Negron v. Ray ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 24 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
BENITO NEGRON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 99-1592
CHARLES RAY, Warden; No. 00-1052
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE (D.C. No. 99-Z-2168)
STATE OF COLORADO, (D.Colo.)
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , Chief Judge, EBEL and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Benito Negron, a prisoner at the Bent County Correctional Facility at Las
Animas, Colorado, seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
*
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Because Negron’s direct appeal is still pending before a Colorado appellate court,
the district court dismissed Negron’s habeas petition without prejudice for failure
to exhaust state remedies. The district court also denied Negron’s requests for a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) and for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on
appeal. We deny Negron’s request for a COA and dismiss Negron’s appeals.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Slack v. McDaniel , 120 S. Ct. 1595(2000) controls our analysis of Negron’s request for a COA. In most cases, 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) requires a prisoner to make a “substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right” to obtain a COA. When a district court denies a
prisoner’s request for a COA on procedural grounds without reaching the merits
of the prisoner’s claims – as the district court in this case did when it dismissed
Negron’s petition for failure to exhaust state court remedies – a slightly different
standard applies. In these circumstances, “a COA should issue when the prisoner
shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.” Slack , 120 S. Ct. at 1604 (relying on Barefoot v. Estelle , 463 U.S. 880,
893 & n.4 (1983)). Each component of this showing “is part of a threshold
inquiry, and a court may find that it can dispose of the application in a fair and
prompt manner if it proceeds first to resolve the issue whose answer is more
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apparent from the record and arguments.” Id. The maxim that a court will not
pass upon a constitutional question when a case can be resolved on other grounds
“allows and encourages the court to first resolve procedural issues.” Id. (citing
Ashwander v. TVA , 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
“Jurists of reason” would not find it debatable whether Negron exhausted
his state court remedies before seeking habeas relief. “Before a federal court may
grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in
state court. In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an
opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court
in a habeas petition.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel , 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); accord
Brown v. Shanks , 185 F.3d 1122, 1124 (10th Cir. 1999). This exhaustion
requirement is satisfied if the issues raised in the petition “have been ‘properly
presented to the highest state court, either by direct review of the conviction or in
a postconviction attack.’” Brown , 185 F.3d at 1124 (quoting Dever v. Kansas
State Penitentiary , 36 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1994)). Negron does not dispute
that the direct appeal of his conviction remains pending. As a result, Negron has
not had an opportunity to present the issues raised in his habeas petition to the
Colorado Supreme Court.
Negron’s argument that he should be exempt from the exhaustion
requirement is unconvincing. Negron claims that he has been subjected to
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“inordinate delays” during the course of his state court appeal, and that these
delays make the state appellate process “ineffective.” It is true that “[i]nordinate
and unjustified delay by the state in adjudicating a direct criminal appeal can
‘make the state process ineffective to protect the petitioner’s rights.’” Harris v.
Champion , 48 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 1995) (citation and one set of internal
quotation marks omitted). A delay of more than two years in adjudicating a direct
criminal appeal “creates a presumption that the state appellate process is
ineffective.” Carpenter v. Young , 50 F.3d 869, 870 (10th Cir. 1995); accord
Harris , 48 F.3d at 1132. Here, however, the record indicates that Negron filed his
notice of appeal in the state court case on May 26, 1999. The delay of almost 12
months Negron has experienced undoubtedly has been frustrating, but it is
insufficient to suspend the exhaustion requirement.
Negron’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
Negron’s request for a COA is DENIED and the appeals are DISMISSED. The
mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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