Jackson v. Trammell , 805 F.3d 940 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 10, 2015
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
SHELTON JACKSON,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 13-5119
MAURICE WARRIOR, Interim
Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiary, *
Respondent - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA - TULSA
(D.C. No. 08-CV-0204-JHP-FHM)
John T. Carlson, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Denver, Colorado (Virginia
L. Grady, Federal Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, Jacob Rasch-Chabot,
Research and Writing Specialist, Denver, Colorado, and Mark Henricksen of
Henricksen & Henricksen, Lawyers, Inc., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on
the briefs), for Petitioner - Appellant.
Jennifer L. Crabb, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (E.
Scott Pruitt, Attorney General State Oklahoma, with her on the brief), for
Respondent - Appellee.
Before KELLY, LUCERO, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2) Anita Trammell is replaced by
Maurice Warrior as Interim Warden of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, effective
October 28, 2015.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner-Appellant Shelton Jackson appeals from the district court’s
denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction and
death sentence. Jackson v. Workman, No. 08–CV–204–JHP–FHM, 2013 WL
4521143 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 26, 2013). In 1997, Mr. Jackson was charged with the
murder of Monica Decator in Tulsa, Oklahoma and was subsequently convicted
and sentenced to death. Mr. Jackson raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the
state court’s submission to the jury of an allegedly invalid sentencing aggravator
unconstitutionally skewed the jury’s deliberations during the penalty phase of his
trial; (2) whether his defense lawyers provided constitutionally deficient
representation during the penalty phase; and (3) whether the combined effect of
these two errors warrants habeas relief even if, viewed individually, each error is
harmless.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), and we
affirm.
Background
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) set forth the relevant
facts in its published opinion on direct appeal. Jackson v. State, 146 P.3d 1149,
-2-
1154–55 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006). We presume these facts are correct. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
On the morning of April 8, 1997, Mr. Jackson killed his girlfriend Monica
Decator, with whom he had been living for several months. The previous day,
Mr. Jackson had been watching Ms. Decator’s two-year-old son when he “lost his
patience” due to the child’s fussiness and crying. Jackson, 146 P.3d at 1154. He
“picked the child up by the neck, and tossed him to the ground several times.” Id.Later, when the child began crying again, Mr. Jackson pushed the child down
repeatedly. After this abuse, the child could not walk, and his eyes were “glazy.”
Id. Mr. Jackson used a screwdriver to pry the child’s mouth open because he was
having difficulty breathing.
The parties contest the timing and sequence of the next series of events.
According to the state, Mr. Jackson covered the severely injured child with a
large piece of carpet and hid him in the crawlspace of a nearby vacant house. He
then went to a gas station, where he purchased a gallon of gasoline and used an
ATM to empty Ms. Decator’s bank account. Later that evening, he watched
wrestling at his uncle’s apartment, as he regularly did. When he returned home,
he killed Ms. Decator to prevent her from reporting his child abuse to the
authorities. He left town at noon on April 8.
Mr. Jackson provided a different sequence of events to the police. He
stated he left the injured child at home in bed when he went to his uncle’s house
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to watch wrestling. When Ms. Decator returned to the house that evening, she
heard her child crying and discovered his severe injuries. This discovery led to a
fight with Mr. Jackson when he returned, which ended when he knocked her
unconscious by hitting her in the head several times with a brick. According to
Mr. Jackson, at that time he carried the child to the vacant house. When he
returned to Ms. Decator, she had regained consciousness, and she attacked him
with a knife. He hit her again with the brick, gained control of the knife, and
stabbed her.
Ms. Decator’s body was discovered at 8:30 a.m. on April 8, when
firefighters responded to a fire at her home. Investigators concluded that
someone had set the fire intentionally. Police arrested Mr. Jackson later that
afternoon, when his Houston-bound bus stopped in McAlester, Oklahoma. He
had no visible injuries. In McAlester, Mr. Jackson gave detectives a general
location for the hidden child, but they could not find him. Mr. Jackson was then
taken to a police station in Tulsa, where he provided more specific directions to
find the child and gave a statement confessing to the child abuse and killing of
Ms. Decator.
On April 29, 1997, Mr. Jackson was charged with first degree murder, first
degree arson, and injury to a minor child. A jury found Mr. Jackson guilty of all
three crimes and recommended the death penalty for his murder conviction. On
appeal, the OCCA found that Mr. Jackson’s trial attorneys were constitutionally
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ineffective because they conceded Mr. Jackson’s guilt without consulting with
him or obtaining his consent or acquiescence. Jackson v. State, 41 P.3d 395,
400–01 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001). The OCCA reversed and remanded Mr.
Jackson’s murder conviction and death sentence for a new trial, and affirmed his
convictions for arson and injury to a child. Id. at 401.
Mr. Jackson’s retrial was held in March 2003. At the guilt stage of Mr.
Jackson’s second trial, the salient question for the jury was whether Mr. Jackson
acted with deliberate intent to kill Ms. Decator, or whether instead he acted in
self-defense or in the heat of passion. The jury found that Mr. Jackson intended
to kill Ms. Decator, and he was again convicted of first degree murder. Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.7(A) (Supp. 1996).
