Reed v. Mineta , 93 F. App'x 195 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 12 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DONALD D. REED,
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross- Nos. 02-1461 & 02-1462
Appellant,
v. (D.C. No. 98-N-1298 (MJW))
NORMAN Y. MINETA, Secretary of (District of Colorado)
the Department of Transportation, on
behalf of the United States Department
of Transportation,
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-
Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and MURPHY,
Circuit Judge.
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Donald Reed was terminated from his position as an air traffic
controller with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) when he failed to
report to work on five Saturdays in 1995. Reed thereafter filed suit in federal
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
district court alleging, inter alia, that the FAA violated Title VII by failing to
accommodate his religious beliefs and by intentionally discriminating against him
on the basis of his religion. The jury returned a verdict for Reed on both claims.
The matter is before this court on the FAA’s appeal from the denial of its motion
for judgment as a matter of law and Reed’s cross-appeal from the denial of his
request for prejudgment interest.
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the denial
of the FAA’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and reverse the denial of
Reed’s request for prejudgment interest.
II. Factual Background
Reed is a member of the Worldwide Church of God. His religious beliefs
require him to refrain from working between sundown Friday and sundown
Saturday. From November 1991 to August 1994, Reed was employed at the
Pueblo, Colorado Airport as a Quality Assurance and Training Specialist
(“QATS”). While in the QATS position, Reed was not required to work on his
Sabbath. In December 1993, George Hof became the manager of the Pueblo
facility. At trial, Reed testified that he informed Hof of his religious practice of
strictly observing the Sabbath on Saturdays. Reed further testified that Hof
routinely questioned him about his religious beliefs, repeatedly asked him which
hours he could not work, and frequently asked him to complete projects on
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Saturdays even though the QATS position did not ordinarily require him to work
on Saturday.
Reed testified that Hof quizzed him several times about how he would be
impacted if the QATS position was eliminated and threatened to remove him from
the position. In August 1994, Hof arranged for the QATS position to be
converted from a permanent position to a temporary position with a one-year
term. Hof testified that his objective was to “give other controllers in the
[Pueblo] facility the opportunity at a career enhancing position.” Reed applied
for the QATS position but was not selected from among three applicants. Reed
testified that he thought his permanent QATS position was eliminated to create an
accommodation problem and that he believed his qualifications were superior to
those of Mike Turner, the individual chosen for the position. Reed did not,
however, challenge either the conversion of the position or Turner’s selection.
On August 21, 1994, Reed was reassigned as one of the twelve controllers
staffing the tower’s daily operations. Reed assumed Turner’s work schedule until
October 1, 1994. Because Turner’s regular days off were Thursday, Friday, and
every other Saturday, Reed was scheduled to work only two Saturdays. Turner
worked for Reed both of those Saturdays.
A collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) governs the rights and
obligations of the FAA and the air traffic controllers of the National Air Traffic
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Controllers Association. The CBA and a separately negotiated Facility Staffing
Order governed the work schedules and staffing procedures at the Pueblo facility
at the relevant time. The Facility Staffing Order could not be changed without
agreement between FAA management and the union. Work schedules were
established by a rotating bid system based on seniority. After October 1, 1994,
Reed was required to bid his days off under the rotating seniority system. Reed
was placed at the bottom of the list for selecting days off. 1 From October 1,
1994, through September 30, 1995, Reed was unable to obtain Saturdays off and,
consequently, he formally requested an accommodation. Marlin Long, the area
supervisor, sent Reed a written response to his request. Relying on his obligation
to comply with the terms of the Facility Staffing Order, Long refused to approve
Reed’s request to accumulate compensatory time during the week and use it to
avoid working between sunset Friday and sunset Saturday. Long suggested that
Reed use annual leave to avoid working on his Sabbath or attempt to swap shifts
with other controllers. Reed testified, however, that his ability to convince the
other controllers to swap shifts with him was adversely affected when Hof
instructed all the controllers to re-bid their days off, based on the hypothetical
assumption that Reed would never be scheduled to work on Friday or Saturday.
1
The Facility Staffing Order for the Pueblo facility states, “When a
permanent staff person returns to the controller workforce, he/she shall be placed
at the bottom of the NATCA bid list.”
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Reed testified that Hof’s behavior “soured the position of the controllers with
regard to [shift swapping] and with regard to me.”
Reed proposed several alternative work arrangements but none were
permanently implemented. Reed, however, successfully avoided working on his
Sabbath until May 20, 1995, by swapping shifts, using annual leave, and earning
compensatory time.
