Thomas v. City of Wichita , 29 F. App'x 564 ( 2002 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 30 2002
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CHESTER A. THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 01-3167
(D.C. No. 98-CV-1491-MLB)
CITY OF WICHITA, a municipal (D. Kan.)
corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO , PORFILIO , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
Appellant Chester Thomas, appearing pro se, challenges the district court’s
decision granting summary judgment in favor of appellee City of Wichita (“the
City”) on his claims of discrimination based on disability under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213, and based on race under
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The Court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I
On August 12, 1992, Thomas, then a firefighter for the City, injured his
right arm and shoulder while attempting to lift a large heart-attack patient. On
January 11, 1993, Thomas signed a resignation stating that he was physically
unable to perform his duties as a firefighter. He had been told by his superiors
that because there was no position that could accommodate his new limitations, he
would either have to resign or be fired.
Thomas subsequently applied for permanent partial work disability benefits.
Michael Payne, risk manager for the City of Wichita, denied his request, stating
that because Thomas had resigned voluntarily, he was excluded from benefits
under Kansas’s worker’s compensation law.
An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) heard Thomas’s benefits claim, and
concluded that Thomas was entitled to benefits based on a 55% disability. This
determination was appealed by the City, and the Worker’s Compensation Appeals
Board reduced the award to benefits based on a 47.6% disability. A settlement
was then reached by the parties for a lump-sum payment representing the total of
Thomas’s benefit payments less 10%.
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On September 1, 1998, Thomas filed complaints with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the Kansas Human Rights
Commission alleging that the City had discriminated against him based on his
disability when it forced him to resign and based on his race in its handling of his
claim for worker’s compensation benefits. These agencies declined to pursue his
claims. On December 22, 1998, Thomas filed this suit.
The City moved for summary judgment on both the ADA and the Title VII
claims, arguing that because Thomas resigned in 1992 but did not file his
administrative complaints until 1998 he was well outside the 300-day time limit
and his claims were barred. 1
In response, Thomas stated that the continuing
violation and equitable tolling doctrines applied to excuse this defect.
The district court granted the City’s motion with respect to Thomas’s claim
of disability discrimination, concluding that no continuing violation had been
alleged because the only action purportedly based on Thomas’s disability was his
forced resignation in 1993 and concluding that the doctrine of equitable tolling
did not apply because there was no evidence that the City attempted to conceal
facts from Thomas. Finally, the court determined that the race discrimination
1
Under Title VII’s time limitation requirements, which also apply to ADA
actions, a lawsuit must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the
discriminatory action in states, such as Kansas, that statutorily prohibit
discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
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claim was not time-barred because the City’s appeal of Thomas’s benefits award,
alleged to be motivated by Thomas’s race, was within the 300-day time limit.
A second motion for summary judgment on the remaining Title VII claim
was then filed by the City, arguing that (1) Thomas had not established a prima
facie case of discrimination; (2) even if Thomas had established his prima facie
case, the City had proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its
treatment of his benefits claim; and (3) Thomas offered no evidence that those
reasons were merely pretextual. The district court agreed, resolving the motion in
favor of the City on the basis that Thomas had failed to show that the City’s
purported reasons for its actions were unworthy of credence or motivated by
Thomas’s race.
II
Our review of the district court’s decision granting summary judgment is
de novo, and we apply the same standard as the district court. Adler v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. , 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is warranted
when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
On appeal, Thomas argues that either the continuing violation or equitable
tolling doctrine should apply to excuse his delay in pursuing his ADA claim.
Upon review of the briefs and the record, we conclude that the district court
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correctly determined that neither of these concepts applies. We affirm on this
issue, therefore, for the reasons stated by the district court.
On his Title VII claim, Thomas argues that the City failed to provide
a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for appealing Thomas’s benefits award.
In reviewing Thomas’s argument, we note that “[t]he relevant inquiry is not
whether [the employer’s] proffered reasons were wise, fair, or correct, but
whether [the employer] honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith
upon those beliefs.” Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 186 F.3d 1301, 1318
(10th Cir. 1999).
There are two linchpins to Thomas’s argument: an internal memorandum
setting forth the City’s strategy for responding to his claim, and the distinction
between the 1993 and 1990 versions of the Kansas worker’s compensation law.
According to Thomas, the City’s reason for denying his claim was not supported
by the 1990 version of the law and the City knew the 1990 rather than the 1993
version applied to his claim.
First, the interoffice memorandum reveals no racial animus. As the district
court concluded, it merely presents the City’s strategy for resolving Thomas’s
claims on terms favorable to the City. Second, the City’s basis for rejecting
Thomas’s claim appears to be equally tenable under either version of the Kansas
statute. Payne reasoned that an employee who voluntarily resigned could
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theoretically continue to earn a salary comparable to his pre-injury salary. While
this logic was ultimately rejected by the ALJ and the Appeals Board, the
conclusions of these two bodies were not based on any distinction between the
two versions of the law. Compare Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-510e(a) (1990)
(disallowing benefits where employee is able to earn “comparable” wages) with
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-510e(a) (1993) (disallowing benefits where employee is able
to earn 90% of previous salary). Rather, the critical issue was the ALJ’s finding
that Thomas had not resigned voluntarily, but had been forced to resign.
Ultimately, the proceedings before the ALJ and Appeals Board involved
legitimate disagreements among the various physicians and other witnesses
regarding the nature and extent of Thomas’s injuries and the events surrounding
his resignation/termination. While Thomas ultimately prevailed on these points,
nothing suggests that the City’s position in these proceedings was frivolous.
Legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons were offered by the City for appealing
Thomas’s award.
In light of this showing, the burden fell on Thomas to counter with specific
facts showing that the City’s reasons for its appeal were unworthy of credence or
racially motivated in some way. See Bullington , 186 F.3d at 1317. This showing
must be made by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific
exhibits. See Adler , 144 F.3d at 670–71. Repeated, unsupported assertions by
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Thomas that the City’s actions were based on his race are insufficient to defeat
summary judgment.
Finally, Thomas also appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for
sanctions based on his allegation that the City had committed fraud, as evidenced
by the above-referenced interoffice memorandum. We review the district court’s
ruling on a motion for sanctions for abuse of discretion. See Burkhart ex rel.
Meeks v. Kinsley Bank , 852 F.2d 512, 515 (10th Cir. 1988). There is nothing
suggesting that the City’s conduct before the court was fraudulent. Accordingly,
we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
III
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue
forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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