At the penalty phase of the second trial, the prosecution sought to prove
four aggravating circumstances, each listed in Oklahoma’s death penalty statute:
(1) Ms. Decator’s murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel
(“heinous crime aggravator”);
(2) Mr. Jackson killed Ms. Decator for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution for a previous crime—the
abuse of her child (“avoid arrest aggravator”);
(3) Mr. Jackson posed a continuing threat to society because he would
probably commit violent acts in the future (“continuing threat
aggravator”); and
(4) During the commission of the murder of Ms. Decator, Mr. Jackson
knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person—the
injured child (“great risk of death aggravator”).
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Id. § 701.12; 16 R. 23 (2003 Trial Tr.). 1
At trial, the state rested upon the evidence presented during the guilt phase
of the trial to prove the first three aggravators. The state offered testimony from
the doctor who treated the child at the hospital to prove the final aggravator—that
Mr. Jackson knowingly created a great risk of death to the child when he
murdered Ms. Decator. After the trial judge dismissed the continuing threat
aggravator, the jury found the remaining three aggravators applied.
Before the jury’s deliberations, Mr. Jackson’s defense counsel presented
mitigating evidence, much of it focused on Mr. Jackson’s life history. Mr.
Jackson’s mother drank heavily throughout her pregnancy, and a neurologist
testified that Mr. Jackson suffered from fetal-alcohol syndrome, causing an array
of cognitive and functional disabilities. Mr. Jackson’s stepfather abused him
severely. His classmates teased him for poor hygiene and a speech impediment,
and he was committed to the Louisiana Department of Corrections when he was
twelve years old. He spent three difficult years in a correctional facility that the
Department of Justice later accused of failing to protect children from abuse.
Mr. Jackson’s defense counsel also presented as mitigating evidence the
character witness testimony of Arthur Farahkhan. Mr. Farahkhan worked with
1
In conjunction with the filing of his opening brief, Mr. Jackson
submitted to this court a CD containing an electronic version of the record on
appeal. We cite directly to this electronic record, and to its various folders and
volumes, in accordance with Mr. Jackson’s briefing.
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Mr. Jackson developing a program to assist disadvantaged youth. He testified
about Mr. Jackson’s leadership qualities and his genuine desire to improve life in
his neighborhood. He stated that Mr. Jackson’s life would have value in prison.
Mr. Farahkhan had provided similar testimony in Mr. Jackson’s first trial.
There he stated that he “believ[ed] in the death penalty.” 11 R. 2189 (1998 Trial
Tr.). He reconciled his general belief in the death penalty with his support for
Mr. Jackson because he did not think Mr. Jackson’s murder of Ms. Decator was
premeditated. Id. The first trial judge sustained an objection by the prosecution
and admonished the jurors to disregard Mr. Farahkhan’s comment regarding
premeditation.
Prior to testifying at the second trial, Mr. Farahkhan “made it crystal clear”
to Mr. Jackson’s counsel that, consistent with his previous testimony, he believed
Mr. Jackson would deserve the death penalty if the murder of Ms. Decator was
premeditated. 1 R. 219 (Post-Conviction). Despite this warning, Mr. Jackson’s
counsel called Mr. Farahkhan to testify. When, on cross-examination, Mr.
Farahkhan agreed with the prosecution that “the death penalty would be
appropriate” if Mr. Jackson “intentionally” killed Ms. Decator, Mr. Jackson’s
counsel did not object or ask Mr. Farahkhan any further questions. 17 R. 129–30
(2003 Trial Tr.).
Mr. Jackson filed a direct appeal from the conviction and death sentence
resulting from his second trial. He raised ten propositions of error, including that
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there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the great risk
of death aggravator. The OCCA affirmed the murder conviction and death
sentence. Jackson, 146 P.3d at 1168. Mr. Jackson then sought post-conviction
relief, raising seven propositions of error. Among other things, he argued that his
trial counsel was ineffective in investigating and presenting Mr. Farahkhan as a
mitigation witness and in failing to object to his testimony during cross-
examination. Mr. Jackson also argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise that claim on direct appeal. 1 R. 274, 276 (Post-Conviction).
The OCCA denied all requested relief in an unpublished opinion, 1 R. 273 (Post-
Conviction) (PCD 2003-670), and the United States Supreme Court denied Mr.
Jackson’s petition for a writ of certiorari, Jackson v. Oklahoma, 552 U.S. 838(2007).
Mr. Jackson initiated this federal habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 in October 2008. He again argued the evidence was insufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the great risk of death aggravator and that both his
trial and appellate counsel were constitutionally ineffective. The federal district
court denied the petition but granted a COA on Mr. Jackson’s ineffective
assistance claim. Jackson, 2013 WL 4521143, at *45. We expanded the COA to
include Mr. Jackson’s improper aggravator claim.
