Simon v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Health Care Plan ( 2001 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    JUN 11 2001
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    STEPHEN SIMON, individually and
    as ultimate assignee of Humanistic
    Mental Health Foundation,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                     No. 00-1331
    (D.C. No. 99-B-1791)
    v.                                                     (D. Colo.)
    CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS
    HEALTH CARE PLAN; CHRIS
    CROWL, individually and as Plan
    Administrator,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT            *
    Before EBEL , ANDERSON , and KELLY , Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    Plaintiff Stephen Simon appeals the district court’s order dismissing his
    claims brought pursuant to the civil enforcement provision of the Employee
    Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 
    29 U.S.C. § 1132
    (a).        1
    We exercise
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and affirm.
    Plaintiff sued on his own behalf and as the assignee of Humanistic Mental
    Health Foundation (Humanistic), which had provided medical services to an
    individual referred as “J.W.” Plaintiff sought to recover money from defendants,
    who are an ERISA health insurance plan and its administrator, for the medical
    services provided to J.W. J.W. had assigned his claim for benefits to Humanistic,
    which in turn, had assigned the claim to plaintiff. The district court determined
    that plaintiff lacked standing to bring an ERISA action, and dismissed the case for
    failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
    As a preliminary matter, we address defendants’ motion to dismiss this
    appeal on the ground that plaintiff’s appellate brief was filed late. Plaintiff
    served his brief within the time allotted by this court’s letter dated October 18,
    1
    Plaintiff refers in his appellate brief to state law, constitutional, and civil
    rights claims. Although his complaint mentions these claims, they are not
    supported by well-pleaded factual contentions and do not withstand dismissal.
    See Hall v. Bellmon , 
    935 F.2d 1106
    , 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
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    2000. Under the circumstances, we will consider the merits, rather than dismiss
    because of “minor technical defects.”     See Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. v.
    Union Pac. R.R. , 
    119 F.3d 847
    , 848 (10th Cir. 1997).
    Turning to the merits, we review de novo an order dismissing a complaint
    for failure to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
    Civil Procedure, using the same standard applied by the district court.     See
    Ordinance 59 Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of Interior Sec’y       , 
    163 F.3d 1150
    , 1152
    (10th Cir. 1998). “We accept as true all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from
    conclusory allegations, and view those facts in the light most favorable to the
    nonmoving party.”     Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc. , 
    144 F.3d 1302
    , 1304 (10th
    Cir. 1998). Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) will be upheld
    only if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
    support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”      Conley v. Gibson , 
    355 U.S. 41
    , 45-46 (1957).
    Plaintiff asserts that he has standing to sue under ERISA’s civil
    enforcement provision, 
    29 U.S.C. § 1132
    (a). “[T]he standing question . . . is
    whether the . . . statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be
    understood as granting persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to judicial relief.”
    Warth v. Seldin , 
    422 U.S. 490
    , 500 (1975) (footnote omitted). Under § 1132(a),
    an action may be brought by a participant, a beneficiary, the Secretary of Labor, a
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    fiduciary, or under limited circumstances, a State or employer. § 1132(a).
    Plaintiff claims he has standing as, or through, a beneficiary. ERISA defines a
    “beneficiary” as “a person designated by a participant . . . who is or may become
    entitled to a benefit” under an employee benefit plan.       
    29 U.S.C. § 1002
    (8). A
    “participant” is defined as “any employee or former employee . . . who is or may
    become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit
    plan . . . .” 
    Id.
     § 1002(7). Under the facts before us, J.W. is an ERISA
    “participant.”
    Plaintiff does not qualify as a “beneficiary” because he was not “designated
    by a participant.” Rather, he is the assignee of an assignee of a participant.
    “ERISA carefully enumerates the parties entitled to seek relief under
    [§ 1132(a)] . . . .”    Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust    , 
    463 U.S. 1
    , 27 (1983). The remedial provisions are part of a “comprehensive and
    reticulated statute.”     Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.      , 
    446 U.S. 359
    , 361 (1980). ERISA’s enforcement provisions, “crafted with such evident
    care,” indicate that Congress intended to limit the available remedies to those
    included in the statute.     Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell   , 
    473 U.S. 134
    , 145,
    147 (1985). Plaintiff has not established that Congress intended to grant an
    ERISA remedy to an assignee of an assignee of a plan participant. Accordingly,
    we decline to expand the remedial and enforcement provisions. Because plaintiff
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    does not qualify as a party entitled to the ERISA civil enforcement provisions, he
    does not have standing to bring this action. Therefore, the district court’s
    dismissal was correct. Other jurisdictions have also rejected on the same basis
    similar claims brought by plaintiff.      Simon v. Value Behavioral Health, Inc.       , 
    208 F.3d 1073
    , 1081 (9th Cir. 2000),       cert. denied , 
    121 S. Ct. 843
     (2001);   Simon v.
    Belwith Int’l, Inc. , No. 00-1680, 
    2001 WL 111651
    , at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2001)
    (unpublished); Simon v. Quaker Oats Employee Benefit Plan            , No. 00-2342, 
    2000 WL 1657967
    , at *1 (7th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000) (unpublished),           petition for cert. filed ,
    (U.S. Feb. 26, 2001 ) (No. 00-1650).
    Plaintiff complains that the district court did not grant him an opportunity
    to amend his complaint. The record reflects that he did not request such an
    opportunity. Therefore, no error occurred.
    Defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions are denied.
    Plaintiff’s requests for oral argument and an initial en banc hearing are denied.
    The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado is
    AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
    Entered for the Court
    Stephen H. Anderson
    Circuit Judge
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