By March 1995, however, the number of air traffic controllers at the Pueblo
facility had decreased to seven. In September 1994, a controller was allowed to
transfer to another facility in order to be closer to a sick family member. That
controller was not replaced. In January 1995, a Pueblo controller was permitted
to swap assignments with Fred Arbuckle, a controller from a Houston, Texas
facility. Arbuckle, however, was never able to obtain full certification to work in
the Pueblo tower. In March 1995, the facility lost three additional controllers:
two were decertified for committing operational errors and one was released to
another facility to accept a promotion. Although the negotiated minimum staffing
level at the Pueblo facility was nine controllers, the union agreed to allow the
decrease in staffing on the condition that Hof, Turner, and Long cover
controllers’ leave requests. Reed testified that management worked for the other
controllers each time a request was made but worked to cover his religious leave
requests only twice.
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Reed testified that his relationship with Hof deteriorated in the spring of
1995. On March 25, Hof accused Reed of violating procedures applicable to the
familiarization travel program (“FAM”). Reed had used the FAM program to
travel to California. When he was unable to obtain a seat on his originally
scheduled return flight, he departed from a different airport on a different flight.
Hof first reprimanded Reed for failing to inform management that he had
switched flights. Reed testified that when Hof realized he had traveled on a
Saturday the “meeting took a bad, bad turn, a real bad turn.” Hof pounded the
table, shouted, and swore. He asserted that Reed’s religion was a “scam” and
accused Reed of “scamming” the facility, the other controllers, and the FAA.
After the meeting, Hof contacted Reed’s minister to verify Reed’s religious
beliefs.
After the March incident, Reed was scheduled to work a series of six
consecutive Saturdays in May and June 1995. Reed was unable to make
alternative arrangements for five of those Saturdays and Hof refused to work for
Reed on the five Saturdays.
On Saturday May 20, 1995, Reed called Turner and requested eight hours
of annual leave. Turner denied the request due to “current and potential [air]
traffic.” Turner, however, testified that at the time Reed called, traffic was being
handled by only one controller. Turner further testified that he left work early on
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May 20 because traffic was so light. Reed did not report to work on May 20.
On May 27, 1995, Reed requested “spot” leave for two, one-hour periods.
The controller in charge, Larry Halpern, granted Reed’s request for one of the
periods based on an “extremely light” level of traffic. When Hof learned that
Reed’s leave request had been granted, he ordered Halpern to turn the Pueblo
facility’s radar operations over to the Denver Air Route Traffic Control Center.
Later that day, Hof ordered the airspace turned over to Denver Center for a
second, one-hour period. Halpern testified that Hof’s decision to turn the Pueblo
airspace to Denver Center was unnecessary and “disruptive.” Another controller
on duty May 27, 1995, filed an unsatisfactory condition report regarding the
incident and Hof later admitted that his actions were “disruptive to air traffic and
could have compromised safety.”
Reed was terminated on July 28, 1995, for failing to report to work on
May 20, June 3, June 10, June 17, and June 24. Reed challenged his termination
through the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”) and initially received a
favorable ruling from the administrative law judge. That ruling, however, was
reversed and the matter remanded by the MSPB. Reed v. Dep’t of Transp., 76
M.S.P.R. 126 (1997). On remand, the administrative law judge ruled in favor of
the FAA and Reed’s termination became effective May 9, 1998.
Reed then filed a complaint in federal district court raising a retaliation
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claim, two Title VII claims, and a Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)
claim. The case proceeded to trial. At the close of Reed’s case and again at the
close of all the evidence, the FAA filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. R. 50. The district court granted the motion as to Reed’s
RFRA claim and his retaliation claim but denied the motion as to the Title VII
claims for failure to accommodate and intentional religious discrimination. The
jury found that the FAA failed to accommodate Reed’s religious beliefs and that
the FAA intentionally discriminated against Reed based on his religious beliefs.
The jury awarded Reed compensatory damages of $1.5 million and returned an
advisory award of $248,356 in past economic damages and $508,088 in future
economic damages. The district court adopted the advisory awards in its
judgment.
After judgment was entered, the FAA filed a renewed motion for judgment
as a matter of law and filed a separate motion to alter or amend the judgment.
Reed filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requesting prejudgment interest. The district court denied the FAA’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law, reduced Reed’s compensatory damage award to
$300,000, and decreased the front-pay award to $440,302. Finally, the district
court denied Reed’s motion for prejudgment interest, concluding only that the
request should have been raised in a Rule 59(e) motion.
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The matter is now before this court on the FAA’s appeal from the denial of
its motion for judgment as a matter of law, No. 02-1461, and Reed’s cross-appeal
from the denial of his motion for prejudgment interest, No. 02-1462.
