whether the findings are supported by substantial
evidence in the record viewed as a whole. See Castellano v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). “If supported by
substantial evidence, the [Commissioner’s] findings are conclusive and must be
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affirmed.” Sisco v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 10 F.3d 739,
741 (10th Cir. 1993). “In evaluating the appeal, we neither reweigh the evidence
nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” Casias v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991).
We turn first to plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ failed to obtain records
from various doctors, presumably both treating and non-treating physicians, who
had seen plaintiff during the relevant period and also failed to obtain a copy of
an MMPI. “It is beyond dispute that the burden to prove disability in a social
security case is on the claimant.” Hawkins v. Chater , 113 F.3d 1162, 1164
(10th Cir. 1997). Nonetheless, because a social security disability hearing is
a nonadversarial proceeding, the ALJ bears responsibility for ensuring that “an
adequate record is developed during the disability hearing consistent with the
issues raised.” Henrie , 13 F.3d at 360-61. Generally, “[a]n ALJ has the duty to
develop the record by obtaining pertinent, available medical records which come
to his attention during the course of the hearing.” Carter v. Chater , 73 F.3d 1019,
1022 (10th Cir. 1996). The degree of effort required by the ALJ to develop the
record, however, varies from case to case. Cf. Battles v. Shalala , 36 F.3d 43, 45
(8th Cir. 1994) (noting that whether ALJ has adequately developed record must be
determined on case by case basis); Lashley v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs. , 708 F.2d 1048, 1052 (6th Cir. 1983) (same).
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The record shows that plaintiff’s representative was advised in writing that
he needed to gather and submit medical evidence to the ALJ. See R. Vol. II at 42.
In addition, the ALJ specifically asked plaintiff’s representative at the hearing if
there were any other documents he desired to have made part of the record. See
id. at 397. After the February 1995 hearing, the ALJ wrote plaintiff telling him to
re-contact his paralegal representative, as the latter required more information
regarding plaintiff’s medical evidence. See id. at 39. Thus, the ALJ gave
plaintiff’s representative an opportunity to submit additional medical evidence
and, in fact, reopened the record twice after the conclusion of the hearing to
receive new evidence. See id. at 426.
Further, and as mentioned above, by the time plaintiff’s case reached the
appeals stage, plaintiff had secured the services of an attorney. The attorney
submitted new evidence to the Appeals Council, but presumably did not include
the physicians’ records and the MMPI. This fact could lead to the conclusion
that, either the reports were unobtainable, 2
or that they were not that crucial to
plaintiff’s case. See Shannon v. Chater , 54 F.3d 484, 488 (8th Cir. 1995)
(plaintiff’s failure to obtain or even try to obtain records suggests these records
may only have been of minor importance).
2
The initial decision denying benefits listed four separate sources of
evidence considered by the agency. See R. Vol. II at 55. The decision indicated
that additional reports were unobtainable.
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Moreover, plaintiff has not made the required showing in the district court
to justify remand. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (permitting district court to remand a
case for consideration of new evidence where plaintiff shows that new evidence is
material and there is good cause for failure to incorporate such evidence in the
administrative record). The mere fact that plaintiff had undergone an MMPI,
without more, does not lead to the conclusion that the ALJ’s decision would have
been affected by its inclusion in the record. Nor has plaintiff indicated how the
ALJ’s review of the missing physicians’ records would have affected his decision
to deny benefits. See Hawkins , 113 F.3d at 1169 (noting that when the missing
evidence was in existence at the time of the administrative hearing, it may it may
be appropriate to “require[] the claimant to prove prejudice by establishing that
the missing evidence would have been important in resolving the claim before
finding reversible error”) (citing Shannon , 54 F.3d at 488). Under the
circumstances, we conclude that the ALJ did not commit reversible error when he
failed to obtain certain physicians’ reports and the MMPI.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to consider evidence of his mental
impairment. On the contrary, the ALJ correctly noted that plaintiff did not allege
any mental impairment in his disability report but only complained at the hearing
that his pain was causing anxiety and depression. Our review of the evidence in
the record reveals only that plaintiff underwent the MMPI in 1988 before having
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a neck fusion procedure. Before that fusion, plaintiff had complained to a
physical therapist about being under considerable stress. See R. Vol. II at 168.
After the fusion, his doctor noted that he was “less anxious about his overall
condition.” See id. at 258. The last mention of any mental problem came in 1993
when plaintiff was admitted to the hospital complaining of rash, achiness, fever,
and congestion and was noted to be experiencing anxiety. See id. at 214.
As the ALJ correctly noted, plaintiff was never hospitalized for a mental
health impairment and never sought or received psychiatric treatment. Nor did he
seek counseling or use any psychotropic medication. The bare fact that plaintiff
was evaluated via an MMPI is not evidence of the presence of a mental
impairment. As discussed above, had the MMPI been conclusive, or even
relevant, regarding plaintiff’s mental state before the expiration of his insured
status, we can presume that plaintiff’s attorney would have procured the report,
had it been available. The ALJ’s determination that there is no evidence of
a medically determinable mental impairment on or before June 30, 1993,
is supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, we address plaintiff’s challenge to the ALJ’s credibility
assessment. Under the familiar framework set forth in Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d
161, 163 (10th Cir. 1987), an ALJ assessing a claimant’s allegations of disabling
pain must first determine whether there is objective medical evidence of a
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pain-producing impairment. If the first step is met, the ALJ must then determine
whether there is a nexus between the pain producing impairment and the
claimant’s subjective allegations of pain. See id. If the ALJ finds the necessary
nexus, the ALJ must then consider all the evidence–both objective and
subjective–and determine the credibility of the claimant’s allegations of disabling
pain. See id. In making the required credibility assessment, the ALJ must link
the conclusion to the evidence. See Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir.
1995). While “[c]redibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the
finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by
substantial evidence[,] . . . [f]indings as to credibility should be closely and
affirmatively linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise
of findings.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s credibility determination was not
sufficiently linked to substantial evidence in the record. We disagree. The ALJ
specifically noted that plaintiff’s complaints of disabling pain were inconsistent
with his ability to attend college from January 1989 through the early part of
1993. The ALJ also identified conflicts between plaintiff’s testimony at the
hearing and various reports he had given to attending physicians, including his
reasons for quitting school and the circumstances under which he came to be hit
in the wrist with a baseball. Finally, the ALJ pointed to the medical records
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recording treatment for various injuries sustained while plaintiff was boating,
bicycling, and “venturing out into brush.” R. Vol. II at 26. We acknowledge that
the record has much evidence concerning plaintiff’s pain and his efforts to relieve
it. Plaintiff, however, is basically asking us to reweigh the evidence and to
substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ. This we cannot do. See Casias ,
933 F.2d at 800.
Based upon our review, we conclude that the ALJ provided a sufficient link
between the evidence and his determination that plaintiff’s allegations of
disabling pain were not credible. Moreover, we conclude that his credibility
assessment is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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