Williams v. Hallmark Cards, Inc. , 10 F. App'x 790 ( 2001 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 5 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JEROME VINEY WILLIAMS, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 00-3199
(D.C. No. 98-CV-4030)
HALLMARK CARDS, INC., (D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , BRORBY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff seeks review of the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of defendant Hallmark Cards, Inc., and its alternative dismissal of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
plaintiff’s case for lack of prosecution. Plaintiff claimed he was terminated in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213, et seq. We disagree and affirm the grant of summary judgment. 1
Plaintiff held various jobs with defendant Hallmark for approximately eight
years, during which he met the requirements of his employment and was qualified
to perform the duties of his positions. On April 9, 1997, at approximately 6:30
p.m., plaintiff accidentally bumped into a gate while operating a stand-up lift
truck. He later reported the incident to a supervisor, who advised he would need
to report to a hospital for a post-accident drug screen in accordance with
Hallmark’s drug free workplace policy. Accompanied by two supervisors,
plaintiff arrived at the hospital about 8:15 p.m.
Plaintiff was unable to produce the required urine specimen and asked to
give a blood sample instead. This request was refused. A breath alcohol test
proved negative for alcohol ingestion. Plaintiff remained at the hospital until
approximately 3:40 a.m. April 10, still unable to produce the urine sample.
During the course of plaintiff’s stay at the hospital, he was offered water and
soda, which he refused, and afforded the opportunity to walk around or sit in
1
Because we can affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment, we
need not address plaintiff’s argument that his failure to respond to the district
court’s order to file a written report was not his fault because the court notified
his former counsel, rather than him, of the court’s directive.
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another room in order to relax, which he also declined. Finally, he was advised
he could provide the sample by catheterization, but he refused. During this time
period he was informed that failure to produce a urine sample would constitute
a refusal to submit to testing, resulting in his termination.
On April 10 plaintiff was suspended. He obtained his own urine test on
April 11, which was negative for illegal drugs. He met with Hallmark’s medical
review officer, Dr. Heligman, explaining his medication and reporting his daily
urination schedule. Plaintiff reported no history of urological or renal disorders.
The doctor concluded there was no medical reason for plaintiff’s inability to
provide a urine specimen. He was terminated on May 8 for failing to provide a
urine sample on April 9-10.
Plaintiff’s alleged disability is bipolar manic depression, which he has
suffered since 1991. He does not controvert Hallmark’s statement that from 1991
to 1997 he was generally functional, i.e., “able to work, to interact with his family
and friends, and to engage in aerobic exercise.” R. Doc. 36 at 9; Doc. 39 at 8-9.
Moreover, he testified in his deposition that the depression did not affect his
working. Although Hallmark alleges plaintiff never reported he was disabled,
plaintiff claims he informed Dr. Heligman he was taking both Prozac and sleep
medication because of bipolar affective disorder. He claims he told one of his
supervisors as well; however, the alleged dates of these disclosures were after
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the failed drug screening. R. Doc. 39, Pl. Aff. at 1-2. During his deposition,
he admitted he had not told anyone in management that he suffered from manic
depression, although he believed one of the Hallmark doctors may have done so.
He also specifically stated he had not told Hallmark that he was disabled.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal
standard. See Steele v. Thiokol Corp. , 241 F.3d 1248, 1252 (10th Cir. 2001).
“Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)).
Applying this standard, we view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences
from that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.In order to bring a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
he is a qualified person with a disability. Id. Disability is defined as either
a physical or mental impairment substantially limiting one or more of the major
life activities of the individual, or a record of such impairment, or being regarded
as having the impairment. See id. at 1253. It is at this threshold stage that
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plaintiff’s legal argument collapses because he presented no facts showing his
manic depression substantially limited a major life activity. 2
Although depression can be an impairment, see Doyal v. Okla. Heart, Inc. ,
213 F.3d 492, 495 (10th Cir. 2000), to the extent that plaintiff claimed his ability
to sleep 3 was affected by the medication prescribed for his depression, he
admitted that other medication was prescribed to help him sleep and that he did
not take this on a daily basis. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. , 527 U.S. 471,
482 (1999) (if person takes measures to correct or mitigate impairment, effect of
those measures must be considered when judging if person is substantially limited
in major life activity). There is no evidence that plaintiff’s difficulty in sleeping
was severe, long term or had a permanent impact. Pack v. Kmart Corp. , 166 F.3d
1300, 1306 (10th Cir. 1999).
The court “is to analyze only the major life activity asserted by the
plaintiff.” Doyal , 213 F.3d at 496 (quoting Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka &
2
A plaintiff is substantially limited if unable to perform a major life activity
the average person can perform or significantly restricted as to the condition,
manner or duration under which he can perform the major life activity. Steele ,
241 F. 3d at 1254; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). In determining whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity, the court considers the
impairment’s nature and severity, its duration or expected duration, and its
permanent or long-term impact. See Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics , 238 F.3d
1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2001).
3
Sleep is a major life activity. See Pack v. Kmart Corp. , 166 F.3d 1300,
1305 (10th Cir. 1999).
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Santa Fe Ry. , 168 F.3d 1228, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999)). Even assuming plaintiff
adequately alleged that the medication he takes for the sleep problem affects his
ability to urinate, he is not substantially limited in this regard, either. He testified
that he drinks coffee in the morning and regularly urinates during that time. He
also testified he had urinated twice, once in the morning and once in the
afternoon, before reporting to work on April 9. Plaintiff thus failed to establish
any substantial limitation on his ability to urinate. A disability requires more than
just a medical diagnosis of a particular condition; it requires substantial limitation
on a major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (“The
determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on
the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of
that impairment on the life of the individual.”).
Because plaintiff failed to establish he was a qualified person with
a disability, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Hallmark.
AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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