III. Discussion
A. Appeal No. 02-1461
1. Standard of Review
This court “review[s] de novo the grant or denial of a judgment as a matter
of law.” Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554, 557 (10th Cir. 1996). In
the course of that review, we apply the same legal standard as the district court
and construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.“Unless the proof is all one way or so overwhelmingly preponderant in favor of
the movant as to permit no other rational conclusion, judgment as a matter of law
is improper.” Id. (citation omitted).
2. Reed’s Intentional Discrimination Claim
Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . .
to discharge . . . any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . religion. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The term “religion is defined to “include[] all aspects of
religious observance and practice . . . unless an employer demonstrates that he is
unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s . . . religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” Id.
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§ 2000e(j). The FAA argues that the district court erred in denying its motion for
judgment as a matter of law on Reed’s intentional discrimination claim because
Reed presented no evidence from which a jury could conclude that his
termination resulted from religious discrimination. It is the FAA’s position that
Reed was terminated because he failed to report to work. We reject the FAA’s
argument because a reasonable jury could conclude that Reed’s failure to report
to work and, hence, his termination resulted from intentional discrimination.
Evidence presented at trial supports Reed’s contention that Hof
orchestrated the situation which led to Reed’s absences and, ultimately, his
termination. First, Hof converted the QATS position to a one-year, temporary
assignment. Reed then was required to bid for his days off and the
accommodation problem arose. Although Hof testified that he was motivated by
a desire to give other controllers the “ opportunity at a career enhancing position,”
the jury was free to disregard his explanation. Hof then instructed the other
controllers to re-bid their days off under the hypothetical assumption that Reed
would be given every Friday and Saturday off. Reed testified that this created
hostility and made it more difficult for him to convince other controllers to swap
shifts with him. Hof then approved personnel actions that resulted in a staffing
shortage at the Pueblo facility. Although the union agreed to the decrease in
staffing, it was on the condition that Hof and the other members of management
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agree to cover leave requests. Reed testified that Hof nevertheless refused to
cover his Saturday shifts. There was also evidence that Hof refused to implement
alternative staffing plans that would have alleviated most of the accommodation
problem.
Other evidence in the record supports the jury’s finding that Hof’s actions
were motivated by intentional discrimination. Reed testified that Hof quizzed
him repeatedly about his religious beliefs and frequently asked him to work on
Saturdays while he was in the QATS position. Further, at a meeting in March
1995, Hof referred to Reed’s religion as a “scam” and a religion of convenience.
Hof’s actions on May 27, 1995, when he turned the Pueblo airspace over to
Denver Central after learning that Reed had been granted spot leave, could be
interpreted by a jury as an indication of his hostility toward Reed.
3. Conclusion
Construing the evidence and the inferences in the light most favorable to
Reed, we conclude that the jury’s finding of intentional religious discrimination
was not unreasonable. Accordingly, it is unnecessary for us to address the
verdict premised on the failure to accommodate claim and the FAA’s argument
that it reasonably accommodated Reed’s religious beliefs. The district court
order denying the FAA’s motion for judgment as a matter of law is affirmed .
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B. Appeal No. 02-1462
1. Standard of Reveiw
The grant or denial of an award of prejudgment interest is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. Caldwell v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 287 F.3d 1276, 1286
(10th Cir. 2002).
2. Denial of Reed’s Motion Seeking Prejudgment Interest
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to allow for interest on
awards against the government, including back pay awards. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
16(d); Edwards v. Lujan, 40 F.3d 1152, 1154 n.1 (10th Cir. 1994). Reed
requested prejudgment interest in his amended complaint and his request was
noted in the pretrial order. During trial, he presented expert testimony on the
issue of damages, including the calculation of back pay. The judgment entered by
the district court, however, did not contain an award of prejudgment interest.
Reed then filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60(a) to alter or amend the judgment to
include prejudgment interest. The motion was denied solely because the district
court concluded the issue should have been raised in a Rule 59(e) motion. This
court, however, has held that a request for prejudgment interest in a complaint is
sufficient to raise the issue in district court. Macsenti v. Becker, 237 F.3d 1223,
1245 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[D]efendant cites no authority, nor are we aware of any,
which holds that a plaintiff must raise this issue by a Rule 59(e) motion in the
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trial court rather than taking an appeal.”); McNickle v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
888 F.2d 678, 680-81 (10th Cir. 1989). The district court’s decision to deny
Reed’s motion without considering the merits of his request for prejudgment
interest amounts to a failure to exercise discretion which is an abuse of discretion.
McNickle, 888 F.2d at 680. (“A clear example of an abuse of discretion is where
the trial court fails even to consider either an applicable legal standard or the
facts upon which the exercise of its discretionary judgment is based.”).
3. Conclusion
The district court’s order denying Reed’s request for prejudgment interest
is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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