Phillips v. Dale , 356 F. App'x 163 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 15, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD PHILLIPS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 09-6093
(D.C. No. 5:07-CV-00668-D)
JOHN DALE, in his individual (W.D. Okla.)
capacity,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
of the County of Jefferson State of
Oklahoma,
Defendant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, GORSUCH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Richard Phillips filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against John Dale, alleging
that Mr. Dale terminated his employment in violation of his First Amendment
right to free speech. 1 Mr. Dale moved for summary judgment on the merits of
Mr. Phillips’ claim, arguing that Mr. Phillips could not meet his burden of
establishing a prima facie case of retaliation for exercising his First Amendment
rights. Alternatively, Mr. Dale asserted that he was entitled to summary judgment
on Mr. Phillips’ claim based on qualified immunity. The district court denied
Mr. Dale’s motion, concluding that there were genuine issues of material fact in
dispute that precluded summary judgment in his favor. Mr. Dale filed an
interlocutory appeal from the district court’s denial of his motion for summary
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. 2 We conclude that we lack
jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal and therefore the appeal must be
dismissed.
1
Mr. Phillips filed the complaint with another plaintiff, James Underwood,
but Mr. Underwood’s claims were handled separately by the district court and are
not at issue in this appeal.
2
Mr. Phillips’ complaint also included state law claims against Mr. Dale and
claims against the Board of County Commissioners for Jefferson County. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Dale on the state law
claims and granted in part and denied in part the Board’s motion for summary
judgment on Mr. Phillips’ claims. Those portions of the district court’s decision
are not at issue in this appeal.
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I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Dale was the District 3 County Commissioner for Jefferson County,
Oklahoma. He hired Mr. Phillips as a road foreman in July 2001. Mr. Phillips
remained in that position until Mr. Dale demoted him in September 2006.
Subsequently, Mr. Dale terminated him on November 16, 2006. According to
Mr. Dale, he terminated Mr. Phillips because Mr. Phillips asked a non-county
mechanic to perform certain repairs on a Jefferson county truck without prior
approval. Mr. Phillips denied that he did so and argued that the true reason for
his termination was retaliation for publicly criticizing Mr. Dale. Specifically,
Mr. Phillips alleged that he reported Mr. Dale’s improper treatment of a
Department of Corrections inmate assigned to work on the District 3 road crew;
and he told people in the community that Mr. Dale misused county funds and
resources. Mr. Phillips asserted that he repeated these statements during his July
2006 campaign to replace Mr. Dale as District 3 County Commissioner.
Mr. Phillips was not elected, but because Mr. Dale’s term as County
Commissioner did not expire until the end of 2006, he remained Mr. Phillips’
supervisor until he terminated Mr. Phillips in November 2006.
Mr. Phillips filed a § 1983 complaint, alleging that Mr. Dale demoted him
and ultimately terminated him in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment
right to freedom of speech. Mr. Dale moved for summary judgment arguing that,
as a matter of law, he had not violated Mr. Phillips’ constitutional rights.
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Alternatively, he asserted that, even if he had violated Mr. Phillips’ rights, the
law was not clearly established with respect to those rights and he was therefore
entitled to qualified immunity.
Mr. Phillips argued in response that there were material issues of fact in
dispute and, drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, sufficient evidence
existed from which a jury could infer that Mr. Dale terminated him in retaliation
for exercising his First Amendment rights. As to the qualified immunity issue,
Mr. Phillips incorporated his First Amendment argument, asserted that the right at
issue was clearly established, and argued therefore that Mr. Dale was not entitled
to qualified immunity.
The district court first considered whether Mr. Phillips could establish a
prima facie case that his First Amendment rights were violated, applying the
five prong Garcetti/Pickering analysis. 3 Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Mr. Phillips, the court ultimately determined that summary judgment
was not proper because (a) there were issues of fact in dispute, (b) there were
credibility issues for the jury to decide, and (c) Mr. Phillips had presented
sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. The district court then stated:
3
We adopted the “Garcetti/Pickering analysis” in Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin
Peaks Charter Academy, 492 F.3d 1192, 1202-03 (10th Cir. 2007), which reflects
the combined reasoning of two Supreme Court cases: Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951
(2006).
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“With regard to [Mr.] Dale’s qualified immunity argument, material fact issues
also preclude summary judgment. [Mr.] Dale’s argument focuses on the
contention that [Mr.] Phillips cannot, as a matter of law, show that a
constitutional violation occurred. Because the court has concluded that material
fact disputes preclude that finding, [this] alternative argument fails.” Aplt. App.
at 400-01. Mr. Dale then filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the district
court’s denial of his request for qualified immunity.
II. DISCUSSION
“[O]rders denying summary judgment are ordinarily not appealable,” but
we may take “interlocutory jurisdiction over denials of qualified immunity at the
summary judgment stage to the extent that they turn on an issue of law.” Fogarty
v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation and alteration
omitted). We may not take jurisdiction at the interlocutory stage, however, over
appeals that challenge the district court’s factual conclusions. Id. at 1154 (“[W]e
are not at liberty to review a district court’s factual conclusions, such as the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact for a jury to decide, or that a
plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to support a particular factual inference.”).
Mr. Dale argues that the district court erred in denying him qualified
immunity because Mr. Phillips cannot, as a matter of law, show that a
constitutional violation occurred. Specifically, he argues that the district court
did not correctly apply the five-prong Garcetti/Pickering analysis because
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Mr. Phillips’ speech was made in the course of his official duties; Mr. Phillips’
speech did not involve a matter of public concern; and Mr. Phillips’ alleged
comments were not a substantial or motivating factor in Mr. Dale’s decision to
terminate Mr. Phillips.
In response, Mr. Phillips asserts the district court “concluded that a
material factual dispute existed in the instant case, precluding summary judgment
and an exact determination of whether or not Defendant was entitled to qualified
immunity,” Aplee. Br. at 5; and this court “‘lack[s] jurisdiction to review a denial
of summary judgment based on qualified immunity if the claim on appeal is based
on disputed facts,’” id. at 3 (quoting Rosewood Servs. v. Sunflower Diversified
Servs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2005)).
We agree with Mr. Phillips’ assertion that we lack jurisdiction over this
appeal. Although Mr. Dale tries to frame his appeal as a challenge to the district
court’s application of the Garcetti/Pickering analysis, what he is really
challenging is the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the district court’s
analysis. See Aplt. Br. at 21, 24-25, 26-27. Moreover, the district court did not
reach an ultimate legal determination on the question of whether Mr. Phillips’
constitutional rights were violated. Rather, the district court concluded that
disputed issues of fact precluded a legal determination on that question, and that
Mr. Phillips had presented sufficient evidence to reach a jury on his First
Amendment claim. Because of this factual determination, the court further
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concluded that Mr. Dale was not entitled to summary judgment on his qualified
immunity defense. Mr. Dale’s appeal ultimately seeks to challenge the district
court’s factual conclusions, including that there was sufficient evidence for
Mr. Phillips to survive summary judgment; accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to
review his appeal at this interlocutory stage. See Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1154;
Rosewood, 413 F.3d at 1165; Garrett v. Stratman, 254 F.3d 946, 952 (10th Cir.
2001) (“We must scrupulously avoid second-guessing the district court’s
determinations regarding whether [a plaintiff] has presented evidence sufficient to
survive summary judgment.” (quotation omitted)).
III. CONCLUSION
We DISMISS Mr. Dale’s interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction and
REMAND to the district court for further proceedings.
Entered for the Court
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
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