Stine v. Oliver ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      April 5, 2016
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                     Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    _________________________________                 Clerk of Court
    MIKEAL GLENN STINE,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                                      No. 15-1233
    (D.C. No. 1:15-CV-01293-LTB)
    MR. JOHN OLIVER, Warden, ADX;                             (D. Colo.)
    MR. JULIAN, Associate Warden,
    ADX; MR. C. PORRO, Unit Manager,
    ADX; FEDERAL BUREAU OF
    PRISONS, (Agency); JOHN DOE;
    UNKNOWN PERSONS; CLAY COOK,
    Supervising Attorney, ADX,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    _________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    _________________________________
    Before GORSUCH, McKAY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Mr. Mikeal Stine is a federal prisoner subject to filing restrictions in the
    District of Colorado. Notwithstanding these restrictions, he filed a new suit in the
    District of Colorado, claiming that federal officials had failed to provide safe
    *
    Mr. Stine has requested oral argument, but we conclude that oral argument
    would not materially aid our consideration of the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P.
    34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Thus, we have decided the appeal based on the
    briefs.
    Our order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except under
    the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. Fed. R. App.
    P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
    conditions and had disregarded his serious medical needs. Mr. Stine argued that
    he could not comply with the filing restrictions because prison officials had
    destroyed his legal papers. The district court rejected this argument and
    summarily dismissed the action based on a failure to comply with the filing
    restrictions. Mr. Stine appealed 1 and sought relief from the obligation to prepay
    the filing fee. We excuse the prepayment obligation and affirm the dismissal.
    I.    We grant Mr. Stine leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing
    fee.
    Like any appellant, Mr. Stine must pay the filing fee. See Fed. R. App. P.
    3(e). We ordinarily require prepayment, but Mr. Stine claims that he does not
    have enough money to prepay the fee. The filing fee is $505, and he states under
    oath that he has only $7.42 in his prison account. 2 As a result, he seeks leave to
    proceed without prepayment of the filing fee.
    We generally relieve appellants of the prepayment obligation when they are
    unable to make an immediate payment. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (a). But when prisoners
    have had three or more dismissals in civil actions for failure to state a valid claim
    or frivolousness, they must prepay the filing fee unless they show that they are in
    imminent danger of serious physical injury. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (g).
    1
    Mr. Stine also asked the district court to reconsider its dismissal. The court
    declined, but Mr. Stine has not appealed the denial of his request for
    reconsideration.
    2
    Mr. Stine’s balance of $7.42 is encumbered.
    2
    Mr. Stine has had three or more dismissals for failure to state a valid claim
    or frivolousness; thus, he must show that he is in imminent danger of serious
    physical injury. To make this showing, he must present “specific, credible
    allegations of imminent danger of serious physical harm.” Kinnell v. Graves, 
    265 F.3d 1125
    , 1127-28 (10th Cir. 2001).
    Mr. Stine has made this showing. He alleges that
    !      his teeth are infected and abscessed and
    !      authorities are failing to provide dental care.
    He adds that he has obtained prescriptions for Sensodyne and anesthetic oral gel,
    but states that he cannot use his prison account to purchase these items. We
    conclude that these allegations suffice for a showing of an imminent danger of
    serious physical injury. See McAlphin v. Toney, 
    281 F.3d 709
    , 710-11 (8th Cir.
    2002) (stating that the standard under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (g) is satisfied by
    allegations of a spreading mouth infection and a need for two tooth extractions);
    see also Stine v. U.S. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 465 F. App’x 790, 793-95 (10th
    Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (holding that Mr. Stine’s allegations, involving an
    inability to buy medication for a chronic stomach condition, satisfied the standard
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (g)). As a result, we grant leave to proceed without
    prepayment of the filing fee.
    3
    II.   The district court acted within its discretion in ordering dismissal.
    The appeal involves the district court’s order of dismissal based on Mr.
    Stine’s noncompliance with filing restrictions. Under these restrictions, Mr. Stine
    could not sue until he was given leave to proceed. To obtain leave, he had to file
    !      a petition listing each prior lawsuit and stating each lawsuit’s status
    and outcome and
    !      an affidavit verifying that he has not made the same claim in a prior
    lawsuit.
    Mr. Stine filed a petition seeking leave to sue, but the district court found
    that the petition was insufficient. We review that ruling only for an abuse of
    discretion. Gripe v. City of Enid, 
    312 F.3d 1184
    , 1188 (10th Cir. 2002).
    Mr. Stine claims that
    !      the district judge should have recused because he had been named in
    three of Mr. Stine’s earlier lawsuits and
    !      prison rules prevented compliance with the filing restrictions.
    We reject these arguments.
    Judges do not need to recuse simply because they have been sued by one of
    the parties. See United States v. Grismore, 
    564 F.2d 929
    , 933 (10th Cir. 1977)
    (stating that a “judge is not disqualified merely because a litigant sues or
    threatens to sue him”). Thus, we conclude that the district judge did not abuse his
    discretion in declining to recuse.
    4
    We also conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in
    applying the filing restrictions. Mr. Stine challenges the ruling based on a prison
    rule identifying the materials that can be kept in a cell. These materials include
    three cubic feet of “Legal Materials (must be active or prospective case).”
    Appellant’s Opening Br., Attachment at 2. Relying on this limitation, Mr. Stine
    argued he could not provide the required list because he could not keep a history
    of cases over more than 30 years. R. at 4.
    The district court disagreed, reasoning that Mr. Stine had not requested any
    of the documents needed to comply with the filing restrictions. R. at 58. The
    district court’s skepticism ultimately proved correct, for the documents would
    have been available to Mr. Stine had he asked for them. Prison authorities
    ultimately identified five recent cases in the District of Colorado, providing the
    case numbers and pointing out that each case contained a list of all his prior suits.
    R. at 66. In addition, authorities pointed out that in one of these cases, Mr. Stine
    had said his attorney had compiled a list of all Mr. Stine’s prior suits. 
    Id.
    Mr. Stine could have asked for these lists from his attorney or the Court
    Clerk for the District of Colorado. But there is no indication that Mr. Stine ever
    made such a request. As a result, the district court had the discretion to reject Mr.
    Stine’s excuse for failing to comply with the filing restriction.
    5
    III.   Disposition
    We grant leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and affirm
    the dismissal.
    Entered for the Court
    Robert E. Bacharach
    Circuit Judge
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-1233

Judges: Gorsuch, McKay, Bacharach

Filed Date: 4/5/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024