Haulman v. Jefferson County Sheriff Office ( 2001 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 27 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DAVID F. HAULMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY SHERIFF
OFFICE; ROGER KEY; JEFFERSON No. 00-1478
COUNTY PROBATION OFFICE, (D.C. No. 00-Z-1433)
MARIE BUSTAMANTE-SNELL; (Colorado)
JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT
ATTORNEY; LAURA K. DUNBAR;
PROGRESSIVE THERAPY
SYSTEMS, P.C.; KRISTEN SCALES;
WALTER T. SIMON, PH.D.,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit
Judge.
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
David F. Haulman, a pro se state prisoner, brought this action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for monetary and injunctive relief against a Jefferson County
deputy sheriff, a Jefferson County probation officer, and a psychologist who
worked under a contract with Jefferson County. Mr. Haulman claims that his
constitutional rights were violated in three ways: first, by the deputy sheriff, who
did not provide him Miranda warnings and who ignored his request for counsel
when interrogating him and giving him a polygraph test; second, by the probation
officer, who did not provide Miranda warnings when preparing his presentence
report and who placed false statements in the report; and third, by the
psychologist who, during a court-ordered evaluation, did not provide Miranda
warnings, made false statements in the report and failed to include exculpatory
information. He also contends that the district attorney discussed his polygraph
test with Mr. Haulman’s wife after he was sentenced, thereby tampering with a
witness. Mr. Haulman ultimately entered into a plea agreement with state
authorities. It appears from the record that he is presently pursuing state post-
conviction relief through court-appointed counsel.
After granting Mr. Haulman leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the district
court dismissed the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as legally frivolous.
The court held that the failure to provide Miranda warnings does not give rise to
liability under section 1983, and that the only available remedy is the suppression
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of any incriminating statements. The court noted that because Mr. Haulman
entered into a plea agreement, Miranda is not applicable to his claims in any
event. The court concluded that Mr. Haulman’s remaining allegations did not,
even construed liberally in his favor, set out well-pleaded constitutional
violations.
We conclude that Mr. Haulson is not entitled to relief on his allegations.
First, the law in this circuit is clear that the only remedy available for a Miranda
violation is the suppression of any incriminating evidence. See Bennet v. Passic,
545 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1976); accord Neighbour v. Covert, 68 F.3d 1508,
1510-1511 (2d Cir. 1995). Accordingly, Mr. Haulman may not recover damages
on that claim. Second, Mr. Haulman’s claims that his requests for counsel were
ignored, that he was sentenced on the basis of false and withheld information, and
that the district attorney tampered with a witness all directly challenge the validity
of his conviction or sentence and are therefore barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994). Under Heck, in order to recover damages for an alleged
unconstitutional conviction or sentence, a section 1983 plaintiff must prove that
the conviction or sentence has been reversed or otherwise set aside. Id. at 486-87.
Mr. Haulman has made no such showing here, and his claim for damages is
therefore premature. Even if we were to construe Mr. Haulman’s request for
injunctive relief as asserting a claim under the federal habeas corpus statute, 28
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U.S.C. § 2254, it would still be subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust
available state court remedies.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court dismissing the action as
legally frivolous is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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