Byers v. LeMaster ( 2002 )


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  •                                                                             F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                              FEB 14 2002
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    STEVEN M. BYERS,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.                                                       No. 01-2261
    (D.C. No. CIV-01-219-LH/KBM)
    TIM LEMASTER, Warden;                                 (D. New Mexico)
    PATRICIA A. MADRID, Attorney
    General for the State of New Mexico,
    Respondents-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before SEYMOUR and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit
    Judge.
    Mr. Byers, a state prisoner appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of
    appealability in order to appeal the district court’s denial of his petition for writ
    of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 2254
    . For the reasons set out
    below, we deny Mr. Byers’ request for a certificate of appealability and dismiss
    *
    After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
    determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
    determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
    34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and
    judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
    res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
    orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
    terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    the appeal. 1
    Mr. Byers pled guilty to two property crimes and the trial judge indicated
    that he would impose consecutive sentences. Prior to sentencing, Mr. Byers filed
    a “Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence” requesting concurrent sentences.
    Without ruling on the motion, the trial judge filed a written judgment and
    sentence imposing consecutive sentences. The judgment was entered on May 14,
    1993, and no appeal was filed.
    In October 1999, upon request of the warden where Mr. Byers is
    incarcerated, the trial judge amended the judgment and sentence to include a
    proper parole term. Mr. Byers filed a motion for relief from the consecutive
    sentences in state court in February 2000. The trial judge denied relief on April
    10, 2000, and denied Mr. Byers’ subsequent motion for reconsideration. The state
    court of appeals dismissed Mr. Byers’ appeal because he had failed to file his
    motion for amendment of the amended sentence within the 90-day limit set by
    state law. The state supreme court denied Mr. Byers’ motion for a writ of habeas
    corpus.
    1
    Mr. Byers filed what he called a “Motion for Summary Judgment,” asking
    us to find in his favor on appeal because the state chose not to file a response
    brief. Under our rules, the state may decline to respond to a petitioner’s brief on
    appeal. Consequently, we deny Mr. Byer’s motion.
    -2-
    On February 23, 2001, Mr. Byers filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
    in federal district court. The magistrate judge recommended, sua sponte, that it
    be dismissed as not timely under AEDPA. See rec. vol. I, doc. 17. The district
    court adopted the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge and
    dismissed Mr. Byers’ petition. The court subsequently denied Mr. Byers’ request
    for a certificate of appealability under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    .
    To determine whether Mr. Byers is entitled to a certificate of appealability
    when the district court has denied a habeas petition on procedural grounds, we
    examine whether he has made a substantial showing “that jurists of reason would
    find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
    constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
    district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 478 (2000) (construing 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c)). Pursuant to AEDPA, the
    district court determined that Mr. Byers’ state court conviction became final on
    May 14, 1993, and that because his conviction was final before April 24, 1996,
    Mr. Byers had a grace period of 365 days, until April 24, 1997, to file a habeas
    petition pursuant to § 2254. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
    (d); see also United States v.
    Simmonds, 
    111 F.3d 737
    , 746 (10th Cir. 1997). Because Mr. Byers did not file
    his federal habeas petition until February 23, 2001, long after his state conviction
    became final, the district court dismissed his federal habeas petition as untimely.
    -3-
    Mr. Byers argues that his sentence did not become final until it was
    amended on October 19, 1999, to include the proper parole term. Even assuming
    that were true, however, Mr. Byers’ habeas petition was still untimely. Under this
    scenario, Mr. Byers would have a year from October 19, 1999, or until October
    19, 2000, to timely file his petition in federal court unless the time was tolled.
    Under AEDPA, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for state
    post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment
    or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this
    subsection.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
    (d)(2). In this circuit, a “properly filed”
    application is one that satisfies the filing requirements for subsequent state relief,
    including the time of filing. Habteselassie v. Novak, 
    209 F.3d 1208
     (10th Cir.
    2000).
    Mr. Byers did not file his motion seeking relief from the consecutive
    sentences set forth in the amended judgment and sentence until February 9, 2000,
    113 days after the amended judgment was filed. New Mexico requires such
    motions to be filed within 90 days of the trial court’s decision. Rule 5-801
    NMRA 2000. The state court of appeals held that the motion was not timely
    filed. As a result, the time during which Mr. Byers’ claims were proceeding in
    the state courts is not exempted from the AEDPA-imposed 365-day limit. Mr.
    Byers filed his federal habeas petition on February 23, 2001, well over a year
    -4-
    after his state court sentence became final, whichever date we use. We conclude,
    therefore, that Mr. Byers’ petition is time-barred under AEDPA.
    We have reviewed Mr. Byers’ briefs, the magistrate judge’s order, the
    district court’s order and judgment, and the entire record on appeal. Because Mr.
    Byers’ section 2254 petition was due at the latest by October 19, 2000, and he
    failed to file his petition for a writ of habeas corpus within that time period, the
    district court’s dismissal of his petition as time-barred was correct. In addition,
    for the reasons stated by the district court in its Order filed July 18, 2001, rec.
    vol. I, doc. 19, we hold that Mr. Byers is not entitled to equitable tolling of the
    AEDPA limitations period. When, as here, a claim is denied on procedural
    grounds without reaching the merits of the underlying constitutional claim, a
    COA should issue only if the petitioner shows that “jurists of reason would find it
    debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”
    McDaniel, 
    120 S.Ct. at 1604
    . Mr. Byers has made no such showing, and we
    therefore deny his request for a COA on this claim. 2
    2
    We decline to address issues Mr. Byers has raised for the first time on
    appeal.
    -5-
    We DENY the request for a certificate of appealability and DISMISS the
    appeal.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Stephanie K. Seymour
    Circuit Judge
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-2261

Judges: Seymour, McKay, Brorby

Filed Date: 2/14/2002

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024