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Discussion
The standard of review applicable to Mr. Jackson’s claims depends on
whether and how the state court resolved those claims. Alverson v. Workman,
595 F.3d 1142, 1146 (10th Cir. 2010). When a state court has adjudicated a claim
on the merits, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas relief only if the decision
was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or was
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). Federal
law is “clearly established” when it is embodied in a holding of the Supreme
Court. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 412 (2000).
Our review under § 2254(d) is “highly deferential” and requires us to give
“state-court decisions . . . the benefit of the doubt.” Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704
F.3d 817, 824 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24
(2002) (per curiam)). When we review a state court’s application of federal law,
“we are precluded from issuing the writ simply because we conclude in our
independent judgment that the state court applied the law erroneously or
incorrectly. Rather, we must be convinced that the application was also
objectively unreasonable.” McLuckie v. Abbott, 337 F.3d 1193, 1197 (10th Cir.
2003) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)).
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I. The Submission to the Jury of the Great Risk of Death Aggravator
A. The Alleged Invalidity of the Great Risk of Death Aggravator
Mr. Jackson’s first argument is that the trial court’s submission to the jury
of the great risk of death aggravator unconstitutionally skewed its deliberations
during the penalty phase of his second trial. Under Oklahoma law, the great risk
of death aggravator focuses on whether “another person was endangered by the
defendant’s actions in killing the victim.” Hanson v. State, 206 P.3d 1020, 1033
(Okla. Crim. App. 2009). The aggravator is “established by acts which create a
great risk of death to another person in close proximity to the homicidal act in
terms of time, location, and intent.” Harris v. State, 84 P.3d 731, 751 (Okla.
Crim. App. 2004). “The gravamen of the circumstance is not the number of
persons killed, but the callous creation of the risk to more than one person.”
Williams v. State, 22 P.3d 702, 724 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001).
Mr. Jackson strenuously objected to the prosecution’s submission of the
great risk of death aggravator to the jury. He contended that Oklahoma law
requires juries applying the great risk of death aggravator to focus on the risk to
another person created by the homicidal act itself. Yet, here, the child’s injuries
were far removed in time, place, and intent from the murder of Ms. Decator.
According to Mr. Jackson, the child was not present in the house when he killed
Ms. Decator; he had been hidden in another location roughly twelve hours earlier.
See Hanson, 206 P.3d at 1033 (requiring evidence that another person was “so
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near the victim at the time of the murder and consequently put in jeopardy of
suffering real harm”); Miller v. State, 313 P.3d 934, 988 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013)
(applying the great risk of death aggravator only “where the homicidal act at issue
puts another person at great risk of death, because of that other person’s ‘close
proximity’ to the victim at the time of the homicidal act”); Salazar v. State, 919
P.2d 1120, 1123 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996) (“In the majority of the cases in which
this aggravator has been upheld, the endangered bystanders who suffered a great
risk of death were either in the line of the defendant’s fire or were
contemporaneously injured or killed by the defendant.”); but see Ryder v. State,
83 P.3d 856, 874 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (holding that a defendant who killed a
woman, waited for her son to return home, and then killed her son had created a
great risk of death to more than one person; although not simultaneous, the two
murders were “in close proximity”).
To the contrary, the state argued at trial and on appeal that the aggravator
was appropriate because Mr. Jackson acted with a single “murderous intent” when
he hid the severely injured child where authorities were unlikely to find him and
then murdered his mother to prevent her from reporting the abuse. Jackson, 146
P.3d at 1163. Ms. Decator’s murder created a great risk of death to the child
because, as his mother, she was the only person likely to search for and find him
before he died from his injuries. Id.-11-
The trial court agreed with the state, viewing the incidents with Ms.
Decator and her child as part of a single continuing transaction warranting
application of the aggravator. On direct appeal after the second trial, the OCCA
did not directly address the merits of Mr. Jackson’s or the state’s arguments when
it affirmed his conviction and sentence. The OCCA noted that “[t]he
circumstances here are unlike those in any of our prior cases and the opposing
parties at oral argument each made persuasive arguments in support of their
position.” Id. at 1164. Regardless, the court continued, “[w]e need not decide the
issue” because, even if Mr. Jackson’s conduct did not constitute the knowing
creation of a great risk of death to more than one person, “the submission of this
aggravator to the jury did not skew the jury’s decision to impose the death
penalty.” Id.The OCCA based this analysis on Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212 (2006),
which “set forth a test to determine when a death sentence must be set aside if an
aggravating circumstance is invalidated.” Jackson, 146 P.3d at 1164. Under
Sanders, “[a]n invalidated sentencing factor . . . will render the sentence
unconstitutional by reason of its adding an improper element to the aggravation
scale in the weighing process unless one of the other sentencing factors enables
the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances.”
