Shively v. Santa Fe Preparatory School, Inc. , 21 F. App'x 875 ( 2001 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 15 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
PHAEDRA R. SHIVELY,
Plaintiff-Appellant-
Cross-Appellee,
Nos. 00-2107 & 00-2108
v. (D.C. No. CIV-98-809-LCS/LFG)
(D. N.M.)
SANTA FE PREPARATORY
SCHOOL, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee-
Cross-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY , ANDERSON , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cases are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Phaedra R. Shively was employed by defendant Santa Fe
Preparatory School as a French teacher for many years. The school signed and
offered her a full-time contract for the 1994-95 school year which included the
following as the last sentence: “The School may refuse to reemploy the teacher
without cause, and this contract shall not give rise to any entitlement to or
expectation of reemployment.” Appellant’s App. at 82. Plaintiff signed and
returned the contract with the following notation: “I agree with all of the last
paragraph except the last sentence. I deserve and expect just cause for
non-renewal of continuation of my teaching.” Id. Defendant did not respond to
plaintiff’s notation, but did employ plaintiff as a teacher during the 1994-95
school year. Defendant did not offer plaintiff a contract for the 1995-96 school
year. Plaintiff then filed this suit asserting claims under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34, and for breach of contract
under New Mexico law.
The case was tried to a magistrate judge by consent of the parties. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The magistrate judge found that plaintiff’s age was not
a factor in defendant’s decision to terminate her employment and dismissed
plaintiff’s ADEA claim. Appellant’s App. at 54. With regard to plaintiff’s state
law claim, the magistrate judge found that the notation plaintiff added to her
1994-95 contract was a counteroffer which defendant accepted through silence by
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accepting the benefit of her services during that school year. Id. at 55. The
magistrate judge concluded that the parties had amended their contract to provide
that plaintiff would not be renewed only for just cause. Id. at 55-56. The
magistrate judge further found that defendant did not have just cause as that term
was defined in the contract and New Mexico law, id. at 56-63, and that defendant
breached plaintiff’s contract by failing to renew it, id. at 63. The magistrate
judge rejected defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s notation provided for “only
one, year-long renewal period,” id. at 77, deciding that the amended language
“was not limited to one renewal, but rather provided for continued renewal in the
absence of just cause for non-renewal,” id. at 78. The magistrate judge awarded
plaintiff $60,000 in damages, representing “one year’s full salary, as well as a
declining, lesser amount for each subsequent year . . . tempered . . . with the
amount Plaintiff had earned in mitigation of her damages,” id.Plaintiff appeals, arguing that: (1) the magistrate judge’s factual findings
are insufficient to support the amount of damages awarded; and (2) if the
findings are sufficient for review, the award is clearly erroneous based on the
evidence and is too low. Defendant cross-appeals, arguing in the alternative that:
(1) plaintiff’s notation on her contract was not a counteroffer and was ineffective
to alter defendant’s right to not renew her contract without just cause; (2) if
plaintiff’s notation was a counteroffer, defendant did not accept it and did not
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need just cause to not renew her contract; (3) if the contract was amended,
defendant had just cause to not renew it; and (4) if defendant breached an
amended contract, the amendment required defendant to renew plaintiff’s
contract for one more year only and the damage award is clearly erroneous based
on the evidence and is too high. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
On appeal from a bench trial, we review the district court’s “findings of
fact for clear error and the court’s conclusions of law de novo .” EEOC v. WilTel,
Inc. , 81 F.3d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Salve Regina College v.
Russell , 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991) (holding that issues governed by state law
are reviewed de novo by the appellate court).
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. This standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court
to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is
convinced that it would have decided the case differently.
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City , 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quotation and
citation omitted). Further, “due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
Defendant argues that the notation plaintiff added was not a counteroffer
but was plaintiff’s “grumbling acceptance.” Appellee’s Br. at 15. We disagree.
Outside of the commercial context governed by the Uniform Commercial Code,
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 55-2-101 to 55-2-725, New Mexico law requires that
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acceptance of an offer must be unconditional. Gardner Zemke Co. v. Dunham
Bush, Inc. , 850 P.2d 319, 322 (N.M. 1993); see also Fratello v. Socorro Elec.
Co-op., Inc. , 758 P.2d 792, 795 (N.M. 1988); Silva v. Noble , 515 P.2d 1281,
1282-83 (N.M. 1973); Tatsch v. Hamilton-Erickson Mfg. Co. , 418 P.2d 187, 189
(N.M. 1966). Plaintiff’s amendment clearly states her unwillingness to be bound
by the term in defendant’s offer providing that her employment could be
terminated without cause at the end of the contract. It cannot be concluded that
plaintiff accepted defendant’s contract as it was presented to her. The magistrate
judge correctly concluded that plaintiff’s notation was a counteroffer.
Defendant’s authorities are inapposite.
Defendant argues, in the alternative, that it did not accept plaintiff’s
counteroffer as a matter of law. This argument is without merit, as New Mexico
law recognizes acceptance by silence or by performance. See, e.g., Long v. Allen ,
906 P.2d 754, 756 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing acceptance by performance);
Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist. , 664 P.2d 1000, 1005 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1983) (discussing acceptance by silence), overruled on other grounds by
Montoya v. AKAL Sec., Inc. , 838 P.2d 971 (N.M. 1992). Defendant argues that
an offeree’s silence does not evidence acceptance unless the offeree has a duty to
speak. While this is true as far as it goes, see Garcia , 664 P.2d at 1005,
defendant ignores the proposition that silence operates as an acceptance “[w]here
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because of previous dealings or otherwise, it is reasonable that the offeree should
notify the offeror if he does not intend to accept,” Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 69(1)(c) (1981). We have found no cases explaining how a duty to
speak arises under New Mexico law, but also no case indicating that New Mexico
would not follow the Restatement on this point.
