Haas v. Stewart , 226 F. App'x 782 ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
February 16, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ROBERT B. HAAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and No. 06-1421
M ARIAN T. STUM PF (Involuntary (D.C. No. 05-CV-02556-M SK)
Plaintiff),
(D . Colo.)
Plaintiff,
v.
TH E H ON O RA BLE C . JEA N
STEW ART, in her official capacity for
the Denver Probate C ourt,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, M cKA Y, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G ).
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Plaintiffs are beneficiaries of a trust w ho are dissatisfied with the probate
court’s disbursement of monies in that trust to a law firm. Appellant filed a §
1983 action against the probate court judge challenging various collateral orders
but not the award of monies to the law firm. The district court dismissed the
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Appellant argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude
federal court jurisdiction because his § 1983 action seeks only prospective
injunctive relief and challenges only administrative orders rather than the final
judgment.
W e review the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction de novo. See G uttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1031 (10th Cir.
2006). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine operates as a jurisdictional limit on federal
courts, precluding “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
comm enced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see
also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) (stating that
Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents “a party losing in state court . . . from seeking
what in substance would be appellate review of [a] state judgment in a United
States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment
itself violates the loser’s federal rights”). “To determine whether a federal
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plaintiff’s claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment we must
pay close attention to the relief the plaintiff seeks.” Crutchfield v. Countrywide
Home Loans, 389 F.3d 1144, 1147-48 (10th Cir. 2004). As A ppellant is
proceeding pro se, he is afforded liberal treatment. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972).
The fact that Appellant contends he is challenging only collateral orders
does not save his appeal. 1 Under Colorado law, Appellant’s right to appeal the
probate court’s collateral orders merged into the final judgment. See Nw. M utual
Life Ins. Co. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 703 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1985). Appellant has not filed an appeal with the C olorado state court
system regarding this case. After his time to appeal expired, Appellant filed the
instant action. The jurisdictional question therefore falls within the ambit of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Cf. Federacion de M aestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta
de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 2005)
(discussing effect of Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon M obile on timing of
Rooker-Feldman doctrine in relation to interlocutory orders).
Accordingly, after reviewing the parties’ briefs, the record on appeal, and
the district court’s decision, we agree with the district court that the § 1983 action
1
This contention is specious at best. It is apparent from Appellant’s
Verified Complaint that he is seeking reversal of these orders in order to
challenge the probate court’s ultimate award.
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challenging the collateral orders is inextricably intertwined with the probate court
award and we therefore AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the action.
Entered for the Court
M onroe G. M cKay
Circuit Judge
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