Id. (quoting Sanders, 546 U.S. at 220). Therefore, the OCCA explained, a
sentence will stand if “the jury could have properly considered the evidence used
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to support the invalidated aggravator anyway because it also supported a separate
and valid aggravator.” Id. Because the evidence presented to support the
allegedly invalid great risk of death aggravator was also “relevant to support the
aggravator that he committed the murder of Decator ‘to avoid arrest or
prosecution,’” the jury’s deliberations were not unconstitutionally skewed. Id.B. The Applicability of Sanders in Oklahoma
Given the procedural posture of Mr. Jackson’s claim and the OCCA’s
decision, we need not determine whether the great risk of death aggravator was
indeed appropriate under these facts. We must determine only whether the
OCCA’s decision to affirm Mr. Jackson’s death sentence was an unreasonable
application of Sanders. Mr. Jackson contends the OCCA’s decision was “contrary
to clearly established federal law” because Sanders, upon which it relied, does not
apply in Oklahoma. Application of a “rule different from the governing law set
forth in [Supreme Court] cases” is a clear violation of § 2254(d)(1). Bell v. Cone,
535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). 2
2
The state asserts Mr. Jackson waived his argument about the applicability
of Sanders in Oklahoma by failing to raise it below. In his briefing, Mr. Jackson
acknowledges he “cannot quarrel with the thrust of the State’s assertion: his
theory as to why he satisfies the § 2254(d) standard is new.” Aplt. Rep. Br. 11.
Although we generally decline to address theories a party did not develop before
the district court, United States v. Windrix, 405 F.3d 1146, 1156 (10th Cir. 2005),
Mr. Jackson has argued vigorously at every stage of this litigation that the
submission of the great risk of death aggravator to the jury violated his
constitutional rights. His position on appeal that the OCCA misapplied Sanders is
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As described in Sanders, Supreme Court precedent historically has
distinguished between “weighing” and “non-weighing” death penalty
jurisdictions. 546 U.S. at 216. Generally, in order to impose the death penalty in
a weighing jurisdiction such as Oklahoma, Duckett v. Mullin, 306 F.3d 982, 1001
n.9 (10th Cir. 2002), a sentencer must first find a defendant guilty of capital
murder and determine that at least one statutory factor rendering a defendant
eligible for a death sentence applies. Then, to decide whether a “death-eligible”
defendant will in fact receive the death penalty, the sentencer must weigh any
mitigating evidence against the statutorily-defined factors that rendered the
defendant death-eligible in the initial eligibility stage. Sanders, 546 U.S. at 217;
Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 229 (1992).
In weighing states, “[s]ince the eligibility factors by definition identified
distinct and particular aggravating features, if one of them was invalid the jury
could not consider the facts and circumstances relevant to that factor as
aggravating in some other capacity.” Sanders, 546 U.S. at 217. Thus, the
sentencer’s consideration of an invalid eligibility factor “necessarily skewed its
balancing of aggravators with mitigators” and therefore required automatic
reversal of the sentence, “unless a state appellate court determined the error was
closely intertwined with his prior position and involves pure matters of law
appropriate for our review under these circumstances.
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harmless or reweighed the mitigating evidence against the valid aggravating
factors.” Id.In a nonweighing state—just as in a weighing state—a sentencer must limit
its initial consideration of whether a defendant is death-eligible to factors
expressly described in the applicable statute. However, once the sentencer has
reached the secondary deliberation stage, it may consider aggravating factors
beyond those enumerated eligibility factors to determine whether to impose a
death sentence. In this way, the sentencer in a nonweighing state is allowed
broader discretion to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances at the
secondary stage. Because of this broader discretion, the “automatic skewing”
problems arising in weighing states do not necessarily follow from the
introduction of an invalid eligibility factor in nonweighing states. For example,
death penalty deliberations are not necessarily skewed when the aggravating
factors are entirely different from the eligibility factors, or when the aggravating
factors add to the eligibility factors categories that would allow the same facts
and circumstances to be weighed in aggravation under a different rubric. Id.Thus, determining whether the submission of an invalid factor amounted to
constitutional error in nonweighing states historically required a more complex
analysis than the weighing-state “automatic skewing” rule provided.
The Supreme Court in Sanders noted that “[t]his weighing/non-weighing
scheme is accurate as far as it goes, but it now seems to us needlessly complex
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and incapable of providing for the full range of possible variations.” Id. at 219.
For example, the same concerns giving rise to the automatic skewing rule in
weighing states would arise if a sentencing factor, rather than an eligibility factor,
was later found to be invalid. In such a case, the weighing process would be
automatically skewed for the same reason: “The sentencer might have given
weight to a statutorily or constitutionally invalid aggravator.” Id. at 219–20. Yet,
in some cases the “automatic skewing” could be “shown to be illusory for the
same reason that separates weighing States from non-weighing States: One of the
other aggravating factors . . . made it entirely proper for the jury to consider as
aggravating the facts and circumstances underlying the invalidated factor.” Id. at
220.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court stated:
We think it will clarify the analysis, and simplify the
sentence-invalidating factors we have hitherto applied to
non-weighing States, if we are henceforth guided by the following
rule: An invalidated sentencing factor (whether an eligibility factor
or not) will render the sentence unconstitutional by reason of its
adding an improper element to the aggravation scale in the weighing
process unless one of the other sentencing factors enables the
sentencer to give aggravating weight to the same facts and
circumstances.”
Id. at 220 (citation and footnote omitted).
