De Jesus Cerca v. Thomas , 30 F. App'x 931 ( 2002 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 11 2002
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
MARIA DE JESUS CERCA, Friend
and Mother of Iris Fuentes, David
Fuentes, Dario Fuentes, and Ulises
Cerca Fuentes, minor children,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 00-3257
(D.C. No. 98-2408-CM)
DAVE THOMAS, in his individual (D. Kansas)
capacity; CITY OF TOPEKA,
KANSAS,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO , PORFILIO , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
The surviving children of David Fuentes brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil
rights action against the City of Topeka, Kansas, and numerous other Topeka law
enforcement personnel, including Dave Thomas, a City of Topeka police officer.
During the execution of a search warrant at Mr. Fuentes’ residence, Mr. Thomas
fatally shot Mr. Fuentes. The district court granted partial summary judgment as
to some defendants and some claims, but denied summary judgment with respect
to plaintiffs’ claim that Mr. Thomas used excessive force. After a trial, the jury
returned a verdict for the remaining defendants. The parties are familiar with the
facts; thus, we do not repeat them here. Because plaintiffs have provided an
insufficient record to enable us to address their challenge to certain jury
instructions, and because we conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting certain evidence, we affirm.
I.
On appeal, plaintiffs first contend the district court erred in giving certain
jury instructions. When considering a party’s challenge to jury instructions, our
initial inquiry is whether the party properly preserved that issue for appeal by
objecting at the district court level to the instruction on the same grounds raised
on appeal. Comcoa, Inc. v. NEC Tels., Inc. , 931 F.2d 655, 660 (10th Cir. 1991);
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see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 (stating that “[n]o party may assign as error the giving
or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the
jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the
grounds of the objection.”). Further, litigants in this circuit are required to
identify in their brief where issues on appeal were raised and ruled upon.
10th Cir. R. 28.2(C)(2) (requiring parties to identify where issues on appeal were
raised and ruled upon) and 10th Cir. R. 28.2(C)(3)(b) (noting that “[b]riefs must
cite the precise reference in the record where a required objection was made and
ruled on, if the appeal is based on . . . the giving of or refusal to give a particular
jury instruction.”). We may refuse to review alleged error if the party seeking
review fails “to include and reference the portion of the record wherein their
objection and the district court’s ruling thereon may be found.” Jetcraft Corp. v.
Flight Safety Int’l , 16 F.3d 362, 366 (10th Cir. 1993).
Here, plaintiffs fail to identify where in the record they objected to these
jury instructions or where the district court ruled on their objection. Having
carefully reviewed the record on appeal, we conclude that plaintiffs have not
provided the court with these relevant trial transcripts. See 10th Cir. R.
10.1(A)(1). We do not know whether plaintiffs did, in fact, object to these
instructions, whether they did so on the specific grounds raised on appeal, or the
basis for the district court’s ruling. Thus, we are unable to consider plaintiff’s
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contentions regarding the jury instructions. See Jetcraft Corp , 16 F.3d at 366;
Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. Co. , 969 F.2d 977, 979 (10th Cir. 1992). 1
II.
Plaintiffs next contend that the district court erred by admitting evidence
suggesting that Mr. Fuentes sold illegal drugs. The district court initially granted
plaintiffs’ motion in limine to exclude evidence that Mr. Fuentes had sold illegal
drugs or that an informant had purchased cocaine from him on the basis that the
prejudicial effect of such evidence would outweigh the probative value. See
Fed. R. Evid. 403. During trial, the district court did allow the defense to present
evidence that Mr. Thomas was aware the search warrant had been executed
pursuant to a drug investigation. Further, after testimony from a psychiatrist
about the psychological damages suffered by Mr. Fuentes’ children as a result of
witnessing their father’s killing, the district court allowed the defense to ask the
psychologist whether, in general, drug use, drug sales and criminal conduct in a
home would set a child up for an unhappy life. On cross-examination by
plaintiffs’ counsel, the psychologist stated that he did not know whether or not
Mr. Fuentes’ children had been exposed to any drug use or criminal activity in the
1
If plaintiffs are attempting to claim the district court somehow erred in its
summary judgment ruling, they have failed to provide the court with the necessary
record, and they point this court to no claimed factual or legal error with respect
to that ruling.
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home. Ruling that the plaintiffs had opened the door on cross-examination, the
district court allowed the defense to ask the psychologist if he was aware that
Mr. Fuentes was involved in drug activity and had involved one of his children in
drug sale activity. The psychologist denied any such knowledge and testified that
such information would not alter his opinion as to the emotional damage suffered
by the children.
Plaintiffs contend that the district court failed to adhere to its pre-trial
in limine order by the admission of this evidence, which was unduly prejudicial
and should have been excluded under Rule 403. The decision to admit or exclude
evidence under Rule 403 is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will
not be reversed by this court absent a clear abuse of discretion. Getter v.
Wal-Mart Stores , Inc. , 66 F.3d 1119, 1124 (10th Cir. 1995). We see no abuse of
the district court’s discretion here.
In admitting the evidence that the search warrant was based on a drug
investigation, the district court properly recognized that the nature and severity of
the alleged crime were relevant circumstances considered by Mr. Thomas in
executing the search warrant. To minimize any undue prejudice, the court took
care to exclude any evidence indicating Mr. Fuentes was involved in drug activity
and to allow only the admission of those facts known to Mr. Thomas at the time
he decided to use deadly force. In allowing the questioning of the psychologist,
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the district court properly recognized that whether a parent exposed his children
to drug usage or criminal activity was relevant to the issue of the amount of
damage suffered by the children, but the court avoided undue prejudice by
disallowing any evidence that Mr. Fuentes sold or used drugs or exposed the
children to such activities. It was within the district court’s discretion to allow
further questioning about the psychologist’s knowledge or awareness about the
children’s exposure to any illegal drug activities after plaintiffs’ counsel opened
the door on cross-examination. See McEwen v. City of Norman , 926 F.2d 1539,
1547 (10th Cir. 1991) (allowing testimony to rebut inference raised by defense
during cross-examination). Moreover, the district court took steps to minimize
any possible prejudice by limiting the scope of the questioning and giving the jury
a limiting instruction that the line of questioning was only to be considered with
respect to possible damages, not with respect to liability. We cannot address
plaintiffs’ claim that the district court failed to adhere to its pre-trial in limine
ruling because plaintiffs failed to include the in limine motion or order in the
record on appeal. See 10th Cir. R. 10.1(A)(1) and 10th Cir. R. 28.2(C)(3)(a).
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The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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