The evidence shows that every contract issued between 1988 and 1995
provided that the school could refuse to reemploy a teacher without cause and
that the contract did not create an entitlement or expectation of reemployment.
Appellee’s Supp’l App. at 58. We conclude, based on defendant’s prior dealings
with plaintiff, that defendant had a duty to tell plaintiff that it did not accept her
counteroffer limiting its right not to reemploy her at the end of the 1994-95
contract--at least at the point that defendant took the benefits of her teaching
services under that contract. Compare Hoffman v. Ralston Purina Co. ,
273 N.W.2d 214, 219 (Wis. 1979) (holding that offeree’s silence in response to
offer of settlement could be construed as acceptance where offeree received some
benefits from offeror and extensive past negotiations between parties made it
unreasonable for offeree to remain silent if he did not intend to accept the
proposed settlement) with Vogt v. Madden , 713 P.2d 442, 444-45 (Idaho Ct. App.
1985) (holding that silence did not operate as acceptance where offeree did not
receive any benefits from offeror and where parties had always made express oral
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agreements in the past). As defendant did not notify plaintiff to the contrary, the
magistrate judge correctly concluded that defendant accepted plaintiff’s
counteroffer.
Ultimately, when the evidence is conflicting, whether offer and acceptance
existed are questions of fact. See Hartbarger v. Frank Paxton Co. , 857 P.2d 776,
780 (N.M. 1993). As a factual question, then, we review the magistrate judge’s
findings that plaintiff made a counteroffer which defendant accepted for clear
error. Based on our review of the magistrate judge’s decision and the record, we
conclude that no clear error exists.
Next, defendant contends that the magistrate judge erroneously held as
a matter of law that plaintiff was not insubordinate and that defendant therefore
lacked just cause to terminate her employment. Defendant’s argument is without
merit. The magistrate judge found that plaintiff was not insubordinate based on
“the testimony, the demeanor of the witnesses[,] and the documents” presented at
trial. Appellant’s App. at 57. The magistrate judge’s decision on this point was
a finding of fact, which we review only for clear error.
Defendant contended that plaintiff was insubordinate because she refused
to cooperate with school officials in their performance evaluation process. The
magistrate judge discussed the evidence at length, finding that defendant gave
nothing but “mixed signals” to plaintiff. Id. at 62. In addition, the magistrate
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judge found that defendant did not do performance evaluations for the purpose of
terminating bad teachers and that plaintiff’s evaluation, which was finally done
without her cooperation, did not state that she was insubordinate and should be
terminated. Id. The magistrate judge concluded that plaintiff was not
insubordinate and defendant did not have just cause not to renew her contract.
Id. Although defendant presents a different view of the facts on appeal, this is
inadequate for defendant to prevail. Based on our review of the record, we
conclude that there was factual support for the magistrate judge’s findings
concerning cause for nonrenewal and they are not clearly erroneous.
Finally, defendant argues that the magistrate judge erred by awarding
damages representing more than one year of plaintiff’s salary less the amount she
earned in mitigation of damages. The magistrate judge did not state whether he
found plaintiff’s notation to be ambiguous or unambiguous. See Appellant’s
App. at 77-78. The magistrate judge did state that he considered plaintiff’s
notation to provide for a continuous, year-to-year extension of her 1994-95
contract because defendant lacked just cause to not renew it at the end of the
1994-95 school year. See id. Defendant contends that plaintiff’s amendment is
ambiguous and cannot be construed to provide for continuous employment in
perpetuity without rendering other terms of the contract meaningless. Defendant
also asserts that, if anything, the notation applied only to the succeeding year’s
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contract and damages should have been so limited. In any event, defendant
maintains, any ambiguities in the notation must be construed against plaintiff, the
drafter.
Under New Mexico law, “[a] contract is deemed ambiguous only if it is
reasonably and fairly susceptible of different constructions.” Vickers v. N. Am.
Land Devs., Inc. , 607 P.2d 603, 606 (N.M. 1980). Whether contract language is
ambiguous is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Rummel v. St. Paul
Surplus Lines Ins. Co. , 945 P.2d 985, 988 (N.M. 1997).
The language at issue is this: “I deserve and expect just cause for
non-renewal of continuation of my teaching.” Appellant’s App. at 82. That
language is unambiguous. It plainly imposes a “just cause” condition on
nonrenewal of plaintiff for the position covered by the contract, and extends this
condition not merely to the succeeding year but for the “continuation of my
teaching.” Id. Therefore, defendant’s argument is without merit.
We reverse the award of damages, however, and remand for further
fact-finding on that issue. The magistrate judge awarded plaintiff $60,000 in
damages, representing “one year’s full salary, as well as a declining, lesser
amount for each subsequent year . . . tempered . . . with the amount Plaintiff had
earned in mitigation of her damages,” id. Plaintiff claims damages of
$325,270.00. Appellant’s Br. at 11. The magistrate judge did not explain what
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evidence supported his conclusion that $60,000 was the correct amount to be
awarded. Without an explanation tying the magistrate judge’s award to the
evidence, however, we cannot provide meaningful review. See Joseph A. by
Wolfe v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs. , 69 F.3d 1081, 1087 (10th Cir. 1995). On
remand, the magistrate judge should determine the length of the amended
contract and the damages to be awarded as a consequence of that determination,
specifically tying his conclusions to the evidence.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
New Mexico is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part, and the case is
REMANDED for additional proceedings consistent with this decision.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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