Here, Mr. Jackson argues the new rule announced in Sanders expressly
applies only in nonweighing states; in weighing states, including Oklahoma, the
automatic skewing rule remains good law. Thus, submission to the jury of an
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invalid aggravator is per se constitutional error. Mr. Jackson primarily highlights
the court’s emphasis on its intent to “simplify the sentence-invalidating factors
we have hitherto applied to non-weighing States.” Id. (emphasis added). Yet,
given the whole of the Court’s discussion, we do not believe this phrasing
restricts the scope of the streamlined rule to nonweighing jurisdictions.
Indeed, it is evident from the structure of the opinion that the Court
intended to eliminate the outmoded weighing-nonweighing dichotomy in its
entirety. By choosing first to elaborate, at great length, on the many problems
arising from the “needlessly complex” distinction, the Court signaled its intent to
eliminate that distinction. 3 Then, after setting forth the new rule, the Court
applied it to the case at hand, explaining it was “leaving aside the
weighing/non-weighing dichotomy and proceeding to the more direct analysis set
forth earlier in this opinion: All of the aggravating facts and circumstances that
the invalidated factor permitted the jury to consider were also open to their proper
consideration under one of the other factors.” Id. at 222–23. Thus, no
constitutional violation had occurred because the invalid factor could not have
“skewed” the sentence. Id. at 223. The dissenting Justices interpreted this
3
Among other problems the Court highlighted, determining in the first
instance whether a state employs a weighing or nonweighing scheme can be
difficult given the myriad complexities of state death penalty statutes. Cf. id. at
219 n.5; id. at 234–35 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In fact, the majority in Sanders
believed California to be a nonweighing state, while Justice Stevens in dissent
believed it to be a weighing state. Id. at 222.
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language to “modify our settled law,” id. at 228, and wholly “abolish (or at least
diminish the importance of)” the outmoded dichotomy, id. at 239.
Accordingly, we recently applied the Sanders framework to an Oklahoma
sentence, although the petitioner did not make the argument that Sanders applies
only in nonweighing states, an argument we now reject. Hanson v. Sherrod, 797
F.3d 810, 848-50 (10th Cir. 2015). Several other circuits have likewise applied a
uniform Sanders rule. Sutton v. Bell, 645 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2011) (applying
Sanders to a death sentence in Tennessee, a weighing state); Jennings v.
McDonough, 490 F.3d 1230, 1255 n.22 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is probable that the
Court’s decision in [Sanders] announced a uniform rule to be applied in weighing
and nonweighing states alike.”); Rousan v. Roper, 436 F.3d 951, 963 (8th Cir.
2006) (apparently interpreting Sanders as applying one rule to weighing and
nonweighing states); see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law
§ 3.5, at 16, n.112 (2d ed. Supp. 2007) (“While an approach different from that in
Zant was once used in so-called ‘weighing statutes,’ the Court later, in Brown v.
Sanders, adopted a single rule for all statutes . . . .”); The Supreme Court, 2005
Term—Leading Cases, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 134, 144 (2006) (“The new Sanders rule
clarifies and provides predictability to the weighing-nonweighing distinction by
jettisoning it in favor of a simplified rule.”); but see Wilson v. Mitchell, 498 F.3d
491, 507 (6th Cir. 2007) (“This rule apparently modifies the analysis for
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non-weighing States, but leaves intact the Court’s prior jurisprudence regarding
weighing states.”). 4
Thus, we hold that Sanders established a uniform rule applying in both
weighing and nonweighing states. Therefore, the OCCA looked to the proper
“clearly established” federal law when it relied on Sanders to affirm Mr.
Jackson’s sentence.
C. The Distinction Between Admissibility and “Aggravatability”
Mr. Jackson next argues that, even if Sanders is applicable in Oklahoma,
the OCCA nevertheless misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s guidance by
conflating the question whether evidence is admissible with whether a jury may
properly consider evidence as giving aggravating weight to a valid sentencing
factor.
As discussed in detail above, the Court in Sanders held that an invalidated
sentencing factor will not render a death sentence unconstitutional if one of the
other sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the
same facts and circumstances. Responding to concerns raised by the dissent, the
4
Mr. Jackson cites two unpublished Tenth Circuit orders, both preceding
Hanson, in which our language suggested Sanders may apply only in nonweighing
states. Dunlap v. Clements, 476 F. App’x 162, 171 (10th Cir. 2012)
(unpublished); Ochoa v. Workman, 451 F. App’x 718 (10th Cir. 2011)
(unpublished). However, in neither of these orders did we directly address the
scope and applicability of Sanders, and, regardless, unpublished orders lack
precedential value. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(A).
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majority in Sanders explained that this rule is not “an inquiry based solely on the
admissibility of the underlying evidence.” 546 U.S. at 220 (emphasis added). If
the presence of an invalidated sentencing factor allowed the jury to hear and
consider evidence that would not have been before it otherwise, “due process
would mandate reversal without regard to the rule we apply here.” Id. at 221.
Instead, the Court’s central concern in Sanders was “the jury’s weighing in favor
of death a factor that should not have been part of its calculus.” Id. at 221 n.7
(emphasis added).
According to Mr. Jackson, the OCCA ignored this guidance and confused
admissibility and aggravating weight by holding that, “[i]f the jury could have
properly considered the evidence used to support the invalidated aggravator
anyway because it also supported a separate and valid aggravator . . . the jury has
not considered any improper evidence and has not weighed any improper
aggravating evidence against the mitigating evidence in arriving at its sentence.”
Jackson, 146 P.3d at 1164 (emphasis added). The OCCA further explained that,
here, “the ‘great risk of death’ aggravator was not supported by any evidence that
was not also admissible to support a separate aggravator.” Id. (emphasis added).
Mr. Jackson contends this language underscores the OCCA’s improper focus on
the admissibility of the evidence—which, as the Supreme Court noted in Sanders,
raises separate due process concerns—rather than the aggravating weight of that
evidence.
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Mr. Jackson argues the OCCA failed to appreciate that, “[w]hile all valid
aggravating evidence is admissible, not all admissible evidence is aggravating.”
Aplt. Br. 48. Even if evidence of the child’s injuries “in and of themselves” was
admissible, these injuries “could not properly be given aggravating weight” under
the valid avoid arrest aggravator. Id. at 49. Instead, the child’s injuries would be
admissible only for the limited purpose of proving Mr. Jackson’s motive for
killing Ms. Decator, to avoid arrest or prosecution for child abuse. Ultimately,
only this motive is important, and thus only Mr. Jackson’s awareness of the
nature and extent of the child’s injuries should receive aggravating weight. Id. at
49–50.
Although the OCCA’s use of the phrases “consider any improper evidence”
and “admissible to support a separate aggravator” may be imprecise, Mr. Jackson
overemphasizes the import and effect of any imprecision. It is clear from the
OCCA’s analysis that it appreciated the proper boundary between the general
admissibility of evidence at trial and the use of evidence to give aggravating
weight to a valid sentencing factor. In accord with Sanders, the core of its
opinion is that there was no constitutional error because the facts and
circumstances the jury considered as aggravating under the allegedly invalid great
risk of death factor—the nature and extent of the child’s injuries—could be given
aggravating weight under the valid avoid arrest factor.
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Further, consideration of the injuries in and of themselves surely informs
Mr. Jackson’s awareness of those injuries and his related motive. The more
severe the nature and extent of the injuries, the more likely Mr. Jackson was to be
aware of them and concerned about possible arrest and prosecution.
Additionally, as the state points out, a sentencing jury does not weigh
evidence independently during its deliberations. Instead, the jury considers the
evidence presented to determine if the state has proven the required elements of
an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. If the aggravating
circumstance has been proven, the jury then weighs that circumstance—not the
underlying evidence itself—against any mitigating circumstances. See Vernon’s
Okla. Forms 2d, OUJI-CR 4-80 (“If you unanimously find that one or more of the
aggravating circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt, the death penalty
shall not be imposed unless you also unanimously find that any such aggravating
circumstance or circumstances outweigh the finding of one or more mitigating
circumstances.”). Thus, if evidence may be considered to help a jury decide if an
aggravating circumstance applies, as the OCCA determined was proper here, that
evidence has been given appropriate aggravating weight.
For these reasons, the OCCA’s application of Sanders, finding the
physician’s testimony could properly be considered to support the valid avoid
arrest factor, was not objectively unreasonable. McLuckie, 337 F.3d at 1197.
D. The Treating Physician’s Testimony
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Mr. Jackson next argues that the OCCA misapplied Sanders because “the
doctor’s testimony would not have been admissible to prove the avoid-arrest
factor. And if it would not have been admissible to prove the avoid-arrest factor,
of course, neither could it have carried aggravating weight under that factor.”
Aplt. Br. 56. We disagree. During the guilt phase, the court shielded the jury
from most evidence about the nature and extent of the child’s injuries. The trial
judge allowed the prosecutors to characterize the child’s injuries as “serious” but
“prohibit[ed] the state from going into any detail as to any injuries suffered” by
the child. 9 R. 3–4 (2003 Trial Tr.).
Mr. Jackson agrees that some facts concerning the child’s injuries were
properly before the jury because they suggested he murdered Ms. Decator to
avoid arrest for child abuse. However, he argues the admitted facts should have
been “limited to what Jackson himself saw and knew about the child’s condition.”
Aplt. Br. 59. The OCCA erred, he contends, because the doctor’s testimony did
not speak to what Mr. Jackson appreciated about the injuries “so much as what
highly skilled trauma surgeons equipped with sophisticated brain-imaging devices
could appreciate.” Aplt. Rep. Br. 32. Essentially, he argues only the facts
contained in his own statement to the police soon after his arrest were admissible.
At that time, Mr. Jackson told the detectives that the child’s body was “cramming
up,” that his eyes “had this glaze upon ‘em, you know, like wasn’t nothing there,”
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and that he “knew something was very wrong.” State’s Ex. 54. By contrast, the
doctor’s testimony, involving a substantially more detailed and clinical account of
the child’s injuries and subsequent treatment, “revealed nothing about what
Jackson actually knew of the injuries.” Aplt. Br. 60.
As Mr. Jackson notes, the OCCA disagreed that the physician’s testimony
lent no support to the valid avoid arrest aggravator. Id. at 52. It held that the
doctor’s testimony “showed that Jackson appreciated the seriousness of the
child’s condition and deliberately murdered the child’s mother to avoid being held
responsible.” Jackson, 146 P.3d at 1164. We conclude that fair-minded jurists
could agree. The more severe the nature of the child’s injuries, as perhaps only a
physician can fully and accurately describe, the more likely Mr. Jackson was
aware of the gravity of his crime and concerned about the ramifications.
We cannot find this determination to be unreasonable under our deferential
standard, and Mr. Jackson has not demonstrated that he is entitled to relief under
§ 2254(d)(1). 5
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Concerning Mr. Farahkhan’s Testimony
A. Mr. Farahkhan’s Character Witness Testimony
Mr. Jackson’s next argument is that his lawyers made a critical error during
his sentencing proceedings by allowing Mr. Farahkhan to “testify that Jackson
5
As such, we need not address Mr. Jackson’s remaining arguments
regarding the proper procedure for harmless-error analysis.
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deserved the death penalty.” Aplt. Br. 71–72. Mr. Jackson argues this error
rendered his assistance constitutionally ineffective under the Sixth Amendment.
As discussed above, Mr. Jackson’s lawyers asked Mr. Farahkhan to testify
as a character witness in support of Mr. Jackson’s case in mitigation during the
penalty phase of both his first and second trials. Prior to the second trial, Mr.
Farahkhan met with Mr. Jackson’s lawyers and expressed concerns that his views
on the death penalty might pose a problem. He advised them that he “believe[d]
in the death penalty under some circumstances, including premeditated murder
and in cases of ambush.” 1 R. 219 (Post-Conviction). Mr. Farahkhan did not
believe Mr. Jackson had committed premeditated murder, but he informed them
that, “if this case was a case of premeditated murder and if Mr. Jackson was
waiting to kill Ms. Decatur [sic] because of what he did . . . then he would
deserve the death penalty.” Id.On direct examination during the second trial, Mr. Farahkhan testified that
Mr. Jackson volunteered in a community-based drug-abuse program, which served
a highly distressed area of north Tulsa. 17 R. 124–26 (2003 Trial Tr.).
According to Mr. Farahkhan, Mr. Jackson “really wanted to see those people in
Comanche who had alcohol, drug, gang problems, to be able to overcome those
problems.” Id. at 126. Mr. Farahkhan testified that Mr. Jackson’s life in prison
would have value because of his leadership qualities and genuine desire to
improve the lives of others. Id. at 127–28.
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The following exchange occurred during Mr. Farahkhan’s cross-
examination:
Prosecutor: Did you know or do you know that [Mr. Jackson]
intentionally bludgeoned his girlfriend, Monica Decator, with a brick
at least seven times on the head, then stabbed her in the neck at least
eight times cutting her jugular, her common carotid artery, then stuck
a knife two times right by her heart? Did you know he did that?
Mr. Farahkhan: I listened closely to the language you used, and you
said intentionally. Did I know that he intentionally did that?
Prosecutor: Yes.
Mr. Farahkhan: No, I did not know that he intentionally did that.
Prosecutor: Does that change your opinion any?
Mr. Farahkhan: If I accept what you said, that he intentionally did it,
it would change my opinion. But I don’t believe that he intentionally
did it.
Prosecutor: If you believe that he intentionally did it, do you think
the death penalty would be appropriate?
Mr. Farahkhan: Yes.
Id. at 129–30. Mr. Jackson’s counsel did not object during this exchange or ask
Mr. Farahkhan any further questions.
B. The Doubly-Deferential Strickland Standard Under AEDPA
In his state post-conviction petition, Mr. Jackson argued his trial lawyers
were constitutionally ineffective for, among other things: (1) calling Mr.
Farahkhan to testify in the first instance, despite knowing Mr. Farahkhan
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approved of the death penalty in instances of premeditated murder; and (2) failing
to object during Mr. Farahkhan’s damaging cross-examination.
The OCCA first held that their “strategy in calling Farahkhan as a witness
in Jackson’s capital sentencing proceeding was neither unreasonable nor
unsound” under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 1 R. 277 (Post-
Conviction). Furthermore, the fact that his lawyers did not object during Mr.
Farahkhan’s cross-examination did not render counsel constitutionally ineffective.
Although the government’s hypothetical question—whether Mr. Farahkhan’s
opinion would change if he knew Mr. Jackson killed Ms. Decator intentionally—
was improper, the OCCA denied relief. 1 R. 278 (Post-Conviction). The court
emphasized that Mr. Farahkhan presented ample relevant mitigating evidence for
the jury to consider, and any error on the part of either the prosecution or defense
was harmless. “[T]he jury . . . was not misled by this exchange because it was
evident that Farahkhan was not advocating the death penalty for his friend. . . .
[W]e do not find that his testimony on cross-examination either erased the
benefits of his testimony on direct examination or affected the outcome of the
second stage of this trial.” Id. at 278.
Here, Mr. Jackson acknowledges that “his lawyers’ threshold decision to
call Farahkhan as a witness was not in itself an objectively unreasonable
strategy.” Aplt. Br. 78. Mr. Farahkhan provided mitigating evidence about
positive aspects of Mr. Jackson’s character. However, Mr. Jackson argues his
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lawyers’ silence following the prosecutor’s questions on cross-examination
rendered their assistance constitutionally ineffective. Further, they failed to file a
motion in limine prior to Mr. Farahkhan’s testimony to limit the scope of cross-
examination, did not ask the judge to instruct the jury to disregard the damaging
testimony, and declined to conduct a rehabilitative re-direct examination of Mr.
Farahkhan. Id. at 82–83. Their inaction, Mr. Jackson argues, violated his Sixth
Amendment rights.
Generally, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under
Strickland, a petitioner must show: (1) his lawyers’ performance was deficient
such that they effectively failed to function as the “counsel” guaranteed to all
criminal defendants by the Sixth Amendment, and (2) their deficient performance
so prejudiced the defense that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. 466 U.S.
at 687. The Supreme Court has “declined to articulate specific guidelines for
appropriate attorney conduct and instead ha[s] emphasized that ‘[t]he proper
measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms.’” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). We “must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. An ineffective assistance claim may be
rejected based upon an inadequate showing of deficient performance or prejudice,
or both. Id. at 697.
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Moreover, where a state court has adjudicated an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim on the merits, as the OCCA did here, a petition for habeas relief
cannot be granted unless the state adjudication “(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”; or “(2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d).
Given that the standards of review under both Strickland and AEDPA are
“highly deferential,” habeas review of ineffective assistance claims is “doubly
so.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). We defer both to counsel’s
strategic decisions about how best to represent his client and to the state court’s
determination that counsel’s performance was not deficient. See Yarborough v.
Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2003) (per curiam). We grant relief only where a state
court disposition “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103; see also Knowles v.
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (“The question is not whether a federal
court believes the state court’s determination under the Strickland standard was
incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher
threshold.”).
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C. The OCCA’s Strickland Analysis
Mr. Jackson has not met his substantial burden of showing the OCCA
lacked any justification for denying his ineffective assistance claim, that the
applicability of a Supreme Court holding was so obvious there could be “no
fairminded disagreement.” White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1706 (2014).
Even assuming his lawyers’ inaction after Mr. Farahkhan’s testimony constituted
deficient performance, Mr. Jackson has not shown the OCCA was unreasonable in
its determination that there was no prejudice. To establish prejudice, Mr. Jackson
must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “In assessing prejudice, we reweigh
the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence.”
Id. The prejudice prong is satisfied if at least one juror would have struck a
different balance. Id. at 537.
Before Mr. Farahkhan’s testimony, the jury heard substantial evidence of a
heinous crime in graphic detail. They heard about how Mr. Jackson brutally beat
a two-year-old child and, to avoid being held responsible, placed the injured child
underneath a vacant house in near-freezing temperatures. He murdered his
girlfriend by hitting her repeatedly in the face and head with a brick and stabbing
her multiple times in the neck and chest, and he set fire to her house. On the
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other hand, the jury also heard mitigation evidence about Mr. Jackson’s difficult
childhood and about the physical and mental limitations he faced due to his
mother’s alcohol abuse during pregnancy. Given this ample evidence, both
weighing for and against the death penalty, the OCCA properly concluded there
was no reasonable probability that, absent Mr. Farahkhan’s single damaging
statement, the jury’s deliberations would have been different.
For these reasons, the OCCA reasonably rejected Mr. Jackson’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.
III. Cumulative Error
Mr. Jackson’s final argument on appeal is that the aggregate impact of
errors in his case cannot be excused. Aplt. Br. 94. Under cumulative error
review, a court “merely aggregates all the errors that individually have been
found to be harmless, and therefore not reversible, and it analyzes whether their
cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial is such that collectively they can no
longer be determined to be harmless.” Hamilton v. Mullin, 436 F.3d 1181, 1196
(10th Cir. 2006) (citing Workman v. Mullin, 342 F.3d 1100, 1116 (10th Cir.
2003)). Mr. Jackson argues that the “submission of the invalid sentencing factor
inflated the aggravation side of the scale, while the failure to object to
Farahkhan’s testimony weakened the mitigation calculus.” Aplt. Br. 95. As we
have noted, “cumulative-error in the federal habeas context applies only where
there are two or more actual constitutional errors.” Thacker v. Workman, 678
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F.3d 820, 849 (10th Cir. 2012). That is not the case here and Mr. Jackson’s
cumulative error is unavailing.
AFFIRMED. 6
6
We deny Mr. Jackson’s renewed request for a certificate of appealability
(COA) on the issue of whether a jury must be instructed that it must find
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt. Circuit precedent forecloses this claim. See Matthews v.
Workman, 577 F.3d 1175, 1195 (10th Cir